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Modeling Narrowest Grounds 
Maxwell Stearns* 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court’s doctrinal statements governing nonmajority opinions 
demonstrate inconsistencies and confusion belied by the Justices’ behaviors 
modeling the narrowest grounds doctrine. And yet, lower courts are bound by stated 
doctrine, beginning with Marks v. United States, not rules of construction inferred 
from judicial conduct. This Article simplifies the narrowest grounds rule, 
reconciling doctrinal formulations with observed behaviors, avoiding the implicit 
command: “Watch what we do, not what we say.” 
The two most recent cases considering Marks, Ramos v. Louisiana and 
Hughes v. United States, obfuscate three central features: (1) when the doctrine 
does or does not apply; (2) how it applies in proper cases; and (3) the precedential 
status of narrowest grounds opinions in the Supreme Court. Individual Supreme 
Court Justices capture discrete doctrinal elements; none convey a general 
theoretical understanding of the rule’s scope and meaning. In Ramos, the more 
recent of the two cases, six Justices invite lower courts to treat fractured Supreme 
Court cases as overruling past majority opinions. Three Justices convey that a 
single Justice cannot control on narrowest grounds. Two Justices treat narrowest 
grounds opinions as precedent in the Supreme Court. Each proposition is in tension 
with observed behaviors in other cases even in the Ramos term. 
In June Medical Services v. Russo, Chief Justice Roberts alone issued a 
controlling narrowest grounds opinion, with none of the Justices raising a fuss. By 
declining to join Roberts’s opinion, the four liberal Justices ensured a fractured 
ruling, thereby preserving a broader 2016 abortion precedent. In Bostock v. 
Clayton County, the same cohort joined Justice Gorsuch’s strained textualist 
construction of Title VII, forging a majority embracing sexual orientation and 
transgender status within the meaning of sex. These rulings convey that a single 
Justice can control under Marks and that majority opinions hold precedential status 
beyond narrowest grounds decisions in the Supreme Court. 
This Article models narrowest grounds, introducing the essential doctrinal 
element of dimensionality. A simple model, comporting with behavioral modeling 
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by the Justices themselves, reveals that fractured cases with opinions aligned along 
one relevant dimension necessarily yield a narrowest grounds opinion, and 
fractured cases implicating more than one relevant dimension do not. The analysis 
unlocks each of the preceding questions and resolves several additional puzzles. 
Modeling narrowest grounds provides clarity for lawyers, scholars, and jurists, off 
and on the Supreme Court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Under Marks v. United States,1 lower courts are instructed that when the 
Supreme Court decides a case in which no opinion captures a majority of 
votes, the opinion consistent with the judgment that resolves the case on 
narrowest grounds states the holding.2 The Supreme Court’s doctrinal 
statements seeking to clarify the construction of nonmajority opinions 
demonstrate inconsistencies, even confusion.3 By contrast, individual 
Justices exhibit a greater understanding when modeling their behavior in 
Marks’s shadow.4 And yet lower courts are bound by stated doctrine, not 
rules of construction inferred from judicial conduct. This Article simplifies 
the narrowest grounds rule, reconciling doctrinal formulations with observed 
behaviors, thereby avoiding the implicit command: “Watch what we do, not 
what we say.” 
The confusion surrounding Marks was most evident in two recent 
cases.5 The first, Hughes v. United States,6 ultimately avoided applying 
 
 1 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 2 See id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, 
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (expressing the narrowest grounds doctrine)). 
 3 See infra Part I (discussing Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018), and 
Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020)). 
 4 See infra Section II.A (discussing judicial strategies in several high-profile cases, 
including two cases issued in the most recent Supreme Court term: June Medical Services 
L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020), and Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 
(2020)). 
 5 As explained below, June Medical Services further implicated Marks, suggesting 
Justice Thomas was potentially open to Justice Gorsuch’s construction set forth in Ramos, 
which called for disallowing the narrowest grounds rule when the Court splits 4-1-4 and a 
single Justice issues the narrowest grounds opinion. See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2148 
n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 6 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018). The author submitted an amicus brief in Hughes, joined by 
several leading law professors with wide-ranging expertise in Supreme Court doctrines and 
decision-making processes. See Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief and Brief of 
Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (No. 
17-155), 2018 WL 637338 [hereinafter Hughes Amicus Brief]. 
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Marks, and the second, Ramos v. Louisiana,7 makes ongoing challenges 
related to Marks inevitable, emphasizing the need for a broad understanding 
of this important doctrine. Although Hughes was ultimately resolved on 
statutory grounds, the oral argument revealed conflicting claims concerning 
the scope of the narrowest grounds rule.8 Ramos took on Marks directly, 
revealing no fewer than three camps, each taking a different view with none 
commanding a majority, concerning how the narrowest grounds rule applies 
to Apodaca v. Oregon.9 
Justice Alito, dissenting in Ramos, noted that by avoiding the issue, the 
Hughes Court had left Marks intact, at least for now.10 None of the Ramos 
Justices expressed an intent to displace the narrowest grounds rule, 
notwithstanding substantial academic criticism.11 Alito further noted the 
irony that although struggling to construe Marks, the Ramos majority itself 
fractured, producing uncertainty as to the holding under the narrowest 
grounds rule.12 The Ramos majority ultimately abandoned Apodaca, a 
 
 7 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020). 
 8 As one example, Justice Gorsuch, who delivered the Ramos judgment, inquired at 
the Hughes oral argument whether the problem implicated in construing Freeman v. United 
States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011), the fractured case at issue in Hughes, was sufficiently limited 
that resolving that case on separate grounds would avoid future Marks problems. See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (No. 17-155). Justice Ginsburg 
responded that counsel and two unnamed amici briefs, most likely those submitted by 
Professor Richard Re and this author, provide “lots of examples,” implying a broader scope. 
See id. at 49. Justice Breyer best captured Marks’s inevitable limitations, observing that along 
with Justice Powell, who authored the Marks opinion, he likely could not come up with 
something better. See id. at 33. Even so, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined Justice 
Gorsuch’s limiting construction of Marks set out in the Ramos plurality, claiming the doctrine 
does not apply when a single Justice issues a narrowest grounds opinion. See Ramos, 140 S. 
Ct. at 1403–04 (plurality opinion). 
 9 406 U.S. 404 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390. 
 10 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1425–40 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 11 See, e.g., Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942, 1947 
(2019) (advocating absence of precedential value and encouraging compromise rulings based 
on Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)); Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: 
Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 838–39 (2017) 
(proposing “shared agreement” rule through which lower courts would determine whether the 
judgment-supporting rationales in a fractured Supreme Court case produce the same judgment 
as applied to newly presented case facts). This Article’s author has been described as a rare 
Marks apologist. See Joseph M. Cacace, Note, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of 
the United States: A Reexamination of the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 100 (2007). Since then, a group of leading scholars joined his Amicus 
brief supporting the narrowest grounds rule in Hughes. See Hughes Amicus Brief, supra note 
6, at 2. 
 12 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1432 n.17 (Alito, J., dissenting). For an account as to why 
the approaches taken in separate concurrences by Justices Kavanaugh and Sotomayor 
represent the narrowest grounds holding in Ramos, see infra Part II. 
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fractured case permitting nonunanimous state criminal jury verdicts.13 
Ramos specifically split on how Marks applies to Apodaca.14 
Ramos invites a metalevel Marks inquiry: Under Marks, which Ramos 
opinion, if any, expresses the holding as to how Marks properly applies? 
Resolving that convoluted inquiry ultimately proves less important than 
directly tackling three fundamental questions: (1) identifying the category of 
cases in which the Marks doctrine can, and cannot, properly be applied; 
(2) determining how to correctly apply Marks in appropriate cases; and 
(3) determining the precedential effect of narrowest grounds opinions, and 
nonmajority cases more generally, both horizontally, in the Supreme Court, 
and vertically, in lower federal courts and state courts.15 
Supreme Court Justices are not alone in struggling formally to express 
the narrowest ground doctrine. Several lower court opinions have made a 
hash of Marks,16 and thoughtful legal scholars, frustrated by Marks, have not 
made the task easier.17 The Justices exhibit greater clarity by modeling their 
conduct, which, even during the Ramos term, was in tension with how they 
framed the doctrine in their opinions. 
In June Medical Services v. Russo,18 Chief Justice Roberts alone issued 
a controlling narrowest grounds opinion, with none of the Justices raising a 
fuss.19 By declining to join Roberts’s opinion, the four liberal Justices, 
Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, ensured a fractured ruling, 
preventing June Medical Services from displacing Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Hellerstedt,20 a broader 2016 abortion ruling, as precedent on the Court 
 
 13 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1402–04 (plurality opinion). 
 14 See id. 
 15 This Article resolves several puzzles related to these fundamental inquiries. See infra 
Part III (evaluating various doctrinal Marks formulations, issue voting rule and vote 
switching, and whether Marks should be construed as a predictive or bargaining rule). 
 16 See infra Section III.A. 
 17 See, e.g., Re, supra note 11; Williams, supra note 11. 
 18 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020). 
 19 See id. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 20 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
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itself.21 In Bostock v. Clayton County,22 the same cohort joined Justice 
Gorsuch’s narrow textualist construction of Title VII, without so much as a 
simple concurrence.23 Doing so forged a majority opinion embracing sexual 
orientation and transgender status within the meaning of “because of sex.”24 
These rulings imply that, despite contrary assertions in Ramos,25 a single 
Justice can control under Marks, and that majority decisions generally hold 
greater precedential status than narrowest grounds opinions in the Supreme 
Court. 
Properly expressing the narrowest grounds rule poses conceptual 
challenges because it requires a theoretical foundation extending beyond 
Marks. The missing element informing when Marks can and cannot be 
applied, and how it properly applies, is dimensionality.26 
The narrowest grounds rule is no ordinary statement of judicial doctrine. 
The rule did not arise from construing an open-ended constitutional 
provision or from filling an interstitial statutory gap. Instead, the doctrine is 
a necessary, albeit partial, solution to an inevitable problem associated with 
decision making in an en banc court. Rather than expressing a new rule, 
 
 21 Although one might claim no practical difference between a fractured ruling striking 
down the challenged Louisiana abortion statute and a narrowing majority opinion, failing to 
give Roberts’s narrower concurrence in the judgment majority status had the practical effect 
of preserving Whole Woman’s Health. Overturning Whole Woman’s Health would have 
required a majority opinion that engaged in two separate inquiries––one on the decision’s 
precedential status and another on its merits. The fractured ruling in June Medical Services 
produced no majority opinion on either of these necessary inquiries. This generally aligns 
with the modeled behavior of Supreme Court Justices subject to one notable exception. See 
infra Section II.A.2.C (explaining that the narrowest grounds plurality in Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46, 858 (1992) (joint opinion), 
while declining to overturn Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), nonetheless overturned two 
other Supreme Court abortion cases). 
 22 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
 23 In contrast with a concurrence in the judgment, a simple concurrence means the 
author has joined the majority opinion but wishes to provide additional analysis. See BARRY 
FRIEDMAN, MARGARET H. LEMOS, ANDREW D. MARTIN, TOM S. CLARK, ALLISON ORR LARSEN 
& ANNA HARVEY, JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 561–62 (2020) (describing general 
concurrences as those that offer “supplemental analysis or explanation from a judge who 
joined the majority opinion, agreeing not only with the majority’s judgment but also its 
reasoning,” and describing a concurrence in the judgment as one produced by a judge who 
“agree[s] with the majority on the ultimate outcome or judgment but disagree[s] on the 
underlying reasons”). 
 24 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747. 
 25 See infra Section II.A. 
 26 See infra Section II.B; see also Maxwell L. Stearns, Obergefell, Fisher, and the 
Inversion of Tiers, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1043, 1067–92 (2017) (introducing dimensionality 
analysis). 
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Marks recognized an existing judicial norm or practice.27 Although that norm 
fits broadly within the rubric of general federal common law, there are 
sightings in other pyramidal judicial hierarchies. For example, although not 
constitutionally required to do so, several state judicial systems embrace the 
rule in construing their own fractured highest court rulings. In Appendix A, 
this Article provides the first comprehensive state-by-state data set showing 
which states embrace, reject, or have yet to decide whether to apply the 
narrowest grounds rule to their own highest courts.28 
Writing for a unanimous Court on the issue, Justice Powell recognized 
a practice that the Supreme Court and lower federal courts had already 
observed. Construing Memoirs v. Massachusetts,29 Justice Powell chided the 
 
 27 For an example in English practice, see Gold v. Essex CC (1942) 2 KB 293 at 298 
(Eng.) (Lord Greene MR) (“[W]here two members of the court base their judgments, the one 
on a narrow ground . . . and the other on wide propositions . . . , and the third member of the 
court expresses his concurrence in the reasoning of both, I think it right to treat the narrower 
ground as the real ratio decidendi.”). 
 28 See infra Appendix A (listing state-by-state authorities). Appendix A provides 
helpful data related to two separate questions arising from this Article: first, whether 
appointed or elected state judiciaries are more likely to apply the narrowest grounds doctrine 
to their own highest court, and second, whether, more generally, state courts perceive 
institutional benefits in applying the doctrine to their own highest court decisions. 
On the first question, the author’s initial hypothesis was that appointed judiciaries are 
more apt to apply the rule than elected judiciaries. The author reasoned that appointed jurists 
are likely more concerned about ensuring doctrinal consistency and predictability as a means 
of enhancing the prestige of the state judiciary as a whole, whereas elected jurists are likely 
more concerned with being unconstrained in their individual rulings, unless specifically 
bound by state highest court majority opinions. The data, while supportive, are inconclusive. 
Among elected judiciaries, five apply the rule, two do not apply the rule, and fourteen remain 
undecided. Among appointed judiciaries, eight apply the rule, one does not apply the rule, 
and twenty remain undecided. A higher percentage of states with appointed judiciaries than 
states with elected judiciaries apply the narrowest grounds rule to their state highest court 
decisions, 88.8% versus 71.4%, and a slightly higher percentage of states with elected 
judiciaries have resolved the question, 33.3% versus 31%. Among the states making the 
choice, the data are consistent with the hypothesis, but the data are insufficient at this point to 
draw a definitive conclusion.  
On the second, more general question, the author’s hypothesis was that state court 
systems, like the federal judiciary, would find the doctrine helpful in furthering predictability 
and thus the rule of law. This is consistent with viewing the narrowest grounds doctrine at the 
federal level as a feature of general federal common law rather than as one created from whole 
cloth in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), or Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 
n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). With respect to this question, the 
data are more broadly supportive. Among state judiciaries that have decided whether or not 
to apply the narrowest grounds rule to their state highest court decisions, both appointed and 
elected, an overwhelming majority, 81.25%, have chosen to apply it. Although only 32% of 
states thus far have resolved the question, the datum remains consistent with the Article’s 
larger thesis that jurists, either implicitly or explicitly, perceive benefits to applying the 
narrowest grounds rule that seem often to have eluded the rule’s critics. 
 29 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion). 
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for standing alone among lower 
courts in failing to treat the narrowest grounds plurality opinion as 
controlling.30 Justice Powell stated: “When a fragmented Court decides a 
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds . . . .’”31 
This statement of the narrowest grounds rule is in one respect imperfect 
and in another respect incomplete. Although the imperfection is easily 
remedied, even a perfectly expressed narrowest grounds rule cannot be 
successfully applied to all nonmajority opinions. The absence of a theoretical 
grounding concerning Marks has produced confusion in seeking to formalize 
the narrowest grounds rule in published opinions even as the Justices reveal 
a better understanding through their modeled behaviors. 
Remedying Justice Powell’s slight misstatement is easy, but 
inconsequential.32 Identifying the rule’s incompleteness, which implicates 
dimensionality, although critically important, requires a bit more effort.33 
Justice Powell hints at dimensionality, but the intervening decades have not 
produced a firmer theoretical foundation. In some respects, time has eroded 
core intuitions manifested through contemporaneous judicial behaviors in 
the period of Marks itself.34 Providing this theoretical underpinning is 
 
 30 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 31 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) 
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). 
 32 The formally articulated rule fails to recognize that in a 4-1-1 opinion, with 3 in 
dissent, and in which the listed opinions align from broad to narrow, the bolded 1 satisfies the 
stated rule but the italicized 1 expresses the Court’s median position. The case of Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), provides a rare illustration. For an analysis, see infra Section 
II.B.1.a. For data on how lower courts have treated Fullilove under the narrowest grounds 
rule, see infra Appendix B. The data support the intuition that lower courts generally infer 
that the narrowest grounds rule is intended to capture the median position in a nonmajority 
Supreme Court case resting along a single dimension, even if the case also includes a narrower 
concurrence in the judgment. Of twenty-four lower court opinions interpreting Fullilove, 
twenty-one sought to identify one or more opinions as controlling. Of that subset of twenty-
one, nine identified the Burger opinion as controlling, five sought to reconcile Burger’s 
opinion with Justice Powell’s, and five sought to reconcile Burger’s opinion with both Justice 
Powell’s and Justice Marshall’s. Only two lower court opinions out of those twenty-one 
treated Justice Powell’s opinion as controlling. 
 33 The Marks doctrine’s incompleteness relates to Arrow’s Incompleteness Theorem, 
although understanding the theorem is not necessary to grasping the doctrinal incompleteness. 
For a general exposition relating Arrow’s Theorem to Supreme Court decision making, see 
MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME 
COURT DECISION MAKING 41–97 (2002). 
 34 See infra Section II.B (discussing related cases). 
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essential to unpacking ongoing judicial and scholarly confusion and to 
reconciling how Marks is articulated on one side and modeled on the other. 
The confusion respecting Marks primarily arises from failing to identify 
and distinguish structural characteristics of cases in which the narrowest 
grounds rule can, and cannot, properly be applied. The central characteristic 
is dimensionality. Dimensions are scales or measures along which virtually 
anything can meaningfully be expressed and compared.35 Some comparisons 
can be assessed along a single dimension—large to small, tall to short, heavy 
to light, or broad to narrow. Other comparisons require more than one 
dimension. When assessing multiple means of transportation—a bicycle, car, 
and train—both size and weight positively correlate, with smaller modes of 
transportation weighing less and larger ones weighing more. Now add an 
aloft hot air balloon, larger than a car, yet lighter than a bicycle, or air itself, 
thus thwarting the prior assumption positively correlating size and weight. 
Adding the balloon requires that each dimension—size and weight—be 
separately assessed. Supreme Court cases likewise occasionally force more 
than one dimension. Relating Marks to dimensionality is essential in 
determining the rule’s proper scope. 
The underlying difficulty in ascertaining when and how Marks applies 
involves failing to distinguish two sets of nonmajority opinions. In the first 
set, when opinions implicate one relevant dimension, the narrowest grounds 
rule applies in a straightforward manner.36 In the second set, when opinions 
implicate more than one relevant dimension,37 the doctrine cannot be applied 
because the rule’s underlying premise fails to hold. Failing to appreciate how 
Marks implicates dimensionality has invited creative judicial framings, or 
metaphors, designed to determine the rule’s scope. These include: (1) least 
impact analysis; (2) lowest common denominator; (3) logical subset 
analysis; and, yes, even (4) Matryoshka, or Russian nested, dolls.38 Such 
 
 35 For a more detailed discussion and analysis of dimensionality and relating the 
concept to tiers of scrutiny, see Stearns, supra note 26. 
 36 Although identifying the narrowest grounds opinion in single dimension cases is 
straightforward, construing such opinions can be challenging for various reasons, including 
assessing holding and dictum, as also occurs with majority opinions. See infra Section III.A. 
 37 As explained infra Section II.A., for purposes of Marks, a dimension is not relevant 
if it results from an opinion that can be excluded, with the remaining opinions, including a 
group that forms a majority on the judgment, aligning on a single dimension. More simply, a 
dimension is irrelevant if the Justice forcing it is unnecessary to a majority on the judgment. 
 38 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit employed a ranking-over-opinions 
analysis closely corresponding with this Article’s dimensionality analysis and the concept of 
a Condorcet winner. See United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 
2006) (per curiam) (“When a majority of the Supreme Court agrees only on the outcome of a 
case and not on the ground for that outcome, lower-court judges are to follow the narrowest 
ground to which a majority of the Justices would have assented if forced to choose.”). 
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creativity should not obscure the inherent limitations of metaphors in place 
of essential analytical tools. With the proper toolkit these devices prove 
unnecessary, collapsing into a singular, comprehensive inquiry.39 
Understanding the role of dimensionality in applying the narrowest 
grounds rule makes applications both in Apodaca and Ramos 
straightforward. The analysis refutes Justice Alito’s implicit claim that, as 
applied to Ramos, the rule is uncertain;40 Justice Kavanaugh’s claim that, as 
applied to Apodaca, it is difficult;41 or Justice Gorsuch’s more extreme claim 
that as applied to Apodaca, it is impossible.42 Dimensionality distinguishes 
when the narrowest grounds rule can and cannot be applied, avoiding judicial 
and scholarly confusion in claiming a general inability to apply Marks even 
in such straightforward cases. With one dimension, despite fractured 
majorities, there is inevitably and inexorably a narrowest grounds opinion.43 
With equal certainty, in cases implicating more than one relevant dimension, 
there is not. 
Ascertaining when fractured cases implicate single or multiple 
dimensions requires nuance and skill. That is generally true when construing 
complex Supreme Court opinions and more so when reading several 
opinions to determine which, if any, controls. The task becomes simpler with 
the necessary tools. This Article provides those tools, offering a 
comprehensive exposition of the narrowest grounds rule that reconciles the 
behavior of Supreme Court Justices operating in Marks’s shadow.44 
Applying the narrowest grounds rule to Apodaca and Ramos becomes 
intuitive once we recognize that Marks rests on a singular premise: the 
narrowest grounds doctrine applies when fractured Supreme Court cases 
implicate a single relevant dimension. The initial task when confronting a 
fractured case is determining whether that premise is, or is not, met. As 
demonstrated in Appendix A, a majority of state judiciaries that have 
considered the question also employ the narrowest grounds rule for their own 
 
 39 See infra Section III.A. 
 40 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1432 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“With 
no apparent appreciation of the irony, today’s majority, which is divided into four separate 
camps, criticizes the Apodaca majority as ‘badly fractured.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 41 See id. at 1416–17 & n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). 
 42 See id. at 1403–04 (plurality opinion); id. at 1432 n.17 (Alito, J. dissenting). 
 43 As used here, separate opinions imply at least one concurrence in the judgment that 
avoids a majority expressing the holding. For an analysis of the potential implications under 
Marks when a Justice joining a majority opinion also writes a narrowing simple concurrence, 
see infra Part III. 
 44 See infra Part II. This alternative statement of the narrowest grounds rule is a 
modification of the version proffered in the author’s amicus brief. See Hughes Amicus Brief, 
supra note 6, at 25–26. 
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state highest court nonmajority rulings.45 As a result, the guidance offered 
here equally applies in state judicial contexts. 
Although this Article is about the narrowest grounds rule, its 
implications are broad, affecting salient doctrines including affirmative 
action, the individual mandate, abortion, and more. This Article resolves 
several specific questions implicated in Ramos, along with additional open 
questions concerning the narrowest grounds rule.46 Modeling narrowest 
grounds promises clarity for lawyers, scholars, and jurists, off and on the 
Supreme Court. 
Part I reviews two cases implicating both the incorporation doctrine and 
the narrowest grounds rule: Ramos, resting on a single relevant dimension, 
and McDonald v. City of Chicago,47 resting on two relevant dimensions. The 
analysis demonstrates the importance of dimensionality in applying the 
narrowest grounds rule and exposes problematic understandings expressed 
in the separate Ramos opinions. Part II contrasts the formal articulation of 
the narrowest grounds rule with judicial behaviors modeling narrowest 
grounds. This Part provides a theoretical account of Marks grounded in 
dimensionality, integrating stated doctrine with observed judicial behaviors. 
This Part also provides a comprehensive statement of the narrowest grounds 
rule that reconciles stated doctrine with observed judicial behaviors. Part III 
considers several remaining puzzles associated with Marks, including 
assessing lower court doctrinal framings, issue voting and vote switching, 
and whether to treat the narrowest grounds rule as predictive or a bargaining 
rule.  
 
 45 See infra Appendix A (collecting state-by-state data); supra note 28 (reviewing data 
to test two hypotheses: first, whether appointed or elected state judiciaries are apt to apply the 
narrowest grounds rule to state highest court decisions, and, second, whether state courts more 
generally apply the narrowest grounds rule in that context). 
 46 See infra Part III. 
 47 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
112 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [89:101 
I. Incorporating Dimensionality, and Justice Thomas’s “One Less 
Traveled By” 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I— 
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference. 
––Robert Frost48 
This Part focuses on two cases, Ramos and McDonald. Each case 
resolved an important question arising under the incorporation doctrine.49 
Through that doctrine, the Supreme Court applies specified provisions of the 
Bill of Rights, which otherwise apply only to the federal government, to 
states and localities.50 Although the incorporation controversy, as it was 
sometimes called, dates back to the Black-Frankfurter debates, even today 
open questions remain.51 
Ramos held that states must require unanimous jury verdicts to support 
criminal convictions,52 abandoning the rule of Apodaca.53 McDonald held 
that states and municipalities are subject to Second Amendment protections 
announced in District of Columbia v. Heller.54 The Ramos and McDonald 
Courts fractured, preventing a majority opinion in each case from expressing 
the Court’s holding. These cases implicate both incorporation and Marks. 
In both Ramos and McDonald, Justice Thomas played a unique role, 
albeit with different consequences. Thomas disagreed in each case with the 
eight remaining Justices as to the textual hook upon which to hang the 
incorporation doctrine, even as he helped form a majority respecting the 
judgment that the claimed rights warranted incorporation.55 Despite his 
concurring in the judgment in each case, the implications of Thomas’s 
 
 48 ROBERT FROST, THE ROAD NOT TAKEN (1916), reprinted in 2 THE NORTON 
ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 1099 (Nina Baym et al. eds., 3d ed. 1989). 
 49 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020) (incorporating the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury unanimity requirement); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (incorporating the 
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms). 
 50 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397 (“[I]ncorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights bear 
the same content when asserted against States as they do when asserted against the federal 
government.”). 
 51 See WALLACE MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE 
COURT (2d ed. 1966); Sylvia Snowiss, The Legacy of Justice Black, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 187, 
206; Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 
U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 548–49 (1997). 
 52 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397. 
 53 See id. at 1404 (plurality opinion). 
 54 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 55 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1420–21 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 805–06 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
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approach differed significantly across these cases under the narrowest 
grounds rule. 
As shown below, the Ramos opinions implicate a single relevant 
dimension, and the two additional concurrences in the judgment by Justices 
Sotomayor and Kavanaugh express the Ramos Court’s holding on narrowest 
grounds.56 These opinions establish that although Justice Powell’s Apodaca 
concurrence stated the narrowest grounds holding under Marks, and has the 
status of precedent, Apodaca is overruled.57 Although Justice Thomas 
resolved Ramos on alternative grounds, thus implicating a second dimension, 
that added dimension proved irrelevant to the judgment and to the 
application of Marks. Excluding Thomas, the four remaining opinions, 
capturing eight Justices, align along a single dimension, and five of those 
eight Justices resolved the case in the same manner, favoring incorporation.58 
Three of those five, joining Gorsuch’s plurality opinion, did so on broader 
grounds than the two narrower controlling concurrences in the judgment 
issued by Justices Kavanaugh and Sotomayor. 
In contrast with Ramos, where Thomas provided an optional sixth vote 
supporting the judgment, his vote in McDonald was the decisive fifth on the 
nine-member Court. Consequently, Justice Thomas’s added dimension 
mattered in McDonald, undermining the narrowest grounds rule.59 The 
added dimension is analogous to adding an aloft hot air balloon when ranking 
modes of transportation otherwise aligning on a single dimension capturing 
both size and weight. The resulting McDonald opinions likewise could not 
be captured from broad to narrow, thus preventing the application of Marks 
to McDonald. 
The lesson is clear: in Supreme Court decision making, taking the “one 
less traveled by” makes “all the difference” only when doing so disallows a 
majority of five to reach a common destination. 
A complete analysis extends beyond counting votes.60 The question, for 
purposes of the narrowest grounds rule, is precisely when to count which 
 
 56 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1408–10 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–
A); id. at 1410–20 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (joining Justice Gorsuch’s opinion as 
to Parts I, II–A, III, and IV–B–1). Although identified as partial concurrences, each opinion 
operates as a concurrence in the judgment given that Justice Gorsuch writes Part IV–A for a 
plurality. 
 57 Although this is the Ramos holding, it rests upon a mistaken premise that narrowest 
grounds opinions are binding precedent in the Supreme Court. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 58 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397 (majority opinion); id. at 1432 n.17 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
 59 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 60 See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The 
Political Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849 (2001) (demonstrating that a 
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votes. In Ramos, the Gorsuch plurality and the Kavanaugh concurrence in 
the judgment claimed that applying the narrowest grounds rule in Apodaca, 
permitting nonunanimous state criminal jury verdicts, was challenging, even 
impossible. These claims are mistaken. Marks applies straightforwardly in 
both Ramos and Apodaca, distinguishing those cases from McDonald. 
After a brief introduction to the Incorporation Controversy, this Part 
reviews the separate Ramos and McDonald opinions. The analysis 
demonstrates how, despite Thomas’s common role in each case, he thwarted 
the narrowest grounds rule only in McDonald. 
A. Incorporation in Context 
The Bill of Rights was, in an important respect, part of the Constitutional 
Convention’s unfinished business.61 Specifically, the Bill of Rights stands as 
a rejection of the view, most prominently associated with Alexander 
Hamilton, that listing rights risked implying general federal regulatory 
powers extending beyond those expressly, or impliedly, delegated.62 
As early as Barron v. Baltimore,63 the Supreme Court made plain that 
the listed Bill of Rights protections applied only against federal regulatory 
powers, not those of states or localities.64 States, by contrast, held plenary 
regulatory powers, also called police powers, for which the most vital checks 
in late-eighteenth century jurisprudence were limited to the political realm. 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Reconstruction Amendments 
recognized a shift in the presumption that states remained primary protectors 
of individual liberties, with federal courts more generally limited to checking 
against federal regulatory excesses in light of the latter’s limited delegated 
functions.65 The radical constitutional transformation following the Civil 
War included embedding within section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
three substantive guarantees: protecting persons against state deprivations of 
due process; equal protection; and, by virtue of national citizenship, state 
 
variation on Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam), risked operating in two 
dimensions). 
 61 The compromise of approving for ratification and leaving the Bill of Rights as part 
of the First Congress’s initial business is well documented. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, James 
Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 301–02. Other 
unfinished work includes the obvious compromise disallowing challenges to chattel slavery 
for a full twenty years and otherwise recognizing the institution of slavery, albeit without 
mentioning it by name, through the three-fifths and rendition clauses. See, e.g., DANIEL 
FARBER & NEIL S. SIEGEL, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 279–346 (2019). 
 62 See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513–14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 63 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
 64 See id. at 247–50. 
 65 See FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 61, at 231–54. 
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infringements against privileges or immunities.66 The specific scope of each 
clause was subject to future clarification—politically, pursuant to section 5, 
which provided for congressional enforcement authority,67 and judicially, 
through substantive constructions of the relevant section 1 clauses. 
One overriding question involved whether the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause68 would ensure that following the Thirteenth Amendment, which had 
formally ended slavery, states were required to provide former slaves the 
same protections in the marketplace, voting, travel, and other domains as 
were provided to whites by virtue of freedmen’s new status as U.S. citizens.69 
A few additional observations will help before presenting Ramos and 
McDonald. In the Slaughter-House Cases,70 the Supreme Court so narrowed 
the reach of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that jurists and legal 
scholars customarily declare the clause a virtual nullity.71 The Slaughter-
House Cases held that the Clause did not protect against the invasion of 
rights originating from states, rendering protection against a slaughter-house 
monopoly beyond the Clause’s reach.72 
The Slaughter-House Cases holds a special place in constitutional 
jurisprudence. Writing in dissent, Justices Field, Bradley, and Swayne 
derided Justice Miller’s analysis in part for having the curious effect of 
rendering an operative provision in a recently enacted amendment a dead 
letter.73 All rights claiming their origin in the Constitution or federal law 
were independently protected against state or local encroachment by virtue 
of the Supremacy Clause in Article VI.74 Such rights did not include 
protection against a state-conferred monopoly. The Supreme Court has 
 
 66 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 67 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 68 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 69 See FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 61, at 231–54, 427–54. In overruling Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (enslaved party), the first sentence of section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment ensured state and federal citizenship to freedmen. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, 
§ 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”). 
 70 See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 71 See FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 61, at 231–54, 347–76. This is slightly overstated 
as indicated by Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), which relied on privileges or immunities 
to protect the right to travel, id. at 501–04, and by McDonald itself, which depended for its 
judgment on one Justice invoking the Privileges or Immunities Clause, see McDonald v. City 
of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 806 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). For a more detailed discussion of McDonald, see infra Section I.C. 
 72 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78. 
 73 See id. at 83–111 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 111–24 (Bradley, J., dissenting); id. at 
124–30 (Swayne, J., dissenting). 
 74 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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certainly issued its fair share of erroneous opinions,75 and that alone would 
not give the Slaughter-House Cases special status. What makes the case 
special is that although the case is widely regarded as mistaken, so few seek 
to discard it. 
Save a singular member—Clarence Thomas—the Supreme Court has 
been consistently unwilling to revisit the Slaughter-House Cases. Justice 
Hugo Black, often regarded as the Supreme Court’s strongest advocate of 
incorporation,76 originally sought to deploy the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause in a manner that would revive it, arguably without undoing Justice 
Miller’s slaughtering. Although Miller made plain that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause protected only federal rights,77 Black claimed the 
substantive protections the Clause embraced were fully captured in the Bill 
of Rights, thereby applying those nationally derived rights to the states.78 
Justice Black famously debated Justice Frankfurter, who rejected the 
idea that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states, 
and further rejected the notion that the substantive protections in the Bill of 
Rights constituted a listing of privileges or immunities.79 Over several 
intervening decades, the incorporation debate shifted its focus to the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. This created its own problems, 
including the anomaly that two clauses with nearly identical wording, as set 
out in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, expressed entirely different 
meanings.80 In addition, as Justice Thomas has observed, it is arguably 
anomalous to rely upon a Clause that speaks to due process as a font of 
substantive rights.81 
 
 75 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011) 
(including within the anticanon of constitutional jurisprudence Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 
(19 How.) 393 (1857) (enslaved party), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by Ferguson 
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), 
abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)). 
 76 See Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Justice Black, the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
Incorporation, 30 U. MIA. L. REV. 231, 238–40 (1976). 
 77 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78–79. 
 78 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74–75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 79 See Yarbrough, supra note 76, at 231, 239; Richard Boldt & Dan Friedman, 
Constitutional Incorporation: A Consideration of the Judicial Function in State and Federal 
Constitutional Interpretation, 76 MD. L. REV. 309, 319–20, 328–31, 358 (2017); see also 
Hugo L. Black, In Memoriam, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1965) (noting 
his disagreements with Justice Frankfurter). 
 80 See Yarbrough, supra note 76, at 234–35. 
 81 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The notion that a constitutional provision 
that guarantees only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could 
define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of words.”). 
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As Ramos and McDonald demonstrate, longstanding debates 
concerning the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the scope 
of the Due Process Clause continue even today. As these cases further 
demonstrate, so too does the commitment among members of the present 
Supreme Court, except Justice Thomas, to retaining the Slaughter-House 
Cases as precedent despite ongoing doubts concerning its original merits. 
B. Ramos v. Louisiana 
Ramos v. Louisiana invites a meta-analysis of Marks. The case produced 
a total of four opinions consistent with the outcome in the case, either 
displacing or overturning Apodaca v. Oregon.82 Apodaca had permitted 
convictions in state criminal trials based on nonunanimous jury verdicts.83 
The Ramos judgment demanded incorporating the full scope of the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury, including unanimity, for state criminal 
trials.84 Three Justices dissented, without claiming Apodaca was rightly 
decided, but concluding it should not be overturned.85 
The Ramos lineup thwarted conventional ideological suppositions. 
Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion in part for a majority and in part for a 
plurality of three.86 The majority opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kavanaugh, with the latter two splitting off most 
notably from Part IV–A.87 That part assessed the implications both of the 
narrowest grounds rule and of stare decisis in construing Apodaca.88 Justices 
Sotomayor and Kavanaugh each also separately concurred in the judgment, 
and Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment without joining any part of 
the Gorsuch opinion.89 Justice Alito’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Kagan.90 Each camp—the plurality, concurrences in the 
 
 82 One disagreement between the plurality and concurrences in the judgment concerned 
whether Apodaca is not precedent, and thus simply requires displacement, or is precedent, 
requiring overruling. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1402–04 (2020) (plurality 
opinion) (Part IV–A); id. at 1408–10 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A); id. 
at 1410–20 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). 
 83 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 405–06 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. 
Ct. 1390. 
 84 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1402–04 (plurality opinion). 
 85 See id. at 1425–40 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 86 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1393. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 1402–04 (plurality opinion). 
 89 See id. at 1408 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A); id. at 1410 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part); id. at 1420–21 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); 
id. at 1432 n.17 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 90 Id. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
118 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [89:101 
judgment, and dissent—had members associated with the Supreme Court’s 
liberal and conservative wings.91 
Discerning the Ramos holding under Marks requires assessing how the 
various camps assess Apodaca under Marks. That task demands careful 
reading across opinions, including drawing the most plausible inferences 
when confronting inevitably incomplete text. Although this process risks 
implying speculation, as demonstrated below, a careful analysis cabins, 
rather than expands, speculative inferences.92 The soundness of inferential 
reasoning when construing fractured opinions is a function of having 
identified the most plausible dimension or dimensions along which relevant 
opinions are expressed. 
We begin with Apodaca, which, along with its companion case, Johnson 
v. Louisiana,93 revealed several voting blocs. The Ramos Court assessed the 
Apodaca opinions to resolve three questions: (1) does Marks apply to 
Apodaca?; (2) if so, which opinion controls on narrowest grounds?; and 
(3) assuming Marks applies and yields a controlling opinion, what is 
Apodaca’s precedential status in the Supreme Court?94 Although together 
Apodaca and Johnson produced several opinions, as suggested by Justice 
Gorsuch, we can simplify them into three blocs. 
Writing for a plurality of four in Apodaca, Justice White applied a 
functionalist analysis of the jury right.95 White argued that the historical 
justification for interposing the jury as a filter between a potentially 
overreaching prosecutor and criminal defendant is not meaningfully 
undermined by supermajority verdicts of ten-to-two or eleven-to-one as 
opposed to unanimous verdicts of twelve.96 White balanced the claimed 
benefit of unanimity against the risk of hung juries, which sometimes 
produce problematic dismissals and other times result in costly retrials.97 The 
plurality sustained the nonunanimous jury verdicts, implying that 
nonunanimity is permissible under the Sixth Amendment based on 
functional considerations.98 
 
 91 The three three-member camps, with bold representing Justices generally regarded 
as conservative and italics representing Justices generally regarded as liberal, are as follows: 
plurality (Gorsuch, Ginsburg, Breyer); concurrences in the judgment (Thomas, Kavanaugh, 
Sotomayor); dissent (Roberts, Alito, Kagan). 
 92 See infra Part II. 
 93 406 U.S. 356 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390. 
 94 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1403–04 (plurality opinion). 
 95 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 
1390. 
 96 See id. at 407–10. 
 97 See id. at 410–11. 
 98 See id. at 407–14. 
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Justice Stewart’s Apodaca dissent, for three, is sufficiently brief that the 
relevant part warrants quoting in full: 
In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court squarely held that the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury in a federal criminal case is made 
wholly applicable to state criminal trials by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Unless Duncan is to be overruled, therefore, the only 
relevant question here is whether the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee 
of trial by jury embraces a guarantee that the verdict of the jury 
must be unanimous. The answer to that question is clearly “yes,” as 
my Brother Powell has cogently demonstrated in that part of his 
concurring opinion that reviews almost a century of Sixth 
Amendment adjudication.99 
Because they construed the Sixth Amendment unanimity requirement 
both legally sound and as subject to incorporation based on Duncan v. 
Louisiana,100 the four dissenters voted to overturn the nonunanimous 
conviction.101 
As Justice Marshall observed in dissent, Justice Powell, concurring in 
the judgment and providing the fifth vote to sustain the conviction, reviewed 
the detailed history of the requirement of jury unanimity.102 Powell 
determined that the Sixth Amendment was intended to embrace unanimity, 
but then set out his theory, now known as dual track incorporation.103 That 
theory held that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, through 
which substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights applied to the states, did 
not demand incorporation jot for jot.104 As Justice Gorsuch noted in Ramos, 
 
 99 Id. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 100 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 101 See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414–15 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In addition to Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, who joined Stewart’s dissent, and who wrote separate dissents, Justice 
Douglas also produced a dissenting opinion, and all of the opinions also accompanied 
Apodaca’s companion case Johnson. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 395 (1972) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 399 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 380 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
 102 See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 103 See id. at 372–73 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 104 Powell stated: 
I am not in accord with a major premise upon which that judgment is based. Its 
premise is that the concept of jury trial, as applicable to the States under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, must be identical in every detail to the concept required in 
federal courts by the Sixth Amendment. I do not think that all of the elements of jury 
trial within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment are necessarily embodied in or 
incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. at 369 (footnote omitted). 
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“Justice Powell acknowledged that his argument for dual-track incorporation 
arrived ‘late in the day.’”105 
Until Ramos, and thus for fifty years, Justice Powell’s Apodaca 
concurrence in the judgment was almost invariably deemed controlling on 
the narrowest grounds. That opinion intuitively occupied a middle ground 
between relaxing the jury unanimity requirement in federal and state criminal 
trials, embraced by Justice White for a plurality of four, and insisting upon 
jury unanimity in both federal and state criminal trials, embraced by Justice 
Stewart and three others in dissent. The preceding analysis is depicted 
visually in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. APODACA V. OREGON IN ONE DIMENSION 
Justice White (for 4) Justice Powell Justices Stewart (for 3) and Douglas (dissenting) 
Unanimity not required 
under Sixth Amendment 
Unanimity required under 
Sixth Amendment for 
federal cases, but not for 
state cases 
Unanimity required under 
Sixth Amendment, with 
jot-for-jot incorporation 
Lax Jury Trial Right  Strict Jury Trial Right 
 
As Table 1 shows, of the two opinions consistent with the judgment 
sustaining the petitioners’ nonunanimous jury verdicts in Apodaca, Justice 
Powell’s dual-track incorporation is narrower. Applying one common 
methodology to Marks, of the two opinions consistent with the judgment, 
Powell’s has the “least impact” in terms of sustaining nonunanimous jury 
convictions. Whereas the plurality would allow nonunanimous verdicts in 
both federal and state criminal trials, Powell would cabin nonunanimous 
verdicts to state criminal trials. By contrast, the dissent would disallow them 
in both federal and state criminal trials and thus would overturn the 
petitioners’ convictions in Apodaca along with others resting on less-than-
unanimous jury verdicts. 
Writing for the plurality of three in Ramos, Justice Gorsuch rejected the 
preceding analysis. Gorsuch claimed that no opinion expressed the Apodaca 
holding on narrowest grounds.106 Justice Alito rejoined that this striking 
claim defies a half century of jurisprudence construing the Powell opinion as 
 
 105 Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1398 (2020) (quoting Johnson, 406 U.S. at 375 
(Powell, J., concurring) (“Although it is perhaps late in the day for an expression of my 
views . . . .”)). 
 106 See id. at 1403 (plurality opinion). 
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expressing the Apodaca holding.107 Alito’s account—along with that of 
Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh, who likewise regarded Powell’s opinion 
as controlling—is consistent with the preceding analysis. Despite Gorsuch’s 
analysis, a majority of the Ramos Court regarded Powell’s Apodaca opinion 
as controlling under Marks, even as a separate majority elected to supersede 
Apodaca in favor of the views of Justice Stewart’s dissent requiring 
unanimity in both federal and state criminal trials.108 
The Ramos opinions prove somewhat more challenging to align than 
those in Apodaca, largely as a consequence of Justice Thomas’s outlier view 
of incorporation. Unlike the remainder of the Ramos Court, Thomas claimed 
the Slaughter-House Cases erred not only in failing to afford meaningful 
content to the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause but 
also in failing to recognize that Clause as the doctrinal source for 
incorporating the substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights and applying 
them to the states.109 Because Thomas agreed that incorporation—albeit 
under a different Clause—is jot for jot, he helped form the majority on the 
judgment overturning Mr. Ramos’s nonunanimous jury conviction. 
Thomas’s analysis is orthogonal to that of the Court’s remaining members. 
Identifying the narrowest grounds opinion in Ramos requires determining 
whether Thomas’s alternative analysis prevents aligning the remaining 
opinions—capturing eight Justices—along a single dimension. The analysis 
to follow demonstrates that while Thomas’s analysis does not undermine 
applying Marks to Ramos, it does undermine applying Marks to McDonald 
v. City of Chicago. 
The Ramos opinions comprise four camps. Justice Gorsuch wrote in part 
for a majority of five, including Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kavanaugh, and in part for a plurality of three, joined only by Breyer and 
Ginsburg.110 Part IV–A, for a plurality, assessed the implications of the 
narrowest grounds rule in construing Apodaca and in considering that case’s 
precedential status.111 Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh produced 
individual concurrences in the judgment, most notably parting company 
respecting Part IV–A.112 Despite their differing approaches, Sotomayor and 
 
 107 See id. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 108 See id. at 1403–04 (plurality opinion). 
 109 See id. at 1424 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 110 See id. at 1393 (majority opinion). 
 111 See id. at 1402–04 (plurality opinion). Justice Sotomayor joined Part IV–B of the 
Gorsuch opinion, which determined that reliance interests did not warrant failing to abandon 
the Apodaca judgment. See id. at 1404–07 (majority opinion); id. at 1407–08 (plurality 
opinion); id. at 1408–10 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A). 
 112 See id. at 1408 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A); id. at 1410 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). 
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Kavanaugh each implicitly agreed on the implications of Marks for Apodaca 
and on Apodaca’s precedential status. By contrast, Justice Thomas, who also 
concurred in the judgment, took an altogether different view of incorporation 
from the Court’s remaining eight members.113 Finally, Justice Alito 
produced a dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan.114 
The Ramos Court fractured on how to apply Marks to Apodaca and on 
identifying the textual foundation for incorporation. Although the latter split 
implicated two nominal dimensions, the resulting opinions can be cast along 
one relevant dimension, with Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh expressing 
the Ramos holding on narrowest grounds. To be clear, expressing the 
narrowest grounds holding is separate from the underlying merits. The 
analysis that follows reveals that although not entirely without precedent,115 
the controlling opinions misconstrue an important feature associated with a 
proper construction of the narrowest grounds rule. 
1. Hughes, Freeman, & Shifting Views on Narrowest Grounds 
The positions the Ramos Justices embraced concerning Marks have 
shifted over time. Before Ramos, the Supreme Court had last squarely 
addressed Marks in Hughes v. United States.116 The Hughes Court 
confronted lower court disagreements in construing Freeman v. United 
States.117 Freeman and Hughes presented questions of statutory 
interpretation involving when an offender who pled guilty in a Type C plea—
involving an agreed-upon sentencing recommendation—could petition for 
sentencing reconsideration following a statutory diminution in sentencing 
for a relevant part of the offending activity. Hughes implicated Marks 
because the Freeman Court fractured into three relevant camps. 
Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality of four in Freeman, presumed 
that because plea bargains were informed by the sentencing guidelines, they 
were generally based on the guidelines for purposes of permissible 
sentencing reconsideration, rendering Mr. Freeman eligible.118 In his dissent, 
Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that, in general, sentencing pursuant to a plea 
agreement is based not on the guidelines, but on the plea, thus making 
 
 113 See id. at 1420–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 114 See id. at 1425–40 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan declined to join Part III–D of 
Justice Alito’s dissent. Id. at 1425.  
 115 See infra Section II.A.2.c (discussing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46, 858 (1992) (joint opinion)).  
 116 See 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018). 
 117 564 U.S. 522 (2011). 
 118 See id. at 534 (plurality opinion). 
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Freeman ineligible.119 Justice Sotomayor, who had been a prosecutor,120 
concurred in the judgment, reasoning that, in general, sentencing pursuant to 
a plea agreement is based on the plea agreement not the guidelines, but also 
identifying specific circumstances in which the agreement itself provided 
objective evidence that it was based on the guidelines.121 This included 
wording referring to or incorporating the sentencing guidelines. As applied 
to petitioner Freeman, her conditions were met, rendering him eligible.122 
Most lower federal courts addressing the question determined that 
Sotomayor’s Freeman concurrence in the judgment controlled on narrowest 
grounds.123 Her approach, identifying specific conditions for when pleas 
were eligible, intuitively fell between presuming that virtually all pleas were 
eligible (Kennedy) and presuming that virtually none were eligible 
(Roberts).  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit likewise identified 
Sotomayor’s opinion as controlling in Hughes. In doing so, it denied relief 
to Hughes, whose plea agreement, it determined, failed to satisfy her 
specified eligibility requirements.124 Applying Sotomayor’s analysis, the 
court determined that Hughes’s case differed from Freeman’s in two 
respects.125 First, Hughes’s recommended sentence fell below the low end of 
the guidelines’ sentencing range.126 Second, the sentencing recommendation 
did not incorporate any of the criteria that Sotomayor had identified in her 
Freeman concurrence to refute the claim that the sentence was based on the 
plea, not the guidelines.127 By contrast, under Kennedy’s approach, the 
guidelines are presumed to have influenced Hughes’s sentence, and thus to 
have provided the requisite statutory basis for resentencing. Whereas 
Kennedy would find Freeman and Hughes eligible for sentencing 
reconsideration, and Roberts would find neither eligible, Sotomayor would 
find Freeman eligible, but Hughes ineligible. Hughes appealed, claiming that 
the Eleventh Circuit had wrongly applied Marks to Freeman and further 
 
 119 See id. at 544–51 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 120 Benjamin Weiser & William K. Rashbaum, Sotomayor Is Recalled as a Driven 
Rookie Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2009, at A13. 
 121 See Freeman, 564 U.S. at 534–44 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment). 
 122 See id. at 535–36. 
 123 See Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771 (2018). 
 124 See id. at 1774. 
 125 United States v. Hughes, 849 F.3d 1008, 1015–16 (11th Cir. 2017), rev’d and 
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1765. 
 126 See id. 
 127 See id. 
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claiming that Marks should not be relied upon as a rule of construction in 
fractured cases.128 
As Justice Alito observed in his Ramos dissent, Hughes was resolved on 
separate statutory grounds,129 thereby leaving the narrowest grounds rule 
intact, at least for now. Rather than have the Hughes Court resolve whether 
her Freeman opinion controlled under Marks, Justice Sotomayor joined a 
majority embracing Justice Kennedy’s broader basis for presuming 
eligibility for sentencing relief.130 She explained in a separate concurrence 
that although she continued to embrace the merits of the view she expressed 
in her Freeman concurrence in the judgment, her opinion had fractured the 
Court and, in doing so, compromised guidance to lower courts on an 
important issue of criminal sentencing.131 
During the Hughes oral argument, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg 
expressed an understanding of Marks in some tension with their later 
decision to join Justice Gorsuch’s Ramos opinion, including the part 
comprising a plurality of three. In the Hughes oral argument, Justice Gorsuch 
raised the possibility that the problems in construing Freeman under Marks 
were sufficiently uncommon that resolving Hughes on alternative grounds 
might avoid future difficulties.132 Justice Ginsburg responded that the 
problem was more common, referring to cases cited in two amicus briefs.133 
Justice Breyer separately observed that despite its imperfections, the 
narrowest grounds rule is likely the best the Court can do in setting out 
helpful guiding principles.134 Despite this, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer 
joined Justice Gorsuch’s entire Ramos opinion, which expressed a very 
different conception of Marks.135 
a. Justice Gorsuch’s Marks Deconstruction in Ramos 
In Ramos, Justice Gorsuch advanced three propositions implicating 
Marks.136 First, he contended that Apodaca failed to provide an opinion 
 
 128 See Brief of Petitioner at 37, 55, Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (No. 17-155), 2018 WL 
565327, at *37, *55. 
 129 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1430 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 130 See Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1778–80 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 131 See id. 
 132 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 46–49. 
 133 See id. at 49–50. Most likely this referred to the commentary of Professor Re and this 
Article’s author. 
 134 See id. at 53. 
 135 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1393–94 (majority opinion); id. at 1403–04 (plurality 
opinion). 
 136 See id. at 1403–04 (plurality opinion). 
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resolving the case on narrowest grounds.137 Second, he maintained that, as a 
result, Apodaca lacks precedential status.138 Third, he concluded that 
Apodaca was mistaken and should be superseded, as opposed to overruled, 
thereby demanding unanimous jury verdicts both in federal and state 
criminal proceedings.139 
Justice Gorsuch’s determination that Apodaca lacked a controlling 
narrowest grounds opinion rested on two arguments. First, Justice Gorsuch 
effectively endorsed the part of Justice Powell’s opinion construing the Sixth 
Amendment jury right to require unanimity as a matter of constitutional 
history, early English practice, and constitutional expectation 
notwithstanding that England itself later abandoned the unanimity 
requirement.140 Second, Justice Gorsuch observed that for nearly one 
hundred years prior to Apodaca, the Court had recognized the unanimity 
requirement, eschewing an inquiry into a functionalist, or cost-benefit, 
analysis of the sort Justice White’s plurality embraced.141 Instead, Justice 
Gorsuch claimed that the Framers undertook whatever balancing was 
appropriate, and the modern Court’s task was limited to honoring, not 
reassessing, that balance.142 
Justice Gorsuch surveyed the law on incorporation, ultimately 
embracing the Apodaca dissent. Gorsuch maintained that the proper 
doctrinal approach had long been jot for jot, rendering Justice Powell’s dual-
track analysis not merely mistaken, but legally unavailable.143 Justice 
Gorsuch determined that neither Justice Powell’s dual-track analysis nor 
White’s functionalist analysis could express the Apodaca Court’s holding on 
narrowest grounds.144 With respect to Justice Powell, Justice Gorsuch 
posited one more claim: A single Justice, whose view was rejected by eight 
out of nine members of the Court, cannot control under Marks.145 
There are two important points to make regarding these claims. First, 
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion does not represent the narrowest grounds position 
in Ramos. Second, on the merits, two centerpieces of the analysis are notably 
 
 137 See id. 
 138 See id. 
 139 See id. at 1404. 
 140 See id. at 1395–97 (majority opinion). 
 141 See id. at 1396, 1398. 
 142 See id. at 1402 (plurality opinion). 
 143 See id. at 1405 (majority opinion). For a similar claim in a fractured 4–1–4 context, 
with Justice Scalia claiming that the narrowest grounds position taken by Justice Kennedy 
was legally unavailable, see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 301 (2004); and infra Section 
II.A.1 (reviewing Justice Scalia’s analysis). 
 144 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1405 (majority opinion). 
 145 See id. at 1403–04 (plurality opinion); id. at 1404–05 (majority opinion). 
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flawed whereas a third, although rejected by a majority of the Court, is 
sound. Before evaluating the Ramos concurrences in the judgment, it is 
helpful to consider Justice Alito’s dissent. Justice Alito clarifies some 
aspects of the narrowest grounds rule while complicating others in an 
opinion that contains an apparent internal inconsistency.146 
b. Justice Alito’s Ramos Dissent 
Contrary to Justice Gorsuch, Justice Alito recognized that a single 
Justice can control on narrowest grounds: 
An initial question is whether, in a case where there is no opinion 
of the Court, the position taken by a single Justice in the majority 
can constitute the binding rule for which the decision stands. Under 
Marks, the clear answer to this question is yes. The logic of Marks 
applies equally no matter what the division of the Justices in the 
majority, and I am aware of no case holding that the Marks rule is 
inapplicable when the narrowest ground is supported by only one 
Justice. Certainly the lower courts have understood [Marks to] 
apply in that situation.147 
Justice Alito recognized Apodaca as precedent, including in the 
Supreme Court.148 And yet, despite recognizing that even one Justice can 
control under Marks, Justice Alito qualified his conclusion, stating no one 
ever imagined that Justice Powell’s solo opinion was binding on the Court.149 
This might imply that although Justice Alito regards fractured rulings as 
binding precedent on the Supreme Court, thereby requiring an overruling to 
displace, such rulings do not obligate the Court to embrace the rationale in 
any nonmajority opinion, including the narrowest grounds opinion. 
Setting aside the claimed obligation to formally overrule nonmajority 
Supreme Court cases, this reading largely comports with the analysis that 
 
 146 The author has alerted the Clerk of the Court as to the seeming inconsistency. 
 147 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1431 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 148 See id. at 1427–28 (“Consider what it would mean if Apodaca was never a precedent. 
It would mean that the entire legal profession was fooled for the past 48 years.”); id. at 1429 
(“The idea that Apodaca was a phantom precedent defies belief.”). 
 149 Justice Alito stated: 
The final question is whether Justice Powell’s reasoning in Apodaca—namely, his 
view that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate every aspect of the Sixth 
Amendment jury-trial right—is a binding precedent, and the answer to that question 
is no. When, in the years after Apodaca, new questions arose about the scope of the 
jury-trial right in state court—as they did in cases like Apprendi v. New Jersey and 
Blakely v. Washington—nobody thought for a second that Apodaca committed the 
Court to Justice Powell’s view . . . . 
Id. at 1431 (citations omitted) (first citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); and 
then citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)). 
2021] MODELING NARROWEST GROUNDS 127 
follows. That analysis demonstrates that the precedential status of a 
narrowest grounds opinion differs in lower courts as compared with the 
Supreme Court, binding the former not the latter. The difficulty is that Justice 
Alito then introduces uncertainty with an admittedly ambiguous passage that 
appears to contain an internal inconsistency: 
The next question is whether the Marks rule applies any differently 
when the precedent that would be established by a fractured 
decision would overrule a prior precedent. Again, the logic of 
Marks dictates an affirmative answer, and I am aware of no case 
holding that the Marks rule applies any differently in this situation. 
But as far as the present case is concerned, this question is academic 
because Apodaca did not overrule any prior decision of this 
Court.150 
This passage makes the most sense if we assume the italicized 
“affirmative” was intended as “negative.” It is problematic to claim no case 
holds that Marks applies differently when “a fractured decision would 
overrule a prior” Supreme Court precedent, or to state that the resolution is 
academic because Apodaca did not purport to overturn a prior ruling, unless 
a nonmajority case has the potential to overturn a past majority ruling.151 
Although not without exception, this reading of the narrowest grounds rule 
is in tension with the history of Marks itself and with how Justices have 
generally operated in Marks’s shadow.152 
c. The Sotomayor & Kavanaugh Partial Concurrences in the  
Ramos Judgment 
Of the three Ramos concurrences in the judgment, Kavanaugh and 
Sotomayor can be grouped together, whereas Thomas requires separate 
consideration. Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh rejected Justice 
Gorsuch’s analysis claiming that a single Justice cannot create binding 
precedent under the narrowest grounds rule and that Apodaca lacks 
 
 150 Id. (emphasis added). 
 151 Id. 
 152 See infra Section II.A.2.a (discussing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); 
Justice Scalia’s voting strategy in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); 
and the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion)). Justice Alito further rejected Justice Sotomayor’s claim that 
nonunanimous juries were a relic of Jim Crow, given their more modern reenactments, 
Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1426–27 (Alito, J., dissenting), and Justice Kavanaugh’s claim that the 
Court’s holding created potentially onerous administrative burdens, responding that Teague 
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion), limits the retroactivity of nonwatershed 
rules, Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1437 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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precedential status. For Sotomayor and Kavanaugh, Apodaca is precedent 
that each concludes should be overruled.153 
Justice Sotomayor also reviews the racial history of nonunanimous jury 
verdict laws, describing them as a relic of Jim Crow.154 Nonmajority jury 
verdicts let a majority suppress a minority—historically a racial minority—
of jurors who exhibit a visceral distrust of police and prosecutorial behaviors 
respecting members of their community.155 In Sotomayor’s view, laws 
whose origins are associated with a motivation to suppress the voices of 
African Americans must be assessed in light of that history and deserve no 
lawful place in our jurisprudence.156 
Justice Kavanaugh devoted much of his opinion to reconceptualizing the 
criteria for evaluating when Supreme Court precedents warrant 
overruling.157 This has been a focal point of landmark Supreme Court cases, 
including the narrowest ground plurality in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,158 which declined to overturn Roe v. 
Wade,159 and Lawrence v. Texas,160 which overturned Bowers v. 
Hardwick.161 
Kavanaugh tackled Marks in a detailed footnote, stating that when the 
Court fractures, its rulings bind state and federal courts, including the 
Supreme Court.162 As shown below, this is in tension with how Justices have 
modeled their behavior in the shadow of Marks and with the position taken 
by Justice Gorsuch for a plurality of three.163 Kavanaugh further noted that 
although Marks generally applies in a straightforward manner, that is not 
always the case. He explained: “On very rare occasions, as in Apodaca, it 
can be difficult to discern which opinion’s reasoning has precedential effect 
under Marks.”164 Kavanaugh further observed: “As I read the Court’s various 
opinions today, six Justices treat the result in Apodaca as a precedent for 
purposes of stare decisis analysis. A different group of six Justices concludes 
that Apodaca should be and is overruled.”165 
 
 153 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1409–10 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–
A); id. at 1410 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). 
 154 See id. at 1410 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A). 
 155 See id. at 1394 (majority opinion). 
 156 See id. at 1410 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A). 
 157 See id. at 1411–16 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). 
 158 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion). 
 159 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 160 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 161 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
 162 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). 
 163 See infra Section II.A. 
 164 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1417 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). 
 165 Id. 
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Justice Kavanaugh’s characterization is largely sound, yet it requires 
slight amending. Justice Gorsuch, writing for a plurality of three, did not treat 
Apodaca as binding precedent. As a result, although he concluded the case 
should be superseded, he did not determine that this required the case to be 
overruled. Modifying Kavanaugh’s statement to assert that six Justices 
regard Apodaca as precedent, and another six Justices believe Apodaca 
should either be superseded or overruled, better captures the opinions. 
2. Justice Thomas’s Ramos Concurrence in the Judgment 
Because Justice Thomas’s concurrence in the judgment did not focus on 
the narrowest grounds rule, and because it implicates the earlier discussion 
as to the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, we can 
present it fairly briefly.166 Justice Thomas rejected the premise on which the 
Court has, now for decades, rested its fundamental rights and incorporation 
jurisprudence. Although commentators acknowledge the anomaly of relying 
upon the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to perform this work, 
the Court’s members have long been unwilling to change that approach.167 
The exception is Justice Thomas. Notably Justice Scalia, widely associated 
with originalist jurisprudence, was unwilling to revisit the Slaughter-House 
Cases as the basis for incorporating the Second Amendment right to states 
and municipalities, set out in his earlier majority opinion in Heller168 in his 
concurring opinion in McDonald.169 
Thomas’s revisiting privileges or immunities based on original meaning 
runs up against settled precedent affecting a host of doctrinal domains, 
including privacy, same sex marriage, the Second Amendment, and the 
 
 166 Id. at 1420 (Thomas, J., concurring). In June Medical Services, Justice Thomas 
observed that Chief Justice Roberts’s solo opinion in that 4-1-4 case appeared to express the 
holding on narrowest grounds, adding in a footnote that based on Justice Gorsuch’s Ramos 
plurality analysis, Roberts’s opinion might be ineligible for narrowest grounds status. See 
June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2148 n.4 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
see also infra Section II.A.1 (discussing June Medical Services). 
 167 A turning point for incorporation was Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), 
with Justice White reasoning that abstract inquiries into whether the absence of a claimed 
right is consistent with an Anglo-American scheme of ordered liberty proves less valuable 
than specific inquiries grounded in the Bill of Rights, given that virtually all state criminal 
law systems have come close to replicating the federal criminal justice system. See id. at 148–
56, 149 n.14 (“Of each of these determinations that a constitutional provision originally 
written to bind the Federal Government should bind the States as well it might be said that 
the limitation in question is not necessarily fundamental to fairness in every criminal system 
that might be imagined but is fundamental in the context of the criminal processes maintained 
by the American States.”). 
 168 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 614–20 (2008). 
 169 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791–805 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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broad swath of incorporation cases. One implication of reconsidering these 
cases, as Thomas has observed, is that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
protects the rights of citizens whereas the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses more broadly protect persons.170 Some rights, such as those 
associated with the Second Amendment, for example, might make more 
sense with a citizenship limitation, and one might advance similar claims 
respecting certain procedural rights.171 
Whatever the merits of Justice Thomas’s position as an original matter, 
or even respecting the balance struck between honoring precedent and 
correcting past jurisprudential error, it is clear that the doctrinal implications 
of Justice Thomas’s view are quite different from those of Justices 
Kavanaugh and Sotomayor. For example, if the Court were to declare that 
the basis for incorporation rests on privileges or immunities, not due process, 
the reach of the holding is potentially extremely broad, inviting challenges 
to any number of past precedents resting on due process. Alternatively, the 
effect could be to narrow the reach of past rights vindicated under due 
process that fit less comfortably with privileges or immunities. Simply put, 
there is no obvious assessment of Thomas’s approach that aligns along the 
dimension of breadth versus narrowness as compared with the remaining 
opinions. Thomas’s view, seeking to upend decades of due process 
jurisprudence not necessarily limited to incorporation, is orthogonal to those 
of the remaining Justices on the Ramos Court. 
3. Aligning the Remaining Ramos Opinions 
Recall that Justice Alito observed the apparent irony of failing to 
recognize the effect of the Ramos breakdown in assessing Apodaca. The 
meta-analysis entails ascertaining which of the various opinions in Ramos 
on the narrowest grounds analysis of Apodaca expresses the Ramos holding 
on narrowest grounds. Despite the seeming risk of infinite regress, applying 
Marks in Ramos, as in Apodaca, is straightforward as the opinions align 
along a single relevant dimension.  
 
 170 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1423–24 (Thomas, J., concurring); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 
815–19 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 171 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 YALE L.J. 
2576, 2579–2591 (2014). 
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TABLE 2. RAMOS V. LOUISIANA IN ONE DIMENSION 
(A) Justice Gorsuch 
(for 3) 
(B) Justices Sotomayor 
and Kavanaugh (C) Justice Alito (for 3) 
Apodaca not precedential, 
no narrowest grounds 
opinion, case is superseded 
with requirement of jury 
unanimity in state criminal 
trials 
Apodaca is precedential; 
Powell’s opinion expresses 
holding on narrowest 
grounds; case is overruled, 
requiring jury unanimity in 
state criminal trials 
Apodaca is precedential, 
although Powell’s opinion 
expresses the holding on 
narrowest grounds it does 
not bind the Supreme 
Court, Apodaca should be 
retained as precedent 
Lax treatment of Apodaca 
as precedent 
 Strict treatment of 
Apodaca as precedent 
 
Although the narrowest grounds analysis of Apodaca implicates three 
discrete issues—Apodaca’s precedential status, identifying the controlling 
opinion, and deciding whether Apodaca should be superseded or overruled, 
on one side, or retained, on the other—these issues align along one 
dimension. That dimension captures how lax or strictly the Supreme Court 
treats Apodaca as precedent. The eight Justices who agreed to this framing 
expressed or joined opinions aligning consistently along this dimension from 
left to right for each issue.172 Those who believe that the case is not 
precedential believe it should be overruled; those who believe it is 
precedential split on whether it should be overruled, with those taking the 
stricter view of precedent choosing to retain it. Between these extremes lie 
the two concurrences in the judgment. Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh 
each regard the case as precedent, treat Powell’s opinion as expressing the 
Apodaca holding on narrowest grounds, and conclude Apodaca warrants 
overruling. Finding that Apodaca is precedent warranting overruling (B) fits 
logically between not finding the case precedential and allowing it to be 
superseded with no need to overrule (A) and finding it a precedent that 
should be retained (C). 
Although Table 2 presents the views of eight of the nine deciding 
Justices, the two largely aligned narrowest ground opinions capture the 
median members of the Ramos Court. Excluding Thomas yields a 3-2-3 line-
up, meaning that the narrowest grounds position coincides with the median 
Justice, whether Sotomayor or Kavanaugh.173 That is because six Justices 
agree that Apodaca should be superseded or overturned, rendering the sui 
 
 172 As explained infra Part II, this is consistent with recognizing that the number of 
issues or data bear no correlation to the number of dimensions along which they are assessed. 
See Stearns, supra note 26. 
 173 See supra note 32 (presenting the median position as one way to express the 
narrowest grounds rule). 
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generis position expressed by Justice Thomas unnecessary in applying 
Marks to Ramos. If Thomas’s opinion had been crucial to forming a majority 
of the Ramos Court, the analysis would be more complex, as the following 
discussion demonstrates. 
C. McDonald v. City of Chicago: Incorporation in Two Dimensions 
The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”174 In the 1939 decision, United States v. 
Miller,175 the Supreme Court rejected a Second Amendment defense to a 
prosecution for possession of a sawed-off shotgun, declaring that the 
Amendment does not protect an individual right.176 The scope of the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms has long been a source of 
contention. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court, with 
Justice Scalia writing, abandoned Miller’s narrow reading, which had 
construed the protection as inherently tied to state militias based on the 
prefatory clause.177 
Justice Scalia began his analysis with the operative clause, construing 
“the people” to imply an individual right, and “keep and bear arms” as not 
expressing an idiomatic meaning associated with a military context on the 
ground that when so used, “bear arms” is coupled with “against” followed 
by an identified enemy.178 Scalia further construed “arms” to imply weapons 
commonly in use among the general population, eliminating any specific 
military connection.179 
Upon revisiting the prefatory clause, Scalia determined that the framers 
included it because it conveyed the motivating context, fearing the federal 
government might aggrandize its power by, among other means, removing 
privately held weapons.180 For Scalia, this implied that the prefatory clause 
signaled a benign check but did not express a source of limitation on the 
identified right. 
Scalia acknowledged that the Amendment’s framers could not have 
imagined certain weaponry that might be used in a modern military setting, 
rendering such weapons unsuitable for common usage in the modern age.181 
 
 174 U.S. CONST. amend II. 
 175 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 176 See id. at 178. 
 177 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582–83 (2008). 
 178 See id. at 576–92. 
 179 See id. at 581–92. 
 180 See id. at 595–98. 
 181 See id. at 582. 
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He recognized that this analysis allowed some regulation of, including 
banning, particular weapons that did not correspond to weaponry commonly 
employed at the time the Second Amendment was ratified.182 Scalia 
acknowledged the potentially ironic effect of disallowing private possession 
(keep) and use (bear) of arms suitable to the militia context while protecting 
access to weaponry (handguns and hunting rifles) with no modern military 
benefit.183 Despite this irony, Scalia reasoned that the prefatory clause’s 
disjuncture with the scope of the modern right was not a basis of limitation 
on that right.184 
Although the path of litigation began in the District of Columbia, which 
is subject to federal regulation, the larger stakes were states and localities, 
which carry the bulk of gun regulations. McDonald v. City of Chicago 
presented the question whether the right announced in Heller was 
incorporated, thus applying against a handgun ban in the City of Chicago.185 
The McDonald Court divided into three camps. A plurality of four 
determined that the Second Amendment right declared in Heller is 
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.186 
Justice Thomas rejected the Due Process Clause analysis as the basis for 
incorporation, but reasoned that the right falls within the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, an argument the 
plurality rejected.187 Justice Stevens, dissenting for four Justices, rejected 
both bases for incorporation, finding that the Second Amendment right was 
neither included under the Due Process Clause nor protected under the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.188 
In contrast with the opinions in Apodaca and Ramos, the McDonald 
opinions cannot be expressed along a single dimension. As shown in Table 
3, assessing these three opinions implicates two separate dimensions.  
 
 182 See id. at 627–29. 
 183 See id. at 627–28. 
 184 See id. 
 185 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2010). 
 186 See id. at 748–49; id. at 758–59 (plurality opinion). 
 187 See id. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 188 See id. at 858–61 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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TABLE 3. MCDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO IN TWO DIMENSIONS 
 Incorporate Under Privileges or Immunities 
Do Not Incorporate 
Under Privileges or 
Immunities 
Incorporate Under  
Due Process  Plurality (4) 
Do Not Incorporate Under 
Due Process Thomas (1) Dissent (4) 
 
The narrowest grounds rule provides that in a nonmajority case, the 
opinion consistent with the judgment that resolves the case on the narrowest 
grounds expresses the holding.189 Although the Marks formulation does not 
employ the term “dimension,” the rule’s framing implies dimensionality. 
Positing that the opinion consistent with the outcome decided on narrowest 
grounds is controlling implies at least one other opinion consistent with the 
outcome that would resolve the case on broader grounds. The framing further 
implies a dissenting opinion would resolve the case on grounds so narrow as 
to produce a contrary judgment. This framing suggest that in a paradigmatic 
fractured panel ruling, there would be at least three relevant positions—
broader (not controlling), narrowest consistent with the judgment 
(controlling), so narrow as to dissent (not controlling)—aligned on a single 
dimension of relative breadth. Because a majority is required to issue a 
judgment, the narrowest opinion comporting with the judgment would 
almost invariably capture the median position of the deciding Court. 
Although Ramos is more complex than Apodaca, the preceding analysis 
explains why the doctrine applies in a straightforward manner there as well. 
Justice Thomas’s added dimension can be disregarded while still casting the 
remaining opinions along one dimension, with the result that the two median 
Justices—Sotomayor and Kavanaugh—express the holding on narrowest 
grounds. By contrast, the analysis further demonstrates why Marks is 
thwarted in McDonald. To see why, consider what it means for an opinion 
to be so narrow as not to support the judgment. 
In a case that accepts a constitutional challenge, the opinion consistent 
with the grant of relief that would allow the fewest challenges to succeed 
going forward is the narrowest grounds opinion. By contrast, an opinion that 
would deny relief is so narrow that it would not support the judgment. 
Alternatively, in a case that rejects a constitutional challenge, the opinion 
consistent with the denial of relief that would allow the most challenges 
going forward to proceed is the narrowest grounds opinion. By contrast, an 
opinion that would allow the raised challenge to proceed is so narrow that it 
 
 189 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
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would not support the judgment. Thus, in cases granting relief, the opinion 
consistent with the judgment granting the least relief is the narrowest 
grounds opinion. In cases denying relief, the opinion consistent with the 
denial that allows the greatest relief is the narrowest grounds opinion. 
In terms of nomenclature, it might seem anomalous to label an opinion 
that would grant relief, when the Court has denied it, as narrow. But the 
dimension of broad to narrow assesses the bases for the Court’s judgment 
regardless of what that judgment is. A broad ruling denying relief would 
deny relief across the board; a narrow ruling denying relief would allow 
some other claims beyond the immediate one for which relief is denied to 
proceed; and finally, a ruling that would so narrowly construe the bases for 
denying relief as to confer relief in the immediate case emerges as a dissent. 
The preceding discussion is suitably captured within the framing of 
“least impact analysis.”190 And yet, as explained in the next Part, once we 
recognize that the proper construction of the narrowest grounds rule requires 
assessing the opinions based on dimensionality, it is clear that this is merely 
one of several alternative framings capturing a singular consistent insight. 
For now, consider applying least impact analysis to McDonald. There 
are two ways to grant relief: (1) find that the Heller Second Amendment right 
applies to states via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, or 
(2) find that the Heller Second Amendment right applies to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause. Two camps grant 
relief on each of these alternative bases; the narrower opinion along each 
dimension would grant less relief. Along each dimension, one opinion 
satisfies this test of being narrower, but in each instance that opinion would 
deny relief altogether, thereby emerging as a dissent. The plurality would 
grant relief based on due process, but not privileges or immunities; the 
concurrence in the judgment would grant relief on privileges or immunities 
but not due process. By contrast, the dissent would grant relief on neither, 
achieving an opposite judgment. Although the dissent is narrower along each 
dimension, under Marks, that opinion is ineligible for holding status because 
it is opposite the case judgment. 
This analysis reveals another way to express the McDonald anomaly. 
The two opinions consistent with the judgment, each incorporating the 
Heller Second Amendment right, resolve each of the two controlling issues 
in the case in opposite fashion. Neither can be classified as narrower than the 
other. Thomas is narrower on the question of whether due process provides 
a basis for relief, and the plurality is narrower on the question of whether 
privileges or immunities provides a basis for relief. These orthogonal 
opinions cannot be ranked broad to narrow. 
 
 190 See sources cited infra note 342. 
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This explains why an impressive group of scholars has advocated, 
however problematically, for a variety of proposals allowing separate counts 
on each dispositive issue to control the case outcomes, rather than basing 
outcomes on a tally of each deciding Justices’ determination concerning the 
ultimate case disposition in two dimensional cases.191 As applied to 
McDonald, this would result in five Justices rejecting the due process basis 
for incorporation (Thomas plus the dissenters) and eight Justices rejecting 
the privileges or immunities basis for incorporation (the plurality plus the 
dissenters). With this case-disposition rule, the Heller ruling would not be 
incorporated against states and localities, leaving it in place only as applied 
to federal regulations. This result would lend support to Justice Powell’s 
now-discredited dual-track approach to incorporation. 
D. Summary 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that the Ramos Justices each 
capture a slice of the dynamics associated with the proper application of the 
narrowest grounds rule announced in Marks. A proper application of the rule 
implicates dimensionality. A dimension is a spectrum along which 
innumerable criteria can be expressed and compared. Not all dimensions are 
necessarily relevant in applying the narrowest grounds rule. Whereas 
Apodaca and Ramos present straightforward applications, despite some 
contrary claims among the Justices, McDonald thwarts the rule by invoking 
a second dimension. This is so even though Justice Thomas introduced a 
second dimension in both Ramos and McDonald, resting on privileges or 
immunities, and rejecting due process, as the basis for applying substantive 
protections in the Bill of Rights to states and localities. 
Because five Ramos Justices agree on the relevant dimension, despite 
disagreeing as to where along that dimension the case judgment is best 
expressed, Thomas’s added dimension in Ramos proved irrelevant to 
aligning the remaining opinions on one dimension. By contrast, because 
 
 191 For proposals to implement issue voting, see, for example, Jonathan Remy Nash, A 
Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 
78 (2003) (proposing outcome voting for issues of law and issue voting for issues of fact); 
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial 
Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 30 (1993) (proposing a “metavote” to determine whether to 
employ outcome or issue voting); David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the 
Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J. 743, 745 (1992) (finding 
outcome voting “deeply flawed” and proposing tallying results per issue); and David G. Post 
& Steven C. Salop, Issues and Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor 
John Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1069–70 (1996) (refining authors’ original 
issue voting protocol). For a critical assessment of issue voting proposals, see STEARNS, supra 
note 33, at 99–124; and for a review of the literature, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS, TODD J. 
ZYWICKI & THOMAS J. MICELI, LAW AND ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 888–91 (2018). 
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Thomas provided the critical fifth vote for the McDonald judgment, his 
introduction of a second dimension thwarted the application of Marks to the 
resulting McDonald opinions. Unlike Ramos, McDonald contains no opinion 
expressing the holding on narrowest grounds. 
The next Part provides two complementary means of modeling the 
narrowest grounds rule. It will first demonstrate that despite the stated 
confusion in the various Ramos opinions, the Court’s members have better 
exemplified the meaning of Marks with their conduct. It then generalizes 
several of the preceding points, providing a theoretical analysis that recasts 
the narrowest grounds rule. This avoids a technical defect in the present 
wording, albeit one with little practical consequence, and precisely cabins 
the limited category of cases in which the rule cannot be applied. 
II. MODELING NARROWEST GROUNDS 
This Part provides two complementary analyses, each modeling 
narrowest grounds. The first involves specific manifestations of behavior 
among Supreme Court Justices, including during the Ramos term, that 
appear in tension with formal statements in Ramos concerning Marks. The 
second more rigorously introduces dimensionality and provides a basis both 
for generalizing observed judicial behaviors and for more precisely 
expressing the narrowest grounds rule. 
A. Modeling Narrowest Grounds I: Judicial Behavior 
The first part of the analysis unpacks the three problematic posits in 
Ramos concerning how Marks applies: (1) Does Marks disallow a single 
Justice from controlling on narrowest grounds?; (2) Are narrowest grounds 
opinions precedent in the Supreme Court that can overturn past majority 
opinions?; and (3) Does abandoning a narrowest grounds opinion require 
overruling? Despite the contrary assertions among the Ramos opinions, the 
conduct of the Justices contemporaneous with Marks, and even during the 
Ramos term, generally suggest negative answers to each question. Because 
the second and third inquiries are closely related, they are treated together. 
1. Can Solo Opinions Control on Narrowest Grounds? 
Beginning with Davis v. Bandemer,192 a divided Supreme Court 
considered whether the extreme use of redistricting practices known as 
stacking, packing, and cracking might violate equal protection by providing 
disproportionate representation to the party in power in comparison with 
 
 192 478 U.S. 109, 116–17 (1986) (plurality opinion), abrogated by Rucho v. Common 
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019). 
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electoral demographics.193 The phenomenon arises largely in consequence 
of winner-take-all districted elections. Through these combined practices, 
the controlling party renders the electoral districts of the out-of-power party 
unnecessarily dense (packed); divides voters in districts they might 
otherwise control among other districts, rendering them minority voters 
(cracked); and consolidates disconnected voters from racial minority 
communities with other communities, producing minority-majority districts 
in which outcomes are controlled by elites (stacked).194 These practices 
entrench the party in power. Despite the troublesome nature of these 
practices, a conservative bloc of Justices had long taken the view that 
partisan gerrymandering, as such claims are called, is a nonjusticiable 
political question.195 Ultimately, after Justice Kennedy retired and was 
replaced by Brett Kavanaugh, the conservatives gained the necessary five 
votes to declare this body of law nonjusticiable.196  
In the second major Supreme Court decision to address the issue, Vieth 
v. Jubelirer,197 Justice Kennedy rejected the immediate partisan 
gerrymandering claim, and like Justice White, who wrote the narrowest 
grounds plurality decision in Davis, Kennedy was also unwilling to disallow 
such claims to proceed altogether.198 Unlike Justice White, however, who 
had advanced the consistent degradation standard in assessing future 
 
 193 See id. at 113–18. 
 194 See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering 
and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 849–50 (2015); Russell C. Weaver, 
Gerrymandering Politics Out of the Redistricting Process: Toward a Planning Revolution in 
Redrawing Local Legislative Boundaries, 25 BERKELEY PLAN. J. 98, 101 (2012). 
 195 See, e.g., Davis, 478 U.S. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“I would 
hold that the partisan gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise a nonjusticiable 
political question that the judiciary should leave to the legislative branch as the Framers of 
the Constitution unquestionably intended.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) 
(plurality opinion) (“[W]e must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are 
nonjusticiable . . . .”); id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“A decision 
ordering the correction of all election district lines drawn for partisan reasons would commit 
federal and state courts to unprecedented intervention in the American political process. . . . I 
would not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were 
found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases.”); see 
also Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491 (“This Court has not previously struck down a districting plan 
as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, and has struggled without success over the past 
several decades to discern judicially manageable standards for deciding such claims.”). 
 196 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508 (“[W]e have no commission to allocate political power 
and influence in the absence of a constitutional directive or legal standards to guide us in the 
exercise of such authority.”). The analysis that follows is not focused on the merits of 
particular partisan gerrymandering rulings, but rather with how the Justices have treated the 
Marks rule as applied to solo opinions expressing the holding on narrowest grounds.  
 197 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 198 See id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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claims,199 Justice Kennedy rejected that standard along with those advanced 
by the parties and the dissenters who would have allowed the immediate case 
to proceed.200 Instead, Kennedy maintained that a claim might proceed if a 
future litigant advances a meaningful standard against which such claims 
might be assessed.201 
Like Justice Powell in Apodaca, Justice Kennedy stood alone, between 
two groups of four Justices each. The conservatives sought to jettison 
partisan gerrymandering claims entirely, declaring them a nonjusticiable 
political question, and the liberals wanted to permit such claims, including 
granting relief in the immediate case, offering myriad doctrinal formulations, 
each of which Kennedy found wanting.202 Justice Scalia, who joined in 
denying relief and claiming such claims are nonjusticiable, did not object 
that Justice Kennedy stood alone in issuing the narrowest grounds opinion. 
Instead, Scalia maintained that Justice Kennedy’s position, leaving open a 
constitutional claim yet failing to specify how it might be met, was “not 
legally available.”203 
Although taking somewhat differing approaches, both Justice Gorsuch 
in Ramos and Justice Scalia in Vieth conflate the legal soundness of an 
opinion with whether that opinion is controlling under Marks. Justice 
Gorsuch took the analysis one step further, claiming a categorical ban if the 
apparent narrowest grounds opinion is expressed by a single Justice. 
Supreme Court Justices routinely dispute the merits of each other’s 
opinions. Fractured rulings appear especially prone to such critiques. Even 
so, determining which opinion controls is necessarily distinct from assessing 
an opinion’s merits. Poorly reasoned opinions, arguably including those 
rejecting longstanding historical norms or that leave open a governing legal 
standard, can control on narrowest grounds if they otherwise satisfy Marks. 
Justice Gorsuch’s blanket rule prohibiting solo narrowest grounds 
concurrences in the judgment from controlling is analytically problematic. 
When the underlying opinions align on a single dimension with a 4-1-4 
breakdown, although eight Justices disagree with the solo concurrence in the 
judgment, the four Justices occupying either side disagree with the solo 
 
 199 See Davis, 478 U.S. at 132 (“Rather, unconstitutional discrimination occurs only 
when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or 
a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a whole.”). 
 200 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 201 See id. at 311–317 (“That no such standard has emerged in this case should not be 
taken to prove that none will emerge in the future. . . . If workable standards do emerge to 
measure these burdens, however, courts should be prepared to order relief.”). 
 202 See id. at 305 (plurality opinion); id. at 323–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 346–
47 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 309–17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 203 Id. at 301 (plurality opinion). 
140 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [89:101 
opinion for opposing reasons. One side contends the median position goes 
too far (or is too broad); the other side contends the median position does not 
go far enough (or is too narrow). Rather than explaining that Marks fails to 
apply, this is why the Justices routinely treat such opinions as controlling, 
even including Justice Gorsuch. 
During the very term in which Justice Gorsuch proposed that the 
narrowest grounds rule does not apply in the 4-1-4 context, the Court issued 
June Medical Services v. Russo, a major abortion ruling.204 The case 
produced a 4-1-4 split, like Apodaca, with Chief Justice Roberts producing 
the narrowest grounds concurrence in the judgment.205 None of the three 
Justices who joined the plurality, including Justice Gorsuch himself, raised 
the possibility that the Chief Justice’s narrowest grounds opinion might not 
control. 
June Medical Services presented a challenge to a Louisiana abortion 
statute that the majority of the deciding Court regarded as materially 
indistinguishable from a Texas statute invalidated in the 2016 decision, 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.206 Both statutes demanded that 
abortions be performed only by a physician with admitting privileges at a 
hospital within thirty miles of where the procedure is to be performed.207 The 
effect in each case was to markedly diminish access to qualified physicians 
performing such procedures for women of childbearing age throughout the 
two states.208 
 
 204 See June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (plurality opinion). 
 205 See id. at 2133–42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 206 See id. at 2112–13 (plurality opinion). 
 207 See id. at 2112 (stating that the Louisiana statute in question was “almost word-for-
word identical to Texas’ admitting-privileges law” in Whole Woman’s Health). Compare TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (West 2019) (requiring facilities meet “minimum 
standards . . . equivalent to the minimum standards . . . for ambulatory surgical centers”), and 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (West 2019) (requiring that physicians 
“have active admitting privileges at a hospital . . . not further than 30 miles from the” facility), 
with LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (2020) (requiring a “physician performing or 
inducing an abortion” to “[h]ave active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not 
further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced and 
that provides obstetrical or gynecological health care services,” defining “active admitting 
privileges” as being “in good standing of the medical staff of a hospital that is currently 
licensed by the department, with the ability to admit a patient and to provide diagnostic and 
surgical services to such patient”). 
 208 In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court cited the lower court’s conclusions that there 
are “approximately 5.4 million” women of childbearing age in Texas; that the number of 
abortion clinics in Texas “dropped by almost half leading up to and in the wake of 
enforcement of the admitting-privileges requirement”; and that “[i]f the surgical-center 
provision were allowed to take effect, the number of abortion facilities . . . would be reduced 
further” to approximately seven or eight. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2301 (quoting 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 680–81 (W.D. Tex. 2014)). In June 
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Justice Breyer, who had written for the Whole Woman’s Health majority 
in striking down the Texas statute,209 wrote for a plurality of four in June 
Medical Services.210 In the latter case, Breyer reiterated the Whole Woman’s 
Health rationale on its merits.211 In dissent, Justice Alito, also writing for 
four, claimed that the two cases were distinguishable, and that the Louisiana 
law should be sustained.212 Chief Justice Roberts, alone concurring in the 
judgment, concluded that the two cases were indistinguishable and that based 
strictly on stare decisis, Whole Woman’s Health controlled the outcome in 
June Medical Services, requiring that the challenged Louisiana statute be 
struck down.213 Roberts further sought to narrow the reach of Whole 
Woman’s Health and the earlier abortion ruling, Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, by disallowing consideration of 
benefits in applying the undue burden test.214 
 
Medical Services, the Court cited the lower court’s findings that the statute in question would 
“result in a drastic reduction in the number and geographic distribution of abortion providers, 
reducing the number of clinics to one, or at most two.” June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2115 
(quoting June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 87 (M.D. La. 2017)). 
 209 See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300. 
 210 See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2112 (plurality opinion). 
 211 See id. at 2120–32. 
 212 See id. at 2155, 2157–58 (Alito, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the cases are 
distinguishable because whereas Whole Woman’s Health presented a pre-enforcement facial 
challenge, the immediate case was post-enforcement with evidence of the challenged law’s 
effects). 
 213 See id. at 2133–34 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 214 See id. at 2135–39. Although this placed Roberts’s legal analysis closer to that of 
Justice Alito in dissent, Roberts’s stare decisis analysis aligned him with Justice Breyer on 
the judgment. The benefits analysis, because unnecessary to his judgment vote, is arguably 
dictum. For a general discussion of how to distinguish holding and dictum, see Michael 
Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005). As explained 
below, this issue became the focal point of a split among the U.S. Courts of Appeals respecting 
the interpretation of June Medical Services. 
Professor Ryan Williams has criticized this author’s earlier works advocating the 
approach more fully developed in this Article, which he describes as “the fifth vote approach.” 
See Williams, supra note 11, at 813–17. Among other arguments, see infra note 290 
(discussing role of dissenting Justices in identifying the narrowest grounds opinion); infra 
note 357 (discussing implications of incomplete information regarding dimensionality in 
identifying narrowest grounds opinion), Williams maintains this framing of the Marks rule 
requires accepting all propositions advanced in the opinion designated as controlling on 
narrowest grounds. See Williams, supra note 11, at 815 (“Perhaps most controversially, the 
fifth vote approach treats as binding all aspects of the opinion reflecting the median Justice’s 
views, including propositions that no other participating Justice explicitly or implicitly 
assented to.”). This is mistaken. Applying Marks in a case in which opinions align along a 
single dimension requires identifying which opinion occupies the Court’s median position. 
Once that task is complete, however, those construing the controlling opinion are expected to 
undertake the same analysis that they would in construing any other Supreme Court opinion 
even if issued by a majority or unanimous Court. This includes distinguishing holding versus 
dictum. See David S. Cohen, Why Whole Woman’s Health’s Balancing Test Still Applies After 
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June Medical, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Aug. 24, 2020), 
https://harvardlpr.com/2020/08/24/why-whole-womans-healths-balancing-test-still-applies-
after-june-medical/ [https://perma.cc/9H42-XBDE] (applying this Article’s framework in 
characterizing as dicta Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion in June Medical Services that the 
undue burden test does not allow consideration of the absence of regulatory benefits, and 
concluding that although Roberts’s opinion concurs in the judgment on the narrowest grounds, 
that opinion does not does displace the contrary holding in Whole Women’s Health).  
As this Article was going to press, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on 
one side, and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, on the other, split 
over the very question discussed in the text. The issue involved whether Chief Justice 
Roberts’s concurring analysis in June Medical Services, which rejected the application of an 
absence of regulatory benefits in applying the undue burden test to an abortion restriction, is 
binding on lower courts under the narrowest grounds doctrine. See Planned Parenthood of 
Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Box, No. 17-2428, 2021 WL 940125, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar. 12, 2021). In 
Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Box, Judge Hamilton, writing for a 
majority, embraced the position advocated here. See id. By contrast, Judge Kanne, writing in 
dissent, along with the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, took a contrary view. See id. at *13–15 
(Kanne, J., dissenting); EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 
437 (6th Cir. 2020); Little Rock Fam. Plan. Servs. v. Rutledge, 984 F.3d 682, 687 n.2 (8th 
Cir. 2021); Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).  
In a remand from the Supreme Court in light of the June Medical Services ruling, the 
Seventh Circuit reconsidered this question as applied to an Indiana parental notice 
requirement for a minor pursuing a judicial bypass in seeking an abortion, where the notice 
was independent of a best interests inquiry. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., 2021 WL 
940125, at *1 (majority opinion). Writing for the Seventh Circuit majority, Judge Hamilton 
reviewed several leading articles considering the narrowest grounds rule, including an earlier 
work by this author. See id. at *6 n.6 (citing Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including 
Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321 
(2000)). Judge Hamilton reasoned that although Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion expressed 
the holding on narrowest grounds, Roberts’s rejection of the benefits inquiry in applying the 
undue burden test was dictum and thus nonbinding: 
Applying Marks, the best way to understand the two opinions together is that the 
plurality’s adoption of Proposition B and the concurrence’s adoption of Proposition 
Not-B are both obiter dicta. They were not necessary to the actual judgment striking 
down the new Louisiana law on stare decisis grounds, Proposition A, for which there 
were five votes. There was no majority to overrule Whole Woman’s Health, so that 
precedent stands as binding on lower courts unless and until a Court majority 
overrules it.  
Id. at *8. By contrast, Judge Kanne, writing in dissent, along with the Sixth and Eighth 
Circuits, treated this aspect of the Roberts’s June Medical Services concurrence as binding. 
Judge Kanne reasoned that to do otherwise fails to provide that case legal effect. See id. at 
*10–11 (Kanne, J., dissenting).  
As explained in the body of this Article, this aspect of the Seventh Circuit reading of the 
narrowest grounds rule is superior for three reasons: (1) it follows the formally stated doctrine 
as expressed in Marks, which ensures that lower courts follow the holding expressed in 
narrowest grounds opinions; (2) it is consistent with the weight of historical practice, which 
generally disallows nonmajority Supreme Court opinions to overturn past majority Supreme 
Court rulings; and (3) it encourages Supreme Court Justices to consider relevant tradeoffs in 
choosing whether to forge a majority, as required to overturn an earlier precedent, or to 
express a preferred alternative rule, with more limited effect, in a narrower concurrence in the 
judgment. The Seventh Circuit analysis also avoids the ironic consequence of requiring lower 
courts to give greater doctrinal status to dictum expressed in a narrowest grounds opinion than 
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Applying Marks to June Medical Services is straightforward. The 
opinions align on a single dimension, from broad to narrow protection of 
abortion rights. Along that dimension, Justice Breyer embraces Whole 
Woman’s Health on its merits and as precedent; Chief Justice Roberts 
embraces Whole Woman’s Health only as precedent, without considering the 
merits beyond narrowing the undue burden test; and Justice Alito seeks both 
to cabin Whole Woman’s Health, and to find that it does not control the 
immediate case. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion controls because it goes less 
far in the protection of abortion rights than the plurality, yet farther than the 
dissent. 
The same analysis applies in Vieth. There, the conservatives believed 
Kennedy went too far in allowing the possibility of a successful partisan 
gerrymandering claim, and the liberals believed that Kennedy did not go far 
enough by having rejected the immediate claim. The same analysis holds in 
Apodaca. Justice Stewart determined Powell went too far in allowing states 
to have nonunanimous convictions; Justice White believed Powell did not 
go far enough in maintaining that the same balance could not be struck in 
federal criminal trials. 
In Vieth, Apodaca, and June Medical Services, Justice Kennedy, Justice 
Powell, and Chief Justice Roberts, each writing alone, nonetheless occupied 
the Court’s median position, while expressing the holding consistent with 
the judgment on narrowest grounds. In each instance, the eight remaining 
Justices modeled the narrowest grounds rule by demonstrating that the solo 
concurrence in the judgment controlled. Capturing the median position, 
which itself implies a single dimension along which values are assessed, is 
one of several means of expressing the narrowest grounds rule. And as 
Justice Alito observed in his Ramos dissent, there are several bodies of 
precedent in which a single Justice has expressed the Court’s holding on 
narrowest grounds.215 
2. Do Narrowest Grounds Opinions Bind the Supreme Court & Can They 
Overturn Past Majority Decisions? 
On behalf of the Ramos plurality, including Justices Ginsburg and 
Breyer, Justice Gorsuch claimed that Justice Powell’s narrowest grounds 
 
to dictum in a majority or even unanimous ruling. The disagreement between Justice Breyer, 
writing for the June Medical Services plurality, and the Chief Justice, writing in concurrence, 
concerning whether the absence of regulatory benefits is relevant in applying the undue 
burden test to a challenged abortion restriction was unnecessary in resolving June Medical 
Services. As a result, Judge Hamilton correctly determined that this aspect of Roberts’s 
opinion, which separately rested on stare decisis, was nonbinding dictum. 
 215 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1431 n.14 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(listing lower court cases assuming a single Justice can control on narrowest grounds). 
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opinion in Apodaca was not binding precedent in the Supreme Court. The 
plurality superseded, without overruling, Apodaca. By contrast, Justices 
Sotomayor and Kavanaugh, separately concurring in the Ramos judgment, 
and Justice Alito, writing in dissent for three, maintained that Apodaca was 
precedent, and therefore that abandoning it required a stare decisis 
analysis.216 Justice Thomas did not address this specific issue. 
Once more, the behavior of Supreme Court Justices proved more helpful 
in modeling this aspect of Marks than the formally expressed Ramos 
opinions. The analysis that follows focuses on three lines of cases. The first, 
which includes Marks itself, implicates the prosecutorial standards in 
obscenity prosecutions.217 The second, which includes Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,218 involves the equal protection limits on the 
benign reliance on race in government contracting.219 Together these cases 
support the argument that although narrowest grounds opinions are 
precedential in lower courts, in this instance, Justice Gorsuch is correct. 
Based on how Supreme Court Justices have modeled Marks with their 
behavior, narrowest grounds opinions are not precedential in the Supreme 
Court itself. The third, Casey, arises between these two other lines of cases 
and presents a very specific instance of a plurality overturning two post–Roe 
v. Wade Supreme Court abortion precedents, while retaining and revising 
Roe itself.220 Although Casey demonstrates that Supreme Court Justices have 
not been entirely consistent in their modeled behaviors, the better reading of 
this larger corpus of case law treats Casey as an outlier, with the cases arising 
before and after Casey better capturing the meaning of the narrowest grounds 
rule. 
a. Marks v. United States in Doctrinal Context 
Marks was decided in the context of three prior Supreme Court 
precedents, each centered on the federal prosecutorial standard for obscenity. 
 
 216 As previously explained, Justice Alito was not altogether consistent in his analysis. 
See supra Section I.B.1.b. 
 217 For a more detailed analysis of this line of cases, see Hughes Amicus Brief, supra 
note 6; Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of 
Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321 (2000). The relevant case analysis 
demonstrates that the Marks Court did not anticipate that narrowest grounds opinions would 
bind the Supreme Court. At most, the Marks Court anticipated that nonmajority opinions 
would bind the Supreme Court as to the judgments, not with respect to the holding as 
expressed in the narrowest grounds opinion. 
 218 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 219 See id. at 204–05. 
 220 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870, 881–84 (1992) 
(plurality opinion). 
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The 1957 case, Roth v. United States,221 adopted a relatively lenient multipart 
test that devolved to contemporary community standards.222 In the fractured 
case, Memoirs v. Massachusetts, decided in 1966, a narrowest grounds 
plurality elevated the standard to “utterly without redeeming social value,” 
which most commentators determined was nearly impossible for a 
prosecutor to satisfy.223 Finally, in the 1973 case, Miller v. California,224 a 
majority reverted to a slightly modified version of the earlier Roth test.225 
Marks overturned a conviction based upon conduct that took place 
between the issuance of Memoirs and Miller. The underlying criminal 
activity occurred shortly before Miller was decided, and the district court 
based its jury instruction on that later majority opinion.226 Marks held that 
the government could not, as a matter of due process, retroactively diminish 
the prosecutorial standard on which a jury instruction is based even when the 
earlier claimed standard is the product of a narrowest grounds opinion in a 
nonmajority Supreme Court ruling that was later superseded by a majority 
Supreme Court opinion.227 
The Marks holding was fairly limited; it established that Mr. Marks 
could rely, as a matter of due process, on the Memoirs narrowest grounds 
holding as the basis for charting his alleged criminal activities.228 As a result, 
the district court erred in retroactively lowering the prosecutorial standard 
from that announced by a narrowest grounds plurality in Memoirs to that set 
out by a majority in Miller.229 The Sixth Circuit decision in Marks, which 
the Supreme Court reversed, stood alone among federal circuit courts in 
failing to recognize the Memoirs narrowest grounds plurality as controlling 
precedent.230 
 
 221 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 222 See id. at 489, 492. 
 223 See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion). 
 224 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 225 See id. at 24–25. 
 226 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 189–91 (1977). 
 227 See id. at 191–97. Marks relied, by analogy, on Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 
347 (1964), to hold that due process disallows retroactively lowering the prosecutorial 
standard as applied to a criminal statute. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 196. Analogous to a violation 
of the Ex Post Facto Clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.3; id. § 10, cl.1—which prohibit 
retroactively criminalizing activity—Bouie construes due process to disallow retroactively 
lowering a prosecutorial standard, with the effect of criminalizing previously noncriminal 
activity. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 350; Marks, 430 U.S. at 192. Marks involved an impermissible 
diminution in the prosecutorial standard based on a retroactively applied change in Supreme 
Court caselaw from Memoirs to Miller. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 189–91. 
 228 See Marks, 430 U.S. at 196. 
 229 See id. 
 230 See id. at 189 n.1, 191. 
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Resolving the dispute between Justice Gorsuch’s Ramos plurality, on 
one side, and the remaining Justices who addressed the issue, on the other, 
as to whether Apodaca is precedent in the Supreme Court requires careful 
analysis of what Marks did not say. Although Justice Powell, for the Marks 
Court, chided the Sixth Circuit for alone failing to afford the Memoirs 
narrowest grounds plurality controlling status, he nowhere implied that the 
Miller Court had erred in failing to treat Memoirs as binding precedent.231 
And notably, in Miller, Chief Justice Burger nowhere stated or implied that 
Memoirs was a precedent that required overruling.232 
With respect to Memoirs, the Miller Court stated: “Apart from the initial 
formulation in the Roth case, no majority of the Court has at any given time 
been able to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes obscene, 
pornographic material subject to regulation under the States’ police 
power.”233 
After observing that Justice Brennan, who authored the Memoirs 
plurality, subsequently abandoned the “utterly without redeeming social 
value” test, Chief Justice Burger noted: “[T]oday, for the first time since Roth 
was decided in 1957, a majority of this Court has agreed on concrete 
guidelines to isolate ‘hard core’ pornography from expression protected by 
the First Amendment.”234 Although the Miller Court observed that the 
decision represented the first case since Roth in which a majority agreed 
upon a governing rationale, it did not see any need to overrule Memoirs. 
The implication of these passages is clear: With respect to the Supreme 
Court itself, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Miller majority, presumed 
that only majority opinions, not narrowest grounds opinions, hold 
precedential status in the Supreme Court itself. None of the remaining 
opinions refuted Miller on this important point.235 And nothing in Marks 
suggests a change concerning how narrowest grounds opinions are regarded 
in terms of precedent in the Supreme Court, as opposed to in lower courts. 
The Miller Court had no need to overrule Memoirs for one reason: 
although the narrowest grounds rule was already understood to apply in 
lower federal courts, even before Marks, which explained the decision to 
reverse the Sixth Circuit and to commend the approach of all other circuits 
to address the issue, narrowest grounds opinions were never regarded as 
precedent in the Supreme Court itself. The Justices in Miller and in Marks 
 
 231 See id. at 192–93. 
 232 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1973). 
 233 See id. at 22. 
 234 See id. at 23 & n.4, 29, 36–37. 
 235 Neither Justice Douglas nor Justice Brennan discussed the precedential nature of 
majority versus narrowest grounds opinions in their dissenting opinions. See id. at 37–47 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 47–48 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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modeled this understanding with their contemporaneous conduct in the 
shadow of the narrowest grounds rule. Although a majority of five took a 
different view on this issue in Ramos, Justice Gorsuch was correct that 
superseding Apodaca did not require overruling. 
b. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena & Overruling a Supreme Court 
Precedent 
The 1995 decision Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena236 not only 
supports the understanding that narrowest grounds opinions are not 
precedent in the Supreme Court itself, but a critical aspect of the case would 
otherwise be nonsensical if narrowest grounds opinions were precedent. In 
Adarand, Justice Scalia joined as the critical fifth vote in Justice O’Connor’s 
majority opinion.237 That opinion overturned the part of Metro Broadcasting, 
Inc. v. FCC238 that had relied upon intermediate scrutiny to sustain a racial 
preference for government licensing that benefitted minority business 
enterprises.239 
Although the Court Reporter’s statement of the vote lineup is not a 
formal part of the published opinion, this specific passage is important to the 
analysis that follows: “Justice O’Connor announced the judgement of the 
Court and delivered an opinion with respect to Parts I, II, III–A, III–B, III–
D, and IV, which is for the Court except insofar as it might be inconsistent 
with the views expressed in Justice Scalia’s concurrence . . . .”240 
In Part III–D, Justice O’Connor reiterated her longstanding refutation of 
the view that “strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”241 Justice 
Scalia, by contrast, took the view that, with a single exception not relevant 
to Adarand,242 strict is invariably fatal.243 Despite joining Part III–D, Justice 
Scalia’s disagreement with O’Connor mattered. In the ordinary course, 
 
 236 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 237 See id. at 204. 
 238 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. 200. 
 239 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225–27; Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 564–65. 
 240 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204. 
 241 Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)). 
 242 Id. at 239. Justice Scalia cites to his earlier concurrence in City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co. See id.; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“At least where state or local action is at issue, only 
a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb—for example, a 
prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmates––can justify an exception to the 
principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that ‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’” (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted))). 
 243 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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Scalia likely would have issued a partial concurrence in the judgment, 
declining to join part of an opinion with which he strongly disagreed. 
Without Scalia’s joining Part III–D, O’Connor would have lacked the 
requisite five votes in Adarand to overturn Metro Broadcasting, and to 
declare that contrary to that earlier case, the relevant equal protection 
standard for the benign use was race strict scrutiny, whether the challenged 
regime is state or federal.244 Justice Scalia in Adarand, like Chief Justice 
Burger in Miller, assumed that when the Supreme Court fractures, its rulings 
bind lower courts but are not precedential in the Supreme Court. 
The dispute over whether strict scrutiny was necessarily fatal formed the 
basis for a subsequent, far more significant, ruling squarely placing these two 
Justices on opposing sides. Justice O’Connor’s hedging language in Adarand 
established the foundation for her later majority codification of the Regents 
of the University of California v. Bakke245 narrowest grounds ruling in 
Grutter v. Bollinger.246 Bakke was another 4-1-4 decision, with Justice 
Powell controlling on narrowest grounds.247 
In the 2003 Grutter decision, Justice O’Connor provided a refined 
version of Justice Powell’s Bakke analysis majority status. Although he 
invalidated the affirmative action program used by the Medical School of the 
University of California at Davis, Justice Powell permitted reliance upon 
race as one factor among many in a combined admissions regime, subject to 
strict scrutiny.248 Powell viewed diversity in higher education as a 
compelling state interest, provided the school did not, as U.C. Davis had, 
employ a quota or racially segregate admissions files.249 
In Grutter, Justice O’Connor sustained the University of Michigan Law 
School’s affirmative action program, which, like the plan Powell endorsed 
in Bakke,250 treated race as a plus factor in a combined set of admissions 
processes.251 She further joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in striking down the 
University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program in Gratz v. 
 
 244 The Supreme Court had already insisted upon strict scrutiny in state-based 
contracting set-asides in J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493–507. 
 245 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 246 539 U.S. 306, 322–25 (2003). 
 247 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269–70, 272; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 (“Since this Court’s 
splintered decision in Bakke, Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court 
has served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions 
policies.”). 
 248 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317–18. 
 249 See id. at 314–16. 
 250 Powell explained that he favored an integrated approach, with race as a soft variable, 
as employed by Harvard University, and he included that plan as an appendix to his opinion. 
See id. at 316–17. 
 251 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. 
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Bollinger.252 The undergraduate program, in contrast with the law school, 
had employed a fixed point system for race, which, the Court determined, 
too closely resembled a prohibited quota.253 
c. An Exception: The Planned Parenthood v. Casey Plurality 
There is a notable exception to the preceding analysis. From its 
inception, Roe v. Wade, which recognized a fundamental right to terminate 
an unwanted pregnancy, was subject to a campaign to have the case 
overruled.254 Although there had been earlier cases that seemed likely to 
produce that result,255 Casey presented what many regarded until then as the 
very strongest opportunity. The Casey Court included seven out of nine 
Justices appointed by Republican Presidents, with Justice Harry Blackmun, 
who authored Roe, the sole remaining member of that Court still supporting 
the result.256 The two other remaining members of the Roe Court—Justice 
Rehnquist, later elevated to Chief Justice, and Justice White—had dissented 
in Roe.257 
Casey presented a challenge to a Pennsylvania abortion statute with five 
provisions: (1) an informed consent provision requiring that a pregnant 
woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy be provided detailed disclosures 
twenty-four hours prior to the procedure; (2) a parental notification provision 
for minors seeking an abortion, subject to a “judicial bypass” if the young 
woman was deemed sufficiently informed and mature to make her own 
judgment or if the court determined that the decision was in her best interest; 
(3) a requirement that a married woman seeking an abortion notify her 
husband except in cases of previously documented abuse; (4) exemptions to 
the preceding requirements for medical emergencies; and (5) reporting 
requirements for facilities where abortions were performed.258 
The Casey Court divided into three camps. Justices Blackmun and 
Stevens sought to retain the original Roe v. Wade formulation and voted to 
strike down all the provisions except the exemption for medical 
 
 252 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003). 
 253 See id. at 270–72. 
 254 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 255 See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Kathryn Kolbert, 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Reproductive Freedom Hanging by a Thread, 11 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 153 (1989). 
 256 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 923 (1992) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 257 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 
221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (applying to both Roe and Doe). 
 258 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (joint opinion). 
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emergencies.259 Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia, and 
Thomas, would have overturned Roe and sustained all of the challenged 
provisions.260 The controlling narrowest grounds opinion, coauthored by 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, declined to overturn Roe v. Wade, 
yet revised the Roe opinion in two notable ways.261 First, the joint authors 
relaxed Roe’s trimester framework, considering it inessential to Roe’s central 
holding, and second, they maintained that Roe provided insufficient 
regulatory latitude to states seeking to demonstrate respect for the 
potentiality of human life embodied in the fetus.262 This more deferential 
approach to abortion required reclassifying abortion from a fundamental 
right to a lesser protected liberty interest,263 and it entailed replacing strict 
scrutiny with the newly minted undue burden test.264 The joint authors 
defined undue burden as a shorthand for ensuring the absence of substantial 
obstacles placed in the path of a woman seeking to terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy.265 
Applying the revised doctrinal framework, the joint authors, whose 
opinion controlled on narrowest grounds,266 sustained all of the provisions 
of the Pennsylvania statute, save one. The plurality struck the spousal 
notification provision, holding that a husband may not exercise dominion 
over his wife as parents do over their children.267 In reaching this judgment, 
the plurality, while declining to overturn Roe v. Wade, confronted two earlier 
Supreme Court abortion rulings that had struck down similar twenty-four 
hour disclosure provisions similar to that which the joint authors 
sustained.268 Thus, the Casey plurality announced overturning two preceding 
abortion rulings269: City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 
 
 259 See id. at 934 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part); id. at 911–14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 260 See id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 261 See id. at 846 (joint opinion). 
 262 See id. at 873, 885 (plurality opinion). 
 263 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847–50 (joint opinion); id. at 953 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 264 See id. at 876 (plurality opinion). 
 265 Id. at 877. 
 266 For a related analysis, see STEARNS ET AL., supra note 191, at 883–87 (reviewing 
Casey and providing graphical depiction aligning opinions along one dimension). 
 267 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 898 (joint opinion). 
 268 See id. at 881–82 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 954 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 269 See id. at 870 (plurality opinion). 
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Inc.,270 and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists.271 
This aspect of Casey, with a narrowest grounds opinion announcing the 
overruling of two Supreme Court precedents, is out of keeping with Supreme 
Court practice contemporaneous with Marks, specifically Miller, which 
superseded, but did not overrule Memoirs.272 It is also inconsistent with the 
later Supreme Court understandings as indicated by Justice Scalia’s decision 
to join Justice O’Connor in forging a majority, despite his disagreement on 
a critical part of her analysis, in Adarand to overturn Metro Broadcasting.273 
A possible account of Casey involves its very specific doctrinal context. 
Public attention concerning Casey centered on Roe itself, a case many treated 
as having the status of super precedent.274 The Casey plurality’s overturning 
of two lesser abortion precedents embedded in a decision formally retaining, 
yet modifying, Roe might have been regarded a necessary accommodation. 
Alternatively, this aspect of the Casey plurality opinion, and more 
specifically its implications for Marks, might simply have escaped notice 
given the importance of the case in other respects, despite the earlier modeled 
behavior in Miller, and the later modeled behavior in Adarand. More 
generally, Casey does not appear to have affected the understanding that 
overturning a Supreme Court majority precedent requires a majority opinion. 
3. Summary 
The preceding analyses of Apodaca, Ramos, Adarand, and McDonald 
help to explain the judicial configurations in nonmajority cases to which the 
narrowest grounds rule can or cannot be applied. The preceding analysis 
further considered two questions. First, whether a majority opinion is 
required to overturn a majority Supreme Court precedent, and second, the 
converse inquiry, whether abandoning a nonmajority Supreme Court ruling 
requires formal overruling. The analysis reveals that the Justices’ modeled 
behaviors generally support requiring a majority opinion to overrule a past 
 
 270 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 898. 
 271 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 898. 
 272 See supra Section II.A.2.a.  
 273 See supra Section II.A.2.b. 
 274 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in ‘Superprecedent’?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
30, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/weekinreview/so-do-you-believe-in-
superprecedent.html [https://perma.cc/AR3W-JNFF]. The term “super-precedent” has 
recently been used during Senate Judiciary Committee hearings for now-Justice Amy Coney 
Barrett. See Aaron Blake, Amy Coney Barrett’s Most Telling Exchange on Abortion and Roe 
v. Wade, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2020, 4:30 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/13/amy-coney-barretts-most-telling-
exchange-abortion-roe-v-wade/ [https://perma.cc/4KCK-C3ZA]. 
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precedent and generally do not require that nonmajority rulings be formally 
overruled to be abandoned. 
B. Modeling Narrowest Grounds II: Dimensionality 
A more formal model of the narrowest grounds rule supports how 
individual Justices generally express their understanding through their 
observed behaviors operating in Marks’s shadow. The concept of 
dimensionality is intuitively familiar. At the same time, its more precise 
elements find their roots in the study of group decision making. This Section 
presents a broader theoretical analysis of dimensionality, which provides the 
basis for a clearer articulation of the narrowest grounds rule. 
Dimensionality is a critical concept in assessing and comparing 
innumerable data. A single dimension can account for literally infinite data, 
even as some small data sets cannot be accommodated along one dimension. 
The preceding discussions of Apodaca, Ramos, and McDonald explained 
this intuitively. This Section provides a more formal structure, generalizing 
earlier insights. 
The benefit of the theoretical overlay is twofold. First, it demonstrates 
that the observed phenomena in fractured Supreme Court decision making 
are part of a more general set of problems associated with aggregating 
collective preferences. This implies that legal scholars who perceive 
inevitable imperfections with the narrowest grounds rule as a basis for 
abandonment risk ignoring broader insights from the study of collective 
choice that should first be taken into account. Second, identifying the 
theoretical underpinnings of the narrowest grounds rule, including its 
imperfections, allows for more targeted correction, rather than abandonment. 
Specifically, it allows for recasting Marks in a manner that avoids 
exacerbating the difficulties associated with Supreme Court decision 
making, while improving lower court guidance. 
1. From Hot Air Balloons to Learning to Count 
The analysis to follow integrates understandings from two related 
disciplines, game theory and social choice. These vast literatures offer 
fascinating insights that are often expressed with complex mathematics.275 
Although the analysis that follows uses numbers, the analysis requires only 
distinguishing among three categories of integers (whole numbers) and 
counting.  
 
 275 The analysis that follows, including Table 4, is adapted from the lengthier discussion 
and analysis set out in Stearns, supra note 26, at 1067–68. 
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TABLE 4. DIMENSIONALITY IN CATEGORIZING INTEGERS 
 Odds Evens 
Primes 3, 5, 7 . . . 2 
Non-Primes 9, 15, 21 . . . 4, 6, 8 . . . 
 
Table 4 presents an elementary exercise in counting integers that possess 
two sets of dichotomous characteristics: (1) whether integers are odd or 
even, and (2) whether integers are prime or nonprime. Even numbers yield 
integers when divided by two. Odd numbers are those, other than one, that 
do not. A prime number cannot be divided by any integer other than itself 
and 1 without yielding a fraction. Whereas 9, an odd integer, can be divided 
by 3, yielding 3, 7, also an odd number, can only be divided by itself or 1 
without yielding a fraction. 
Rotating counterclockwise from the upper left of Table 4, and stopping 
with the lower right, each box captures an infinite sequence of integers 
satisfying the combined criteria. There is an infinite sequence of odd primes, 
odd nonprimes, and even nonprimes, with the earliest entries listed and with 
ellipses signaling an endless sequence. Notice that each box contains not one, 
but two characteristic attributes that array endlessly along a single dimension 
from the left, implying a low number, to the right, implying a high number. 
The number of data being sorted bears no correlation to the number of 
dimensions along which sorting takes place. 
Now try to array a minuscule sequence, three consecutive integers 
sorted by two dichotomous criteria: (1) prime or nonprime; and (2) odd or 
even. This three-digit sequence, depicted in bold, cannot be assessed along a 
single dimension because of the anomalous number 2, the sole even-prime. 
Arraying this sequence implicates two dimensions, not one, forcing the split 
between the dimensions of prime/nonprime and odd/even. 
The number of data and the number of dimensions required to sort those 
data are orthogonal, implying no correlation. In some circumstances, 
comparing large numbers of data implicates one, or more than one, 
dimension, and in others, comparing relatively small numbers of data 
implicate one, or more than one, dimension. The preceding analysis cleanly 
expresses this, devoid of extraneous detail. Even so, it is simple enough to 
express the insight without numbers. 
This Article opened with an example that included a hot air balloon. 
Assume that each of the following means of transit are successively larger 
and heavier: skateboard, bicycle, motorcycle, car, bus, and airplane. Table 5 
depicts these six modes of transportation along a single dimension, from low 
to high, capturing both size and weight. 
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TABLE 5. TRANSIT VEHICLES IN ONE DIMENSION 
Skateboard Bicycle Motorcycle Car Bus Airplane 
Low  High 
 
Now interject an aloft hot air balloon, between the size of a car and a 
bus. Because the balloon is lighter than air, or even a skateboard, including 
it breaks down the single dimension that, in its absence, succeeded in 
capturing the size and weight inquiries. To simplify, assume a dividing line 
that separates transit vehicles along the size and weight dimensions, with 
scooter, bicycle, and motorcycle classified as small and light, and with car, 
bus, and plane classified as large and heavy.276 Assume the aloft hot air 
balloon is larger than a car and smaller than a bus. Because the hot air balloon 
is both light and large, it forces a split across the size/weight dimensions, as 
shown in Table 6. 
TABLE 6. TRANSIT VEHICLES IN TWO DIMENSIONS 
 Small Large 
Light scooter, bicycle, motorcycle hot air balloon 
Heavy  car, bus, airplane 
 
Although these categorical assessments, odd/even, prime/nonprime, 
large/small, and heavy/light, are simpler than complex legal line drawing, 
they are no different in terms of dimensionality. Once more, incorporation is 
instructive. Before the Supreme Court largely settled upon incorporation 
based on provisions embedded within the Bill of Rights, the Justices split 
over two approaches, with Justices Frankfurter and Cardozo inquiring 
whether the claimed right was sufficiently fundamental that one could not 
conceive an Anglo-American scheme of ordered liberty without it, whether 
or not the right happened to appear in the Bill of Rights.277 This approach 
recognized that not all claimed rights carry equal weight, implying a 
spectrum, with some relatively easy and other relatively hard cases. Indeed, 
even as the Court increasingly settled upon incorporation as its dominant 
 
 276 Although arbitrary, the dividing line is also irrelevant; the analysis holds wherever 
the line is drawn. 
 277 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (“Due process 
of law . . . [protects] those personal immunities which . . . are ‘so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,’ or are ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 
(1934), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); and then quoting Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 
(1969))). 
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approach,278 as Ramos and McDonald demonstrate, disputes remained as to 
whether, based on the importance of the claimed right, incorporation was jot 
for jot. 
However difficult particular cases might be, assessing claimed 
substantive rights along a single dimension capturing importance to our 
overall scheme or ordered liberty is intuitive. In Apodaca, for example, 
Justice White concluded that, on balance, the Sixth Amendment unanimity 
requirement was not sufficiently important to be constitutionally mandated, 
even at the federal level.279 By contrast, Justice Stewart found the claimed 
right sufficiently important that it must be fully afforded at the federal level 
and incorporated jot for jot.280 And Justice Powell found that although 
unanimity warrants inclusion in federal criminal trials, it is insufficiently 
important to warrant jot for jot incorporation as applied to states.281 Again, 
these competing views align along one dimension: lax (White) to strict 
(Stewart) protection of the claimed Sixth Amendment right, with Justice 
Powell assuming an intermediate position between the extremes. 
Ramos did not consider the underlying merits of the claimed unanimous 
jury right in the first instance. Rather, it construed Apodaca, including 
determining which opinion controls, whether the case is precedential, and 
whether, if precedential, it should be superseded or overruled.282 These three 
issues likewise align along a single dimension, from a strict to lax 
understanding of the status of Apodaca. Justice Gorsuch, who rejected 
Apodaca, took the extreme view that there is no narrowest grounds opinion, 
it is not precedent, and it should be superseded.283 Alito took the opposite 
extreme view: Apodaca is precedent, Powell’s opinion states the holding, 
and the case should be retained.284 Setting aside Justice Thomas, the 
remaining concurrences in the judgment, Kavanaugh and Sotomayor, took 
the view that Apodaca is precedent, Powell’s opinion controls, and Apodaca 
should be overruled.285 Each of the three issues align along the same 
dimension, and each bloc votes consistently with a characterization from the 
 
 278 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968); see also supra note 167 
(quoting Duncan as focusing identification of incorporated rights on the Bill of Rights given 
that state systems of criminal justice largely replicate the federal system). 
 279 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–11 (1972) (plurality opinion), abrogated 
by Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (plurality opinion). 
 280 See id. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 281 See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 372–73 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 282 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1403–04 (2020) (plurality opinion). 
 283 See id. at 1403. 
 284 See id. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 285 See id. at 1410–20 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part); id. at 1402–10 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A). 
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far left (Gorsuch for a plurality of 3), to the median (Sotomayor and 
Kavanaugh), to the far right (Alito dissenting for 3). Once more, the number 
of data or issues do not correlate with the number of dimensions. 
Finally, consider McDonald. Although Thomas took the same approach 
in Ramos and McDonald, the dimensional split mattered only in the latter. 
Because there are two ways to arrive at the result of incorporating the Heller 
Second Amendment right, with one group accepting due process and 
rejecting privileges or immunities, and with Justice Thomas doing the 
opposite, the case presents like sorting the three integers––2, 3, and 4––along 
two dimensions: odd/even and prime/non-prime. Justice Thomas’s position 
corresponds to the integer 2 in Table 4 and to the hot air balloon in Table 6. 
Sorting his opinion, plus the others in McDonald, implicates two dimensions. 
By contrast, despite the large number of opinions and issues involved, Ramos 
implicates only one relevant dimension. Five Justices implicitly agree 
concerning how the dimension is defined even as they disagree as to where 
along it the case should be resolved. Again, the number of issues, opinions, 
or data bear no correlation to the number of dimensions along which they are 
sorted. 
The central problem with the scholarly literature on Marks is failing to 
appreciate the central role of dimensionality in assessing the narrowest 
grounds rule.286 As previously noted there are two problems with the Marks 
formulation of the narrowest grounds rule, one that is easily fixed, but 
unimportant, and one that cannot be fixed and that matters a lot. Life is like 
that sometimes. Let us start with the easy one. Imagine an opinion, similar 
to Ramos, with a plurality of three, three separate concurrences in the 
judgment, and three in dissent. Unlike Ramos, however, imagine that the 
opinions discretely align along a single dimension, such that in the 3-1-1-1-
3 line-up, the bolded concurrence in the judgment is the broadest, albeit less 
broad than the plurality, and the italicized concurrence in the judgment is the 
narrowest opinion consistent with the outcome, and thus closest to the 
dissent. 
In this analysis, the Roman typeface 1 concurring in the judgment 
represents the median position in the nine-member Court. In social choice 
theory, absent a first-choice majority winner, the option that would defeat all 
others in binary comparisons holds special status because it possesses an 
important attribute corresponding to majority rule. To illustrate, consider 
another famous Supreme Court decision, Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, which split 4-1-4.287 Eight out of nine Justices disagreed 
with two arguments that Powell presented only for himself—diversity is a 
 
 286 See infra note 357. 
 287 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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compelling government interest in higher education admissions, and while 
race can be used as a plus factor, it cannot be used in the form of a quota.288 
The two groups of four Justices who declined to join Powell’s analysis 
disagreed for opposing reasons. Those joining Justice Brennan viewed 
Powell as insufficiently accommodative of racial considerations, and those 
joining Justice Stevens viewed Powell as excessively accommodative of 
racial considerations.289 
The statement that eight Justices rejected Powell’s view is not merely 
unhelpful; it is misleading. The better analysis recognizes that if we align the 
opinions Brennan (A), Powell (B), and Stevens (C), along a dimension 
capturing lax-to-strict permissibility of the use of race in higher education 
admissions, the A camp intuitively prefers B to C and the C camp intuitively 
prefers B to A.290 Contrary to Justice Gorsuch’s claim that allowing a single 
Justice to control thwarts consensus on the Court, the analysis reveals the 
majoritarian underpinnings of the narrowest grounds rule even as applied in 
4-1-4 rulings implicating a single dimension. In social choice theory, option 
B is referred to as a Condorcet winner, and rules producing such an option 
when it is available, meaning when options align on a single dimension, are 
said to satisfy the Condorcet criterion.291 
 
 288 See id. at 314–18 (Powell, J.). 
 289 See id. at 324–26 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part); id. at 408–11 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 290 This mechanism was employed in United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 
723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). See supra note 38. Professor Ryan Williams, who has 
criticized earlier versions of the arguments more fully developed in this Article, see supra 
note 214 and sources cited infra note 357, maintains that one troubling feature of this approach 
is that it affords the views of dissenting Justices a role in identifying the opinion designated 
as controlling on narrowest grounds. See Williams, supra note 11, at 815 (“The fifth vote 
approach also implicitly accords weight to the views of dissenting Justices by allowing their 
views to influence the identification of the median Justice’s opinion.”). Although some jurists 
or scholars might regard that feature as problematic, the criticism rests on a misunderstanding. 
It is true that the Gerke court considered the implicit consensus of those who take a broader 
and narrower view of the possible judgment-supporting rationales, including those in dissent, 
to identify the controlling narrowest grounds opinion. But this simply reflects the intuition 
that in identifying any median, for example the number five in an integer sequence from one 
to nine, one can count from one upwards, or from nine downwards, completing the task upon 
reaching five, the median, in either direction. The criticism does not undermine the argument 
advanced here; rather, it reveals an underlying confusion concerning an inevitable feature of 
data arrayed along a single dimension. 
 291 The Condorcet winner is likewise a partial solution to the problem of collective 
preference aggregation. With preferences (1: ABC; 2: BCA; 3: CBA), B is a Condorcet 
winner. By contrast with preferences (1: ABC; 2: BCA; 3: CAB or 1: CBA, 2: BAC; 3: ACB) 
unlimited binary comparisons produce a cycle, ApBpCpA or CpBpApC, for the first and 
second set of listed rankings respectively. For a more detailed discussion and analysis, see 
STEARNS, supra note 33, at 41–97 (providing overview and collecting authorities); and 
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The narrowest grounds rule intuitively embraces the Condorcet 
criterion. Consider that on a nine-member Supreme Court, as a general 
intuition, the median position generally correlates with where the Court is 
apt to settle on an upcoming and unresolved doctrinal question. Discerning 
the median position enhances the stability, and thus the value, of precedent 
by rendering future doctrinal outcomes more predictable based on decisions 
in the past. This helps to explain why, contrary to Justice Gorsuch and 
consistent with Justice Alito, 4-1-4 decisions that implicate one relevant 
dimension readily satisfy the narrowest grounds rule. 
a. Imperfection 
The minor defect in the Marks statement of the narrowest grounds rule 
is now apparent. The opinion consistent with the outcome that expresses the 
holding on narrowest grounds in the hypothetical 3-1-1-1-3 case is the 
italicized 1 (starting left, position 6), whereas the Condorcet winner, or 
median justice, is the Roman typeface 1 (starting left, position 5). In a nine-
member Court, position 5, not 6, is the median. A majority comprising the 
plurality of 3, the bold 1, and the Roman typeface 1 collectively prefer the 
position of the Roman typeface 1 to that of the italicized 1. The formally 
stated Marks rule thus fails to capture precisely the intended majoritarian 
aspect of the narrowest grounds doctrine by risking vindicating 1 over 1. 
Although rare, Fullilove v. Klutznick292 is such a case. Fullilove 
concerned a challenge to a race-based set-aside program for federal 
government contracting.293 The case was decided two years after the 
fractured decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, which 
itself came one year after Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Marks.294 
Bakke struck down an affirmative action program used by the Medical 
School of the University of California at Davis, with Justice Powell alone 
expressing the narrowest grounds holding.295 Powell determined that 
although the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause prohibited the 
medical school’s selection process, which involved segregating files based 
on race and which set a specific quota of sixteen out of one hundred seats for 
specified minorities, some use of race was allowed.296 Specifically, Powell 
 
Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994) 
(reviewing literature). 
 292 See 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The case is also particularly helpful in providing a limited 
empirical survey of the early understanding of Marks. See supra Section II.A.2.a; see also 
Appendix B (reviewing cases and law review articles from 1980–1990 assessing Fullilove). 
 293 See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453 (plurality opinion). 
 294 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 295 See id. at 269–72 (plurality opinion). 
 296 See id. at 279 (majority opinion). 
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determined that although the state medical school could not rely upon race 
to remedy the present effects of past discrimination, it could rely on race in 
a more limited way to promote its compelling interest in diversity in higher 
education.297 To further that compelling interest, the admissions office could 
not employ a quota, although, as Harvard University had done, it could 
employ race as one plus factor among many in an integrated admissions 
regime.298 
Fullilove presented the related question of how to assess a racial 
preference in the federal contracting context, with fifteen percent of contracts 
set aside for specified minorities.299 Like the Bakke Court, the Fullilove 
Court fractured. In Fullilove, however, Justice Powell occupied the same 
unusual position as the theoretical italicized Justice in the preceding 
hypothetical. To illustrate, consider the breakdown in Table 7. 
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For purposes of this presentation, it is easiest to divide Fullilove into 
four camps. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, 
reiterated the view that Justice Brennan had expressed in Bakke. Specifically, 
this group of Justices reasoned that in the context of a benign race-based 
classification, operating in this case at the federal level, the appropriate 
standard of review was intermediate scrutiny.300 Under that test, this group 
of Justices voted to sustain the program against the equal protection 
 
 297 See id. 269–72 (plurality opinion). 
 298 See id. at 316–17 (Powell, J.); id. at 321–24 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.). 
 299 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453–54 (1980). 
 300 See id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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challenge.301 At the opposite end, Justice Stewart, joined by Rehnquist, in 
dissent, applied strict scrutiny, voting to strike down the racial set-aside 
program.302 Justice Stevens, in a sole-authored dissent, voted to strike down 
the set-aside program based upon concerns involving congressional 
deliberations.303 In his sole-authored concurrence, Justice Powell reiterated 
his view in Bakke that the appropriate test for a benign race-based program 
was strict scrutiny, and because he determined federal policy met the test, he 
voted to sustain the program.304 Finally, Chief Justice Burger authored a 
plurality opinion, which Powell also joined, issuing the Court’s judgment.305 
Burger’s fact-driven opinion, while sustaining the race-based set aside, 
declined to adopt either the intermediate or strict scrutiny test.306 Removing 
Powell from the Burger opinion count, as signaled with bracketing, produces 
a 3-2-1-3 lineup, with the Burger opinion occupying the median and the 
Powell opinion expressing the holding on narrowest grounds. 
Fullilove provides a valuable opportunity for assessing early lower court 
and scholarly treatment of this unusual voting lineup because of the 
proximity to when Marks was issued and because the relevant window is 
limited to ten years. Nine years after Fullilove, the Supreme Court 
disallowed states to mimic the federal set-aside policy,307 and ten years after 
Fullilove, in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, the Supreme Court superseded 
Fullilove, embracing, for another five years, the intermediate scrutiny test.308 
Although a survey of lower federal and state court decisions and law 
review articles construing Fullilove in that period does not provide a 
definitive answer, the data suggest that, in general, courts and commentators 
treated Burger’s position as controlling or sought to reconcile outcomes with 
both the Burger and Powell opinions.309 We have located only two of 
seventeen lower court cases that treat the Powell opinion in Fullilove as 
controlling.310 Other lower courts generally treated Burger’s opinion as 
 
 301 See id. at 519–21. 
 302 See id. at 522–27 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 303 See id. at 532–36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). To simplify the presentation, without 
changing the analysis, the discussion will treat the dissent as a bloc of three voters: Stewart, 
Rehnquist, and Stevens. 
 304 See id. at 495–517 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 305 See id. at 453, 492 (plurality opinion). 
 306 See id. at 492 (plurality opinion). 
 307 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476–77 (1989); id. at 511 
(plurality opinion). 
 308 See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563–65 (1990). The Supreme Court 
then overturned Metro Broadcasting, insisting upon strict scrutiny, in Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225–27 (1995). 
 309 Those data are collected and presented infra Appendix B. 
 310 The data supporting the assertions in this paragraph are summarized in Appendix B.  
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controlling or sought to reconcile the two opinions, with a small number 
claiming to reconcile all three judgment-consistent opinions.311 This general 
approach was also consistent with treatment in the Supreme Court itself and 
in contemporaneous law review articles, none of which treated Powell’s 
narrower concurring opinion as controlling.312 Together these data imply that 
despite Marks’s phrasing, with respect to Fullilove, lower courts and 
commentators generally grasped intuitively that in a single dimensional case, 
the narrowest grounds rule intends to capture the opinion that is joined by 
the Court’s median Justice. 
b. Incompleteness 
The second problem with the Marks rule is incompleteness.313 This 
problem proves both inevitable and intractable. And unlike the wording 
imperfection, which is relatively unimportant and easily remedied, this one 
cannot be remedied yet matters a lot. Unpacking it, once more, implicates 
dimensionality. 
Recall that when preferences align along a single dimension this implies 
that those embracing one extreme position prefer the median position to the 
opposite extreme position. As applied to Bakke, with Brennan (A); Powell 
(B); and Stevens (C), it is fair to assume that Brennan and Stevens (A and C) 
would prefer Powell’s position (B) to each other’s positions (C and A).314 
More formally, assume Brennan’s preferences are ABC and Stevens’s 
preferences are CBA. As Bakke revealed, no opinion has majority support. 
Whether Powell’s preference rankings are BAC or BCA, if each participant 
votes sincerely when comparing A to B, B to C, or C to A, option B, which 
defeats A and C, will emerge the winner in a regime that allows all binary 
comparisons to be voted. By contrast, changing our assumptions such that 
either Brennan preferred C over B or Stevens preferred A over B thwarts the 
assumption that the preferences align on a single dimension, generating an 
outcome that cycles. 
To illustrate, we now revisit the earlier table, presenting McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, reproduced as Table 8: 
 
 311 See infra Appendix B. 
 312 See infra Appendix B. 
 313 This phrasing is drawn from Arrow’s Incompleteness Theorem, which demonstrates 
that any institution that avoids cycling in aggregating group preferences runs afoul of some 
other benign attribute that Arrow associated with rational and fair collective decision making. 
See STEARNS, supra note 33. 
 314 This analysis is simplified inasmuch as Justice Stevens rested his analysis on Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act. For a more detailed analysis, see STEARNS, supra note 33, at 130–
33. 
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TABLE 8. MCDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO REVISITED 
 Incorporate Under Privileges or Immunities 
Do Not Incorporate 
Under Privileges or 
Immunities 
Incorporate Under Due 
Process  Plurality (A) 
Do Not Incorporate 
Under Due Process Thomas (C) Dissent (B) 
 
A special feature reveals McDonald as a case implicating two 
dimensions. Discerning whether a case implicates two dimensions requires 
identifying the premise on which all Justices must logically agree. In 
McDonald, that premise follows: Striking the Chicago handgun ban requires 
incorporating the Heller right under either due process or privileges or 
immunities, whereas sustaining the Chicago handgun ban requires failing to 
incorporate the Heller right under either due process or privileges or 
immunities. Despite their disagreements concerning how to resolve the case, 
all Justices would logically embrace this proposition, which is consistent 
with each McDonald opinion. The Justices thus agree that there are two 
controlling issues: (1) Is the Heller right incorporated via the Due Process 
Clause?; and (2) is the Heller right incorporated via the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause? Although positions A and C incorporate Heller, they do 
so by resolving both questions in opposite fashion. By contrast, position B 
resolves one issue in favor of each camp, A and C, yet votes against 
incorporating the claimed right. 
A Supreme Court opinion has two dimensions when separate opinions 
express opposite resolutions of controlling issues yet yield the Court’s 
judgment, and a dissenting opinion, expressing a favorable resolution of a 
single controlling issue from the perspective of each of those opinions 
consistent with the judgment, yields the opposite result. Otherwise, the case 
implicates one dimension. Unlike a single dimensional case, when a case 
presents in two dimensions, there is no inherent reason to assume any 
particular ranking over any of the three expressed combined preferences 
within the opinions. We cannot know a priori that either A or C would prefer 
an opposing resolution of both underlying issues to a partly favorable 
resolution of one of the two issues that nonetheless leads to an opposing 
judgment. Likewise, we cannot know whether B would prefer, if forced to 
choose, yes on 1 and no on 2 or yes on 2 and no on 1. 
There are different ways to express the conceivable preference rankings, 
and each requires specifying assumptions. If the preferences are Alito 
(plurality) (ABC), Stevens (dissent) (BCA), Thomas (concurrence in the 
judgment) (CAB), and if each camp votes sincerely, the rankings reveal a 
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cycle, such that ApBpCpA, where p means preferred to by simple majority 
vote. Conversely if the preferences are Thomas (CBA), Stevens (dissent) 
(BAC), and Alito (ACB), on the same assumptions, the preferences generate 
the reverse cycle: CpBpApC. Although none of these rankings are inevitable, 
each is plausible. In fact, both presentations, the forward and reverse cycles, 
embed each of the two available rankings over the remaining opinions for 
each of the judicial camps. The point is not to defend any ranking about 
which we lack complete information. Instead, the analysis demonstrates that 
unlike the one-dimensional case in which the simplest assumptions yield an 
implicit majority winner, or dominant second choice,315 preferences 
implicating more than one dimension allow no such assumption. 
Cases forcing a split across two dimensions thwart the premise on which 
the narrowest grounds rule rests. Although Marks itself fails to specify the 
rule’s limitations, the narrowest grounds rule assumes a nonmajority case in 
which opinions align along a single dimension, but this cannot be 
guaranteed. The problem is not unique to Supreme Court decision making. 
It is endemic to, and thus inevitable in, group decision making. In the course 
of collective decision making, opinions often align along one dimension, but 
not always, and when they do not, the possibility of aggregation problems 
becomes inevitable. This is the focus of social choice, a major literature that 
has claimed at least two Nobel Laureates.316 
2. Endogeneity & the Rules of the Game 
Part of the problem with the narrowest grounds rule is that those trained 
in law are rarely exposed to social choice. And when judges and legal 
scholars come up against problems in aligning judicial opinions or 
aggregating preferences, they sometimes fail to recognize that the problem 
they are confronting is not special to the context of judicial decision making. 
A considerable literature has emerged identifying cases like McDonald and 
noting the divergence in such cases between outcomes and the logical 
 
 315 In social choice theory the option is referred to as a Condorcet winner. See Stearns, 
supra note 291, at 1252–57. 
 316 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); Kenneth 
J. Arrow, NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-
sciences/1972/arrow/biographical/ [https://perma.cc/3AA5-2LYF]; Amartya Sen, The 
Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349 (1999); Amartya Sen, NOBEL PRIZE, 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1998/sen/biographical/ 
[https://perma.cc/QD6Y-H8QK]; WILLIAM VICKREY, PUBLIC ECONOMICS (Richard Arnott et 
al. eds., 1994); William Vickrey, NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-
sciences/1996/vickrey/biographical/ [https://perma.cc/WYD5-3ZWJ]. Although William 
Vickrey earned his Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on auction theory, he too 
contributed substantially to social choice, including providing a simplified proof of Arrow’s 
Impossibility Theorem. See STEARNS, supra note 33, at 81, 334–35 n.91. 
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progression of issue resolutions using existing protocols (which involve each 
jurist voting on the outcome and aligning rationales around the resulting 
opinions) and proposing various alternative voting protocols (which would 
instead base the case outcome on the results of separate tallies over 
controlling issues).317 
The narrowest grounds doctrine proves central to these debates. What 
issue voting proposals miss is that the narrowest grounds rule is one piece in 
a larger complex puzzle implicating myriad features of decision making at 
the apex of a pyramidal judiciary. As with the clock that strikes thirteen, 
issue voting proposals, by ignoring this piece, raise concerns about what else 
is missing. Removing one piece while imagining all the rest will fit perfectly 
is problematic. Exacerbating the problem is an instinct that all problems are 
solvable when, in fact, some are not, at least not without risking other larger 
problems.318 
The narrowest grounds rule is the flipside of the aggregation coin. We 
have two seemingly plausible methods of resolving appellate court cases: 
aggregating judicial resolutions per issue, producing a pathway to the 
judgment, or, as we actually observe, aggregating judicial resolutions on the 
judgment and reading across opinions to discern which opinion resolves the 
controlling issues. Although several leading scholars have advocated 
variations on issue voting, none have identified an appellate court, quite 
literally anywhere, that employs it.319 This seemingly glaring datum has 
proved remarkable in its failure to signal the possibility of a missing piece of 
the puzzle. 
Consider two economics jokes: 
Joke one: 
Two economists walk down a street. One says to the other, “There’s 
a $20 bill. You should pick it up.” The second says, “There can’t 
be; if it were there, someone would have picked it up already.” 
Joke two: 
An economist watches her lawyer friends playing a game and asks 
if it is the same game they played the prior week. One friend 
responds: “Same game, different rules.” 
The point is not to lament any discipline’s distorted sense of humor. 
Rather, each joke provides a relevant insight into the problem at hand. 
Economists sometimes imagine all valuable opportunities having been taken, 
 
 317 See sources cited supra note 191. 
 318 This is perhaps the central insight of the literature on social choice. See supra note 
290; sources cited supra note 316. 
 319 See sources cited supra note 191. 
2021] MODELING NARROWEST GROUNDS 165 
which, if true, would leave no space for entrepreneurs.320 Legal scholars tend 
toward the opposite fallacy, imaging that an immediate creative spark 
confronts few, if any, theoretical obstacles, failing to search out that missing 
piece. The truth, of course, lies somewhere in between. Creative minds 
certainly can improve the state of the world but only after truly grappling 
with what might be missing in their proposals. Not all $20 bills have been 
taken, but as obvious a proposal as shifting voting protocols to avoid the 
intractable, if occasional, judicial voting anomaly almost surely would, by 
now, have been tried somewhere in the world.321 What appears to be missing 
is a problem that economists refer to as endogeneity, or, as the second joke 
implies, failing to recognize that changing the rules is changing the game.322 
Advocates of issue voting imagine that the preferences over issues, or 
even the very statements of issues expressed across opinions, will remain 
unaffected by a change in judicial voting protocol. But changing voting 
protocols changes the institutional context in which both aspects of decision 
making—identification of issues and their resolution—takes place. Judicial 
opinions are endogenous to, meaning a function of, the decision making rules 
used to decide cases. Changing those rules will affect incentives respecting 
these vital aspects of issue identification and resolution. So what is missing? 
The present system of voting encourages Justices to produce the most 
persuasive opinions they can devise in the hope of forming and retaining a 
majority coalition.323 A majority coalition holds particular value provided 
majority opinions have greater status than nonmajority opinions, including 
narrowest grounds opinions. Historically that has been well understood.324 
Contrary to Justice Alito in Ramos, narrowest grounds opinions have 
 
 320 For a paper that explores this puzzle, see Henry G. Manne, Resurrecting the Ghostly 
Entrepreneur, 27 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 249 (2014). 
 321 This seems especially likely when we consider that social choice dates at least as far 
back as the Constitution itself and likely earlier. See Stearns, supra note 291, at 1221–25. 
And, of course, various manifestations of common law decision making likewise have ancient 
origins. See generally Ephraim Glatt, The Unanimous Verdict According to the Talmud: 
Ancient Law Providing Insight into Modern Legal Theory, 3 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE 
COMPANION 316 (2013) (examining Talmud’s unanimous decision rules in evaluating ancient 
origins of common law decision making); Charles Auerbach, The Talmud—A Gateway to the 
Common Law, 3 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 5 (1951) (examining parallels among common law 
and Talmudic jurisprudence). 
 322 Endogeneity implies that outcomes are a function of the rules generating them. See 
STEARNS ET AL., supra note 191, at 895 (defining endogeneity). 
 323 See Maxwell L. Stearns, How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue 
Identification: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1045, 1050 
(1996). 
 324 See supra Section II.A.2.b (providing examples illustrating that when the Supreme 
Court supersedes a fractured ruling, it does so without the need to overrule). 
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generally not been understood to overturn past majority decisions.325 
Similarly, as previously shown, they have not generally been construed to 
produce binding precedent in the Supreme Court, as opposed to among lower 
courts.326 
Majority opinions are the Supreme Court’s brass ring, the essential 
means by which Justices can place their imprimaturs on controlling doctrine, 
at least presumptively. Such opinions force upon future Supreme Courts 
seeking to displace the resulting precedent not one barrier, but two: a stare 
decisis inquiry and a merits inquiry. An important distinction in Ramos 
between the Gorsuch approach and those of Alito, Kavanaugh, and 
Sotomayor, is that Gorsuch rightly recognized that, unlike a majority opinion 
in the Supreme Court, a narrowest grounds opinion only implicates the 
merits inquiry as such opinions bind only lower courts, not the Court itself. 
Issue voting would allow Justices to work toward splintering off 
colleagues who might otherwise have helped form a contrary majority 
coalition. The change would blend the status of an actual majority ruling, 
earning the twin benefits of having to withstand a stare decisis and merits 
analysis to overrule, with happenstances majority agreements on any 
controlling issues. In cases where the judgment matters more than specific 
issues, the protocol change would encourage Justices to forge favorable 
voting paths, cobbling separate issue majorities capable of producing a 
preferred result. Switching to issue voting risks such incentives in cases 
presently implicating a single dimension and even resolved by majority 
opinions.327 Justices are highly intelligent and motivated actors, and 
changing the rules changes the game. With a rule change to issue voting, 
talented Justices will no longer continue behaving as if operating under 
outcome voting. 
Under the present outcome voting protocol, once the opinions are 
aligned, the narrowest grounds doctrine comes into play. Supreme Court 
opinions divide into four general categories: (1) unanimous opinions, 
(2) majority opinions, (3) fractured opinions, and (4) three-judgment cases. 
Under outcome voting, Marks only comes into play in fractured opinion 
cases, comprising a small subset of the Court’s overall case output. When 
the Court is unanimous, or when there is a majority opinion, there is no 
 
 325 See supra Section I.B.1.b (discussing Justice Alito’s Ramos dissent); see also supra 
Section II.A.2.a–.c (reviewing three case studies implicating Justice Alito’s analysis: Miller 
v. California, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey). 
 326 See supra Section II.A. 
 327 For a discussion about the resulting risks this protocol change would bring about, see 
Stearns, supra note 323, at 1059–61 (illustrating with variation on National Mutual Insurance 
v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949)). 
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collective preference aggregation problem.328 The entire Court, or a 
majority, aligns along one dimension, expressing the Court’s dominant 
position in the controlling opinion. As a practical matter, the Court has 
always resolved three-judgment cases—split over reverse, remand, or 
affirm—with one or more Justices changing from their preferred judgment 
typically toward the remand, providing the lower court with necessary 
guidance.329 
The combined effect of the above analysis cabins the collective 
preference aggregation problem to fractured cases. Within that subset, we 
must further subdivide cases implicating one or more than one dimension. 
The conventional understanding of the narrowest grounds rule implicitly 
construes it to resolve fractured cases implicating one dimension. If lower 
courts, and the Supreme Court, better understood how to discern when 
fractured opinions so align, identifying the smaller, problematic subset of 
cases in which Marks fails to apply would be simplified. When there is one 
relevant dimension in a fractured case, there is always a narrowest ground 
opinion. Rather than speculative, as Professor Re has claimed, this follows 
axiomatically from foundational social choice insights.330 By contrast, when 
there is more than one relevant dimension in a fractured case, there is never 
a narrowest grounds opinion. The same tools also reveal this as 
nonspeculative and axiomatic. 
The question then becomes how to discern when there is one or more 
relevant dimensions. The following restatement of the narrowest grounds 
rule is consistent with the conventional understanding, yet offers critical 
guidance in making these assessments: 
When the Supreme Court issues a nonmajority decision, lower 
courts should presume that the opinions can be expressed along a 
single dimension. In such circumstances, when all Justices are 
participating, lower courts should apply that opinion representing 
the deciding Court’s median position. This will generally coincide 
with the position closest to dissent for each separate judgment. In 
the rare circumstance in which there is an even narrower 
concurrence in the judgment, placing it closer to the dissent, lower 
courts should nonetheless treat the opinion that coincides with the 
Court’s median position as controlling. When two or more opinions 
 
 328 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes?: Miller v. Albright in 
Social Choice Perspective, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 87, 110 (1999) (categorizing Supreme 
Court opinions based on degrees of consensus). 
 329 See STEARNS, supra note 33, at 153–54 (collecting cases). 
 330 See Re, supra note 11, at 1979 (describing as “worrisomely speculative” and 
“inefficient” drawing inferences that necessarily correlate to opinions aligning on a single 
dimension). 
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consistent with the judgment resolve controlling issues in opposite 
fashion, yet reach the same judgment, and when the dissenting 
opinion resolves one or more issues favorably to each opinion 
consistent with the judgment, yet achieves an opposite judgment, 
the premise underlying the narrowest grounds rule fails to apply. 
This can also be determined when separately tallying majority 
resolutions of controlling issues supports the dissenting outcome. 
When making such assessments, lower courts should disregard 
opinions that, if removed, would not affect the ability to align the 
remaining opinions on one dimension, with a controlling narrowest 
grounds opinion emerging among the remaining opinions. Lower 
courts should not presume that one or more Justices embracing a 
broad rule, whether consistent with the judgment, or in dissent, 
prefers an opposing broad rule to an opinion consistent with the 
judgment that decides the case on narrowest grounds. Lower courts 
should assume Justices express their judgment preference through 
the opinion they join.331 
The preceding analysis sets the foundation for this clarified statement of 
the narrowest grounds rule. In the single nonmajority Supreme Court case, 
Fullilove, although the opinions align on a single dimension, the narrowest 
grounds opinion is narrower than that embracing the position of the Court’s 
median Justice. This restatement of the narrowest grounds rule accounts for 
that situation, admonishing lower courts to apply the position of the median 
Justice in this circumstance, consistent with prevalent lower court practice 
in construing Fullilove.332 
In a minuscule subset of fractured cases implicating more than one 
dimension, one or more Justices has acquiesced to a contrary resolution on 
one dispositive issue, treating that issue as settled.333 Doing so allows the 
Justice(s) to change the judgment vote, and along with it, the judgment for 
the Court as a whole. The final sentence acknowledges this rare possibility. 
More generally, the restatement admonishes lower courts to presume that 
when opinions resolve controlling issues in opposite fashion and reach 
opposing judgments, that suggests that the opinions align on a single 
dimension. Most importantly, avoiding this more plausible reading requires 
more—not fewer—ambitious leaps in construction, including drawing 
counterintuitive inferences concerning how Supreme Court Justices would 
align their preferences over the remaining opinions.334 This restatement of 
 
 331 This restatement is a refined presentation of that submitted in the author’s Hughes 
amicus brief. See Hughes Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 25–26. 
 332 See infra Appendix B (collecting authorities). 
 333 See infra Part III.B (providing examples). 
 334 Although this rule of construction likely rests upon an inevitable inference from how 
the opinions in a fractured case relate, it can also be defended in terms of administrability. It 
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the narrowest grounds rule instructs lower courts to avoid unnecessary 
inferences, demanding that before they draw counterintuitive inferences, 
they obtain express guidance by the relevant Justice. And when such 
guidance is provided, there is no need for tenuous or speculative 
constructions. The switched vote will generate a majority opinion, albeit one 
contrary to the logical progression of that Justice’s internal resolution of the 
case based upon her or his independent assessment of controlling issues. 
This restatement of the narrowest grounds rule clarifies, without 
changing, the rule’s meaning. It identifies clearly the very limited 
circumstances in which the premise of the narrowest grounds rule fails to 
apply. This leaves open the question as to how the Supreme Court itself 
construes Marks as applied to past fractured rulings to which the Marks 
premise does not hold. The simplest rule of construction is that such cases 
establish a binding precedent on the overall case judgment in lower courts 
but leave open the resolution of the controlling questions necessary to 
achieve that judgment. Lower courts will inevitably struggle in absence of 
further guidance, but the relevant subset of cases is extremely limited. 
Incompleteness is not unique to the Supreme Court; it is inevitable in any 
system of collective decision making. 
3. Summary 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that in fractured cases in which 
Marks’s underlying premise of a single dimension holds, there is always a 
narrowest grounds opinion, whereas for the smaller subset of fractured cases 
 
is generally sounder as a matter of judicial administration to engage in a set of assumptions 
that lowers, rather than raises, the plausibility of ascribing multiple dimensions to a case. 
Barry Friedman and his coauthors, see FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 23, observe that “[m]ost 
accounts of judicial decision-making assume—implicitly or explicitly—that the median-
justice theory is correct.” Id. at 604. This insight is consistent with the proffered clarification 
of the narrowest grounds rule. 
Friedman and his coauthors further posit that challenges to what they term the median- 
justice theory arise due to an overlooked tension in which Justices sometimes prioritize case 
outcomes over agreement with rules articulated in published opinions. See id. (citing Cliff 
Carrubba, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. Martin & Georg Vanberg, Who Controls the Content 
of Supreme Court Opinions?, 56 AM J. POL. SCI. 400 (2012)). As this Article demonstrates, 
although divergences between outcomes and stated rules might forge a problem of 
dimensionality, that is neither necessary nor inevitable. For example, McDonald implicates 
two dimensions based on the differing rationales that Justice Alito, for a plurality, and Justice 
Thomas, concurring in the judgment, provide while agreeing to the case outcome. See supra 
Section I.C (describing McDonald). Likewise, a Justice who cares more about the outcome 
than rationale may switch votes, subordinating the resolution of one dispositive issue to reach 
another that otherwise would be logically foreclosed. In doing so, the Justice produces a 
majority opinion in which the opinions then implicate a single relevant dimension. See infra 
Section III.B (illustrating with Justice White’s vote in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 
U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)). 
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in which the Marks premise does not hold, there is never a narrowest grounds 
opinion. As a general proposition, as modeled by their behavior, Supreme 
Court Justices exhibit greater implicit understandings of the doctrine than 
when they seek to articulate those understandings in opinions. This is 
especially true in the context of fractured or potentially fractured single 
dimensional cases in which judgments concerning whether to join or not join 
a majority have potentially significant doctrinal consequences. Despite 
expressing uncertainty regarding the scope of Marks, the Justices modeled 
behavior demonstrates that the following represents the best reading of the 
narrowest grounds rule: (1) the rule applies even when a single Justice 
expresses the holding on narrowest ground; (2) narrowest grounds opinions 
bind lower courts, not the Supreme Court itself; and (3) narrowest grounds 
opinions may not overturn past majority decisions.335 
In some respects, observing what the Justices do, rather than what they 
say, is more informative as to how the narrowest grounds rule is intended to 
function.336 In actual cases, members of the Court pay for advancing their 
doctrinal understands by forgoing alternative options. These include writing 
alone, expressing an ideal point, or joining with a majority, thereby gaining 
the benefit of a presumptively binding precedent on the Court itself. The 
preceding discussion provides examples of strategies comporting with each 
of these understandings. 
Along with legal scholars, members of the Court have done less well in 
appreciating the different implications of the narrowest grounds rule in cases 
implicating more than one dimension. This has resulted in failing to 
recognize the very limited circumstances in which Marks fails to apply. The 
dimensionality analysis demonstrates that this problem is not unique to the 
judicial context; it pervades all collective decision making. Modeling when 
the narrowest grounds rule can and cannot be applied helps to avoid 
 
 335 This analysis implies that adherence to the narrowest grounds rule might be construed 
as presenting a spectral rather than purely binary inquiry. Although this Article advocates 
strict adherence to these propositions, it is important to acknowledge that generally construing 
Marks consistently with these principles is preferable to routinely departing from them. As 
this Article has shown, lower courts and even Supreme Court Justices will occasionally 
misapply Marks simply due to the narrowest grounds rule’s inevitable complexity or due to 
the complexity, or unique circumstances, of the relevant cases to which the doctrine is being 
applied. Occasional misreadings of the narrowest grounds rule should not be construed as 
permanent departures from this important core set of understandings. 
 336 For a related analysis linking the value of legislative history to whether the signal 
was “paid for” through various forms of bargaining and proposing that legislative history 
provides greater insight when “the observer can learn whether the informed party bore some 
cost to communicate the signal,” see McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive 
Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring 1994, 
at 3, 8 (Professors Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, writing 
collectively). 
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overreaching claims of inapplicability, including in Apodaca and Ramos, 
with opinions aligning on one dimension. This Article’s recasting of the 
narrowest grounds rule captures the modeled behavior of justices and 
grounds it in dimensionality. 
III. OPEN QUESTIONS ON NARROWEST GROUNDS 
A major benefit of modeling narrowest grounds is narrowing the scope 
of remaining policy questions. These include assessing: (1) various lower 
court formulations of the narrowest grounds rule and relating the analysis to 
holding versus dictum; (2) the implications of vote switching; and 
(3) whether Marks is best understood as a predictive or bargaining rule in 
cases where the choice affects attributing the holding. The discussion that 
follows takes up each of these questions. 
A. Least Impact, Logical Subset, Lowest Common Denominator, & 
Matryoshka Dolls 
Jurists and scholars construing fractured opinions have debated the 
merits of various formulations of the narrowest grounds rule as used to 
discern the holding in fractured Supreme Court cases.337 The preceding 
analysis provides the basis for a reconciliation: all apply, leading to the same 
outcome, when opinions align along a single relevant dimension; none apply 
when the opinions implicate more than one relevant dimension. These verbal 
formulations—Least Impact, Logical Subset, Lowest Common 
Denominator, and Matryoshka Dolls—add little or nothing to the narrowest 
grounds inquiry. Each is a metaphor intended to capture a singular insight. 
Because none has the precision of a model, each has limited value. 
Assuming the opinions in a fractured case align along a single relevant 
dimension, the opinion consistent with the outcome that resolves the case on 
narrowest grounds is a median, dominant second choice, or Condorcet 
winner, each of which, once more, also expresses the same insight.338 If 
either of the extremes prefers an opposite extreme to the median position, 
the opinions do not align on a single dimension. When a given jurist prefers 
one extreme position to the opposite extreme position to the median, for that 
jurist, the dimension being applied fails to capture the stakes.339 If so, 
 
 337 See, e.g., Re, supra note 11; Williams, supra note 11. 
 338 See supra Section II.B. 
 339 In social choice, this can be expressed either as one member holding multipeaked 
preferences cast along a single dimension or as the aggregate members each holding single 
peaked preferences implicating more than one dimension. These two framings express an 
identical insight. For a more detailed analysis that explains the relationship between the two 
framings and that provides helpful graphics, see STEARNS ET AL., supra note 191, at 571–74. 
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employing the term median, which implies a common dimension, is 
mistaken. 
Consider this simple illustration: imagine a legislative body choosing an 
adjournment date: Thanksgiving (T), Christmas (C), or New Year’s Eve 
(N).340 An intuitive dimension that captures these options is time, early to 
late: TCN. Assume member 1 prefers TCN, and member 2 prefers CNT or 
CTN. Now assume member 3 prefers NTC, on the ground that because she 
does not celebrate Christmas, she prefers breaking on either remaining date. 
For her, the time-based dimension fails to capture the stakes because she 
would prefer to work through Christmas, or break earlier on Thanksgiving, 
but not to suspend for a holiday she fails to observe. 
When decision makers agree on a dimension, each extreme logically 
prefers the median to the opposite extreme. That follows directly from how 
dimension is defined.341 Only when another dimension is implicated does the 
assumption concerning such intuitive rankings break down. 
Now consider these alternative framings: Least Impact, Logical Subset, 
Lowest Common Denominator, and Matryoshka Dolls.342 Each implies 
ranking options along a single dimension, although, as shown below, Lowest 
Common Denominator succeeds less well. As previously seen,343 Least 
Impact implies a greater impact, leading to the same judgment, or an impact 
so small as to disallow the judgment reached. Ranking based on degree of 
impact—greater to lesser—implies a single dimension along which options 
may be assessed and compared. This is also true for each remaining 
categorization. 
Logical Subset analysis implies a universe from which a set is drawn.344 
From the set, a subset is drawn. Assume the set defines the conditions under 
which some believe a criminal conviction must be overturned. The logical 
subset implies that for a smaller group, a more stringent set of conditions is 
required before a conviction is overturned as compared with the larger set. 
 
 340 See id. 
 341 See supra Section II.B. 
 342 See, e.g., Re, supra note 11, at 1956–57 tbl.1 (collecting Supreme Court decisions 
most often interpreted by federal circuit courts with an explicit citation to Marks); id. at 1980–
84 (discussing Logical Subset framing); Williams, supra note 11, at 806–19 (discussing lower 
court approaches to discerning precedential effect of U.S. Supreme Court plurality decisions, 
including Logical Subset, Lowest Common Denominator, and nesting—Matryoshka Doll—
framings); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 191, at 45–48 (discussing nesting—Matryoshka 
Doll—framing). 
 343 See supra Section I.C (applying least impact analysis to McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)). 
 344 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying 
logical subset analysis to conclude Freeman lacks a controlling opinion); Re, supra note 11, 
at 1980–84. 
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The dissenters would deny relief to the full set, and thus also to the subset. 
Those preferring to grant relief to the full set (largest cohort) will prefer 
conferring relief to those in the logical subset (smaller cohort) as compared 
with a complete denial (smallest cohort). The dissenters, who prefer denying 
relief across the board (smallest cohort) will prefer conferring relief in the 
logical subset (smaller cohort) to conferring relief to the full set (largest 
cohort). Logical Subset analysis corresponds to a single dimension: full set 
(broadest relief), logical subset (narrower relief), and complete denial 
(narrowest and thus no relief). 
Matryoshka Dolls are stackable, with smaller dolls fitting within larger 
ones in succession until the penultimate doll fits in the largest of all. This too 
implies one dimension, small to large, along which the options can be 
assessed and compared, with a line drawn anywhere separating those that 
correspond to a grant of relief, and the remaining dolls corresponding to a 
denial of relief.345 
Finally, Lowest Common Denominator analysis conveys the same idea, 
but in a less helpful manner.346 The intent is to capture fractions, i.e., 
nonintegers, permitting rankings from large to small. But the denominator 
captures only part of the relative valuation. Absent full information, 
including numerators, the data are incomplete. Even so, it is possible to show 
how this is intended to apply. Imagine a case with several possible factors 
potentially correlating with a grant of relief from a criminal conviction. The 
Justices embracing the broadest position consistent with the grant of relief 
would reverse the conviction if two out of three factors they identify are 
satisfied. The narrowest grounds concurrence would grant relief only after 
adding two additional factors and demanding that four out of the now five 
factors are satisfied. The dissenters agree with the five factors but insist all 
five must be satisfied. Although it is easy enough to rank ordinally 2/3, 4/5, 
and 1, from small to large, we can also do so by finding the lowest common 
denominator, 15, and then ranking based on the corresponding numerator 
values: 10/15 12/15, 15/15. Either approach ranks the values from small to 
large, capturing broad to narrow bases for relief. And again, each 
characterization corresponds to a single dimension along which options can 
be assessed and compared. 
These are metaphors each designed to capture the same essential insight. 
They are not alternative tests. A proper model, grounded in dimensionality, 
better expresses the point for which each metaphor is used.347 With a proper 
model, these, or other, metaphors can be discarded because they are no 
 
 345 See, e.g., Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 191, at 45–47. 
 346 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 11, at 806–19. 
 347 See supra Section II.B. 
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longer necessary or helpful. The recast statement of the narrowest grounds 
rule does all the work of these metaphors, but it does so more 
comprehensively, capturing fully the core analytical insight. Applied 
correctly, none of these framings take us on “one less traveled by.”348 
Instead, each leads us to the same place. 
The preceding analysis also helps unpack the sometimes-confused 
relationship between narrowest grounds and holding versus dictum.349 This 
issue arose with respect to Justice Sotomayor’s narrowest grounds 
concurrence in the judgment in Freeman v. United States,350 at issue in 
Hughes v. United States.351 
Two federal circuit courts had devised hypotheticals intended to 
demonstrate that in some situations, Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion is 
narrower because whereas Justice Sotomayor would deny consideration for 
resentencing following a plea agreement, Justice Kennedy would grant it.352 
We need consider only one hypothetical to understand the underlying 
analytical problem: 
The sentencing court . . . might consider and reject the guideline 
range used by the parties, not because the court finds that a different 
guidelines range (such as the career offender range) applies, but 
because, having considered the applicable guidelines range, the 
court rejects it as a matter of policy and selects its sentence without 
regard to it. If . . . the court decides for reasons unrelated to the 
guidelines range to impose the sentence the parties agreed upon, 
under the plurality’s analysis, the defendant would not be eligible 
even if the guideline range is later reduced. Under Justice 
Sotomayor’s analysis, however, the defendant would be eligible.353 
This seemingly counterintuitive result follows from an anomaly in the 
wording of Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in the judgment in Freeman, 
which Chief Justice Roberts helpfully described: 
In the first half of the [Sotomayor] opinion, the inquiry properly 
looks to what the judge does: He is, after all, the one who imposes 
the sentence. After approving the agreement, the judge considers 
 
 348 See text accompanying supra note 48 (quoting Robert Frost). 
 349 Portions of this discussion are adapted from the author’s Hughes amicus brief. See 
Hughes Amicus Brief, supra note 6. 
 350 See Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 534–44 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 351 See Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771–72 (2018). 
 352 See United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1022–24 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. 
Epps, 707 F.3d 337, 351 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 353 Epps, 707 F.3d at 351 n.8 (first alteration in original) (quoting Reply Brief of 
Appellant at 9–10, Epps, 707 F.3d 337 (No. 11-3002), 2012 WL 170534, at *9–10). 
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only the fixed term in the agreement, so the sentence he actually 
imposes is not “based on” the Guidelines. 
In the second half of the opinion, however, the analysis suddenly 
shifts, and focuses on the parties: Did they “use” or “employ” the 
Guidelines in arriving at the term in their agreement? But [the 
relevant statute] is concerned only with whether a defendant “has 
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing 
range.” . . . Only a court can sentence a defendant, so there is no 
basis for examining why the parties settled on a particular prison 
term.354 
As applied to the petitioners in the Freeman and Hughes cases, the 
concern that Chief Justice Roberts raised respecting the analytical shift from 
lawyer to judge played no role. The facts in each case allowed for an 
application of Freeman to which the Hughes parties agreed: whereas 
Kennedy’s analysis would have granted relief to both Freeman and Hughes, 
Sotomayor’s opinion would have granted relief to Freeman but not to 
Hughes. 
Although the hypothetical plea agreement bases sentencing on the 
guidelines, the judge instead imposes an identical sentence for alternative 
reasons independent of the guidelines. Sotomayor’s opinion contained 
language suggesting an analytical shift implicating two separate bases for 
assessing the plea: that of the parties and that of the judge. That shift was not 
implicated in either Freeman or Hughes. 
Sotomayor’s Freeman opinion could be construed to imply that whereas 
Justice Kennedy, for the plurality, presumes a sentence following a plea 
flows from the plea agreement, which is based on the guidelines, she 
demands objective evidence that the parties agreed on the rationale, later 
shared by the judge, specifically linking the sentence to the guidelines. Her 
disjunctive inquiry, separating the judge’s and lawyers’ reliance on the 
guidelines, gives rise to a potential—if attenuated—hypothetical. The 
hypothetical involves lawyers intending a sentence based on the guidelines, 
when that understanding as the basis for the sentence is not shared by the 
judge. By contrast, Justice Kennedy presumes a judicial intent to rely on the 
guidelines and leaves open the possibility that although the lawyers might 
intend the sentence as based on the guidelines, a judge might expressly state 
the sentence is not based on the guidelines. 
Properly read, the hypothetical reveals language in the two opinions—
Kennedy and Sotomayor—extending beyond what is necessary to resolve 
Freeman and Hughes. The hypothetical’s attenuated nature is not the 
 
 354 Freeman, 564 U.S. at 547 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2)). 
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problem. Rather, the problem is that any judicial opinion, even if unanimous 
or for a majority, sometimes includes language inviting hypotheticals testing 
the outermost limits of its holding. When this occurs, the extraneous 
assertions fall within the category of dictum, here defined to mean assertions 
unnecessary to the case resolution.355 Lower courts routinely confront 
challenges in sorting holding and dictum, but that task is independent of the 
Marks inquiry. The narrowest grounds rule designates the controlling 
opinion; it does not inform how to construe the outermost limits of the 
selected opinion’s internal logic.356 If the opinions align along one 
dimension, this implies that extraneous language that could be deployed to 
construct hypotheticals potentially subverting such intuitive relationships is 
dictum.357 
 
 355 Of course, defining dictum is more complex, but those nuances are not implicated 
here. For a detailed analysis of the distinction between dictum and holding, see Abramowicz 
& Stearns, supra note 214. For a discussion related to a recent split between the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, adopting the approach advocated in this Article on the 
holding-versus-dictum distinction as applied to narrowest grounds opinions, and the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, taking a contrary view, see supra note 
214 and cites therein. 
 356 See supra Section II.A.1 (explaining that Justice Powell in Apodaca and Justice 
Kennedy in Vieth expressed the holdings on narrowest grounds despite criticisms leveled 
against the merits of their analyses). 
 357 This analysis reveals the underlying analytical difficulties with proposals to abandon 
the narrowest grounds rule, including those advanced in Professor Re’s and Professor 
Williams’s thoughtful consideration of Marks. See Re, supra note 11, at 1983–84; Williams, 
supra note 11, at 814–17. 
Each of Professor Re’s examples designed to demonstrate the elusiveness of a median 
position situated between opposing extremes interjects an option that changes dimensionality, 
thereby thwarting the premise on which median, middle ground, or any other proxy, is based. 
Each of Professor Re’s examples fit the same pattern. Professor Re challenges logical subset 
analysis, relying on Justice Alito’s hypothetical during the Hughes oral argument. See Re, 
supra note 11, at 1983 n.205. Alito posited a group of friends choosing whether to watch a 
romantic comedy or mystery, with a subset of those who preferred a romcom hoping to see a 
particular French romcom. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 14–15. Alito 
and Re posit that those preferring a romcom might not consider those preferring the French 
romcom a logical subset. See id.; Hughes Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 34. Yes, of course! 
But that merely demonstrates that sorting preferences of movie type (romcom or mystery) and 
language (English or French) forces a second dimension, just like sorting integers as odd/even 
and prime/nonprime. The example does not refute claims that preferences aligned on a single 
dimension possess a median, logical subset, or whichever other phrasing one prefers. 
Professor Re’s other examples suffer the same difficulty, including his ascription of the 
“fallacy of division,” explaining that enjoying salt does not imply enjoying its components, 
sodium and chloride, the latter of which is toxic. See Re, supra note 11, at 1983 n.206. Again, 
yes, of course. It is commonplace that safe products include unsafe isolated components 
(consider lye in soap), or become unsafe in excess quantities (consider, but please do not take, 
the cinnamon challenge, see, e.g., David Kroll, 5 Reasons Not To Take The Cinnamon 
Challenge, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2013, 9:21 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidkroll/2013/04/23/5-reasons-not-to-take-the-cinnamon-
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B. Vote Switching in the Shadow of Marks 
We have seen the relationship between Justice Scalia’s Adarand 
strategy and the narrowest grounds rule.358 In a critical respect, Justice Scalia 
 
challenge/#611d7ce76405 [https://perma.cc/Y3CN-H5ZL]; see also Michael Herz, Justice 
Byron White and the Argument that the Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227, 
243–49) (illustrating the fallacy of division with salt). None of this implies that persons 
preferring either extreme, a lot of salt or cinnamon, or no salt or cinnamon, would nonetheless 
prefer the opposite extreme, no salt or cinnamon or a lot of salt or cinnamon, respectively, to 
an intermediate quantity of salt or cinnamon.  
Professor Re’s claimed refutation of the plurality’s “utterly without redeeming social 
value” test in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966), as expressing the holding 
on narrowest grounds also forces a second dimension beyond broad to narrow protection of 
allegedly obscene materials. The added dimension involves a concern of nonworkability or a 
preference for bright-line rules (really the same thing). Contrary to Professor Re, who claims 
that presuming preferences aligning on a single dimension yields a median or dominant 
second choice is “worrisomely speculative” or even “inefficient,” Re, supra note 11, at 1950, 
1979, conceiving an additional dimension to thwart finding a narrowest grounds opinion 
absent any specific evidence supporting an added dimension requires greater, not less, 
ambition in construing judicial preferences. 
Professor Ryan Williams offers two challenges that collapse into one. The resulting 
challenge aligns with those of Professor Re. See Williams, supra note 11. Williams posits a 
suit by a foreign corporation, with the Supreme Court divided into three camps: one finding 
no personal jurisdiction but not reaching subject matter jurisdiction; one finding no subject 
matter jurisdiction but not reaching personal jurisdiction; and one finding personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction. See id. at 816. Williams separately maintains that the approach advanced 
in this author’s earlier works and developed more fully here fails to identify a narrowest 
grounds opinion in cases presenting the “voting paradox.” See id. at 815–16. The jurisdiction 
hypothetical is, or at least is potentially, a voting paradox, meaning it too implicates two 
dimensions. See id. 
Williams’s division into two arguments arises from assuming incomplete information for 
the two camps denying jurisdiction, with each argument failing to reach the alternative 
jurisdictional inquiry, as the first jurisdiction resolution renders the second unnecessary to the 
judgment each camp reaches. This means that one must make assumptions to ascertain 
whether the case is best understood as implicating one or more dimensions. Assuming the 
Justices declining jurisdiction on either basis would, if forced to resolve the issue, also decline 
jurisdiction on the alternative basis, then the Court would reach the same result, denying 
jurisdiction six to three. The dimensionality problem arises if, instead, we assume the Justices 
declining personal jurisdiction would grant subject jurisdiction, and vice versa. This plausible, 
although not inevitable, set of assumptions turns the hypothetical case into a voting paradox, 
meaning a case with two dimensions. Although two separate six-Justice majorities would find 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction, another six-Justice majority dismisses the suit for 
want of jurisdiction. 
Contrary to Professor Williams, observing that the approach advanced here does not 
identify a narrowest grounds opinion in such a case, which implicates two dimensions, is not 
a criticism of the thesis. It is the thesis. And yet, this Article does not leave lower courts at a 
loss for guidance. As discussed below, the best approach in such a case is the most 
conservative. See infra paragraph accompanying note 371. Assume that jurisdiction is lacking 
on like facts and seek guidance elsewhere in the civil procedure canon if the underlying issues 
are separately presented. 
 358 See supra Section II.A.2. 
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represented the exception proving a more general rule concerning judicial 
strategy. With the narrowest grounds rule in place, in cases implicating a 
single relevant dimension, Supreme Court Justices are generally motivated 
to align themselves along that dimension in a manner corresponding to their 
preferred position, or what political scientists refer to as their “ideal 
point.”359 More simply, Marks encourages sincere judicial behavior. To 
illustrate, consider the perspective of those to the right or left of the Court’s 
median position, for the controlling issue or issues and for the case as a 
whole. Although these jurists will not necessarily express the holding, since 
none is the median, by voting sincerely for their ideal point, they place the 
Justice occupying the median closer to their ideal point. 
TABLE 9. DISCRETE JUDICIAL PLACEMENTS ALONG SINGLE DIMENSION 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Liberal                                                                                Conservative 
 
To illustrate, consider Table 9, presenting a hypothetical Supreme Court 
along a single dimension with 3 liberals, 3 moderates, and 3 conservatives, 
ranked from 1 on the far left to 9 on the far right. Imagine that within each 
three-Justice bloc, the members’ rankings are more finely grained from left 
to right. For any member of the Court, the incentive is to vote consistently 
with one’s ideal point because doing so situates the median closer to that 
ideal point. Along a single dimension, voting contrary to one’s ideal point 
has the undesirable effect of moving the Court’s median further from one’s 
preferred ideological position. If Justice 2 voted with the conservatives, 
position 6, rather than 5, emerges the median. If Justice 8 voted with the 
liberals, position 4, rather than 5, emerges the median. The observation that 
voting contrary to one’s ideal point moves the median away from one’s 
preferred resolution is generalizable in one dimension. 
As a general matter, the same logic applies across two dimensions, with 
an important caveat captured in the restated narrowest grounds rule.360 
Consider two cases, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,361 and Seminole Tribe 
of Florida v. Florida,362 which overturned Union Gas. Both cases involve 
questions related to the abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Although 
the constitutional questions are complex, the nuances are less relevant here. 
There were two issues in Union Gas: (1) Does the amended Comprehensive 
 
 359 See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 191, at 833 (defining ideal point and relating term to 
judicial decision making). 
 360 See supra Section II.B. 
 361 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996). 
 362 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) of 
1980363 allow a damages action in federal court against a state?; and (2) If 
so, is abrogating state sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause364 
permissible or prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment?365 The opinions, 
implicating two dimensions, are set out in Table 10. 
TABLE 10. PENNSYLVANIA V. UNION GAS CO. IN TWO DIMENSIONS 
 CERCLA Authorizes CERCLA Does Not Authorize 
Abrogation Falls Within 




[White moves left] 
Abrogation Exceeds 




Sustaining the suit against Pennsylvania requires that two conditions be 
met: (1) CERCLA must authorize the suit, and (2) abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity must fall within Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, 
meaning it is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The absence of either 
congressional authorization or constitutional authority is fatal to permitting 
the suit against Pennsylvania to proceed. As Table 10 demonstrates, but for 
a change in Justice White’s vote, the Court was split on both issues in a 
manner implicating two dimensions. Although separate majorities found that 
CERCLA authorized the suit (the left quadrants, totaling five Justices), and 
that doing so fell within congressional Commerce Clause powers (the top 
quadrants, totaling five Justices), only four justices determined, as their ideal 
point, that both necessary conditions to permitting the suit were satisfied. 
Had Justice White stuck with his ideal point, following outcome voting, 
Union Gas would have disallowed the suit. 
Justice White’s vote switch avoided that result. After observing that his 
view on the statutory issue had not prevailed, he acquiesced in the contrary 
majority resolution of that issue, thereby addressing the question of 
constitutional permissibility.366 In doing so, he changed the judgment, 
 
 363 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26, 33, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 364 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 365 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5. 
 366 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 45 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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thereby allowing the suit to proceed. Although this voting tactic is unusual, 
it is not unique,367 nor limited to the Supreme Court.368 
In Seminole Tribe, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority, 
overturned Union Gas, stating: 
In the five years since it was decided, Union Gas has proved to be 
a solitary departure from established law. Reconsidering the 
decision in Union Gas, we conclude that none of the policies 
underlying stare decisis require our continuing adherence to its 
holding. The decision has, since its issuance, been of questionable 
precedential value, largely because a majority of the Court 
expressly disagreed with the rationale of the plurality.369 
There are three important points to make about these combined cases. 
First, when opinions force two dimensions, there is a necessary divergence 
between the resolution of controlling issues on one side and the outcome 
resolution, based on each member’s judgment vote, on the other. As shown 
in the discussion of McDonald v. City of Chicago, a careful analysis allows 
for constructing a singular proposition concerning which all members of the 
deciding Court necessarily agree respecting the case disposition.370 The same 
analysis applies in Union Gas. Although the Justices disagreed on how the 
case should be framed and resolved, all Justices necessarily agreed that for 
the suit to proceed against Pennsylvania two conditions must be satisfied. 
First, amended CERCLA must abrogate state sovereign immunity, and 
second, the abrogation must be a constitutionally permissible exercise of 
Commerce Clause power. If either necessary condition to allowing the suit 
to proceed were not met, the suit must be dismissed. 
Whereas the McDonald framing was disjunctive (either due process or 
privileges or immunities could allow incorporation), the Union Gas framing 
was conjunctive (both conditions must be met for the suit to proceed). 
Despite that difference, votes aligned such that the separate disjunctive 
elements failed in McDonald when aggregated separately, and the separate 
conjunctive elements would have failed in Union Gas when aggregated 
separately but for Justice White’s decision to acquiesce to a majority’s 
contrary resolution on the first issue, construing the amended CERCLA as 
abrogating state sovereign immunity. A critical step in identifying those 
cases to which Marks cannot be applied involves reading across the opinions, 
 
 367 For a general discussion, see Stearns, supra note 328 (collecting and analyzing 
cases). 
 368 For an example of vote switching, including a judicial assessment of the judicial 
voting literature, see Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 
190–92 (3d Cir. 2015); and id. at 204–10 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). 
 369 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (citation omitted). 
 370 See supra Section II.B.1 (setting forth McDonald proposition). 
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identifying the statement constituting common agreement respecting 
controlling issues, and then relating the resolution of those issues to the 
Court’s judgment. 
Second, when any of the articulated doctrinal formulations—Least 
Impact, Logical Subset, Lowest Common Denominator, Matryoshka Dolls, 
and also Dominant Second Choice, Median, or Condorcet winner—are 
properly applied, the Marks rule, coupled with outcome voting, encourages 
sincere voting with respect to issues along a single dimension. Likewise, 
outcome voting generally encourages sincere voting on controlling issues 
with more than one dimension in two ways.371 It encourages Justices to 
devise the most persuasive analysis that will attract others to join the opinion 
with the hope of forming and retaining a successful majority coalition, and 
it avoids voting on issues based on strategic, rather than sincere, assessments 
as to how the separate resolutions of issues might affect the ultimate path 
toward the case resolution. 
The rule of law is intricately linked to providing meaningful guidance, 
allowing persons and institutions to rely on today’s decisions in planning 
their future conduct. When jurists acquiesce in a contrary resolution 
respecting an issue, they compromise such reliance. A strategic vote, by 
definition, is not predicated upon Justices’ sincere resolutions of the issue 
for which they defer to other Justices. 
Third, although Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision to afford diminished 
precedential status to Union Gas is not itself precedential, it is informative 
in much the same way that judicial modeling of Marks is informative. His 
decision effectively signals an expectation of sincere voting, letting the chips 
fall where they may. This aligns with Marks properly construed. 
Although Justices certainly have the power to engage in the sort of vote-
switching behavior observed in Union Gas, doing so is rare.372 This too is 
informative. This exception proves the general rule:  
Assume a single dimension unless and until a Justice gives a reason 
not to. And when opinions align along one dimension, do not 
construct an imaginary or hypothetical dimension. Assume those 
embracing opposing resolutions of issues leading to opposing 
judgments prefer a partially favorable opinion to one coming out 
the opposite way.373 
 
 371 See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 60 (illustrating with a variation on Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam)). 
 372 See Stearns, supra note 328 (reviewing cases). 
 373 As previously observed, see supra note 334, although this rule of construction derives 
from social choice insights respecting dimensionality, it is also independently grounded in 
sound principles of judicial administration. 
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This analysis also supports this limited rule of construction in cases 
implicating more than one dimension:  
When opinions force two relevant dimensions, assume the case 
stands for its judgment, no more, but no less. This is evident when 
separate opinions expressing opposite resolutions of controlling 
issues yield the Court’s judgment, and when a dissenting opinion, 
expressing a favorable resolution of a single controlling issue from 
the perspective of each of those opinions consistent with the 
judgment, yields the opposite result. Do not assume such a case 
creates a binding precedent on either alternative rationale necessary 
for achieving that judgment.  
Although there are exceptions, sometimes that is all that is needed. 
McDonald establishes that the Heller right is incorporated; for more on the 
doctrinal underpinnings of incorporation, look elsewhere in the canon. 
This implicates a tiny subset of cases, a fraction (cases for which binary 
guidance is inadequate) of a fraction (cases thwarting one dimension) of a 
fraction (cases that fail to produce a majority opinion). As social choice 
demonstrates, no collective decision-making rule can solve all problems. But 
failing to recognize the problems existing rules already solve risks making 
matters worse, not better. Had a $20 bill been lying in the street, it might 
have been picked up by now. And if we are going to change the rules, we 
should acknowledge the risk that we might not enjoy the new game we will 
be playing. 
C. Is Marks a Prediction or Bargaining Rule? 
Consider two majority opinion cases aligned on a single dimension: 
Washington v. Glucksberg374 and Schlup v. Delo.375 In each case, Justice 
O’Connor, who joined the majority coalition, also issued a simple 
concurrence expressing her views on narrower grounds.376 This raises the 
question whether the narrowest grounds rule is strictly limited to when the 
Supreme Court fails to issue a majority opinion, as Marks states, or applies 
more generally, capturing the position of the median Justice on the deciding 
Court. The practical consequences matter in each case. The answer turns on 
the resolution of yet another question: Is Marks purely a means of predicting 
the Supreme Court’s median position, or is it a bargaining rule between or 
among separate blocs in a given case? The question is unresolved. For two 
reasons, the better construction treats Marks as a bargaining rule. 
 
 374 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 375 513 U.S. 298 (1995). 
 376 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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First, the bargaining construction requires Justices to trade off the price 
of strictly adhering to their ideal point on one side versus gaining the benefit 
of a majority precedent on the other. Overall, this reading is more consistent 
with Marks, which anticipates paying the price of foregoing a majority 
precedent to express the holding on narrowest grounds.377 Otherwise, the 
narrowest grounds rule would not be expressly limited in its wording to 
nonmajority cases. More importantly, were the rule otherwise, in the 
common single-dimension cases, there would never be an incentive to issue 
a narrowest grounds concurrence in the judgment. The wiser tactic for the 
median Justice would invariably be to join the majority opinion and then 
rewrite that opinion more narrowly in a simple concurrence, thereby 
claiming the benefit of a personally recrafted majority ruling. This is the 
judicial equivalent of having the cake you just enjoyed eating.378 
Second, the bargaining rule construction of Marks provides an 
important, if partial, antidote to a widely accepted premise among Attitudinal 
judicial scholars.379 Such scholars rightly claim that, in large numbers, the 
lineup of the Court’s members, coupled with the ideological position of the 
Court’s median jurist, proves robust in predicting case outcomes.380 And yet, 
the model has two notable limitations. First, it falsely presumes that all cases 
align on a single dimension, which proves false both in individual cases and 
across bodies of caselaw.381 Second, the model presumes that the median 
 
 377 This observation provides a theoretical basis for a convergent insight from the 
political science literature on Supreme Court bargaining. In an article written by Cliff 
Carrubba, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. Martin, and Georg Vanberg, the authors demonstrate 
that the median member of a majority coalition holds special bargaining prominence even as 
compared with the median member of the deciding Court. See Carrubba et al., supra note 334, 
at 407 (“Consistent with our theory’s prediction, the median of the majority coalition (where 
that median differs from the median of the Court) concurs less often than the median of the 
Court. Further, concurrences generally increase as one moves away from the median of the 
coalition.”). This empirical observation is consistent with the analysis in the text, 
demonstrating that the median Justice for the Court as a whole and those Justices forming 
coalitions on either side negotiate to determine where the doctrinal position settles, with 
accommodations that reflect necessary tradeoffs to ensure that the resulting opinion has the 
support, and stature, of a majority. 
 378 For a discussion of Professor Re’s contrary claim concerning the strategies available 
to the median Justice under Marks, and why it has proved contrary to available empirical 
evidence, see infra note 383. 
 379 For a general introduction to the Attitudinal model, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD 
J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
 380 See, e.g., id. at 86–114. 
 381 For an analysis demonstrating dimensionality across bodies of caselaw that include 
standing, the Commerce Clause, separation of powers, equal protection, and the First 
Amendment, see Maxwell L. Stearns, Constitutional Law’s Conflicting Premises, 96 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 447 (2020); and Stearns, supra note 26 (reviewing special problem of 
dimensionality in race-based equal protection jurisprudence). 
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judicial position on any natural Supreme Court is the fait accompli outcome. 
In this analysis, Supreme Court Justices are passive participants in a process 
concerning which they have limited agency. 
A better understanding conceives the Justices as members of discrete 
coalitions, less granular than discrete positions one through nine, from left 
to right.382 Coalition members actively strategize along that dimension, 
bargaining over how far left or right to settle between two blocs whose 
members face tradeoffs that matter. These include rigidly insisting upon an 
ideal point versus making accommodations to forge a majority precedent.383 
If the median position always prevails, holding the status of a majority 
precedent, we gain little information concerning how such negotiations are 
resolved. No matter the outcome, the median controls. Conversely, if we 
treat Marks as a bargaining rule, we gain greater insight into which aspects 
of legal doctrine matter most to the deciding Justices. Specifically, we can 
infer what Justices were willing to sacrifice, revealed in past opinions they 
wrote or joined, as the price of effectuating a majority precedent. Justices are 
forward-thinking strategic actors, and a model giving them agency is certain 
to ensure a more robust understanding of their bargaining dynamics. With 
that, we gain a greater insight into the rule of law. 
 
 382 See supra Table 8. 
 383 This explains away a troubling datum for judicial politics and legal scholars who 
mistakenly predict that the “narrowest grounds rule” encourages fractured opinions. See, e.g., 
Berkolow, Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony of 
Concurrences, and Re-Percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299, 352 (2008) 
(observing that positive political theory predicts a greater number of separate opinions under 
Marks); Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 549 (1998) (reviewing 
LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)) (suggesting that Marks 
encourages Justices who would express a narrowest grounds holding to avoid compromise as 
needed to form a majority); Re, supra note 11, at 1972 (positing that Marks discourages 
compromise by letting the median justice “hav[e] her cake and eat[] it too”). Professors James 
F. Spriggs and David R. Stras, have shown that despite their own contrary predictions such 
claims are not supported empirically, with no statistical differences in the formation of 
fractured versus majority opinions before and after Marks. See James F. Spriggs II & David 
R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 548 (2011) (“The data do not 
support our hypothesis that plurality decisions are more likely to result after Marks, as there 
is virtually no difference in the rate of plurality decisions before and after Marks.”). The 
preceding analysis explains the difficulty. The predictions fail to consider the tradeoff 
between sticking with an ideal point versus gaining a majority precedent that presumptively 
binds the Supreme Court. Whereas Berkolow (Professors Melissa M. Berry, Donald J. 
Kochan, and Matthew Parlow, writing collectively) attributes this result to the unpredictability 
of Marks, Berkolow, supra, at 331–32, Professor Re surprisingly proposes that a danger of 
clarifying Marks might be to encourage more gamesmanship than is presently observed, Re, 
supra note 11, at 1974 n.170. The dimensionality analysis in this Article explains why Marks 
does not encourage fractured decisions, refuting Professor Re’s dire prediction, already in 
tension with available empirical evidence. 
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Glucksberg and Delo illustrate these points. Glucksberg differs from 
other cases we have considered in two respects. First, it is a majority 
decision, and second, although there were no dissents, it includes various 
simple concurrences and concurrences in the judgment.384 Glucksberg 
presented a facial challenge to Washington State’s statutory ban on 
physician-assisted suicide.385 Chief Justice Rehnquist, for a majority, 
sustained the ban against a facial challenge resting on a line of cases 
implicating the right of privacy.386 Justice O’Connor, one of five Justices 
comprising the majority, also produced a simple concurrence stating that 
nothing in the Court’s opinion should be construed to affect the relevant 
standard of medical care for treating terminally ill patients in considerable 
pain. Under that standard of care, physicians assisting such patients prescribe 
pain-relieving medications that relieve suffering, often with the secondary 
effect of hastening death.387 This is known as the double-effects doctrine, 
meaning that high doses of palliative medicines, such as morphine, can have 
two consequences—improving comfort and hastening death—and be 
permitted for the former without regard to the latter.388 
As a matter of legal policy, Justice O’Connor’s position is 
overwhelmingly compelling. Those concurring in the judgment would have 
gone further, expressing the view that although the facial challenge fails, an 
applied challenge might recognize a right to engage physicians in more 
active ways to hasten death, even beyond the double-effects doctrine.389 
The Glucksberg opinions easily align on a single dimension, with the 
most restrictive understanding of due process embraced by the majority, the 
most expansive view embraced by those concurring in the judgment, and 
Justice O’Connor taking the median position. The unanswered question is 
whether her position, however compelling, expresses the holding in 
Glucksberg notwithstanding that she joined the majority opinion.390 
 
 384 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 70 (1997); id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); id. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments); id. at 752 (Souter, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgments); id. at 789 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments). 
 385 See id. at 705–07 (majority opinion). 
 386 See id. at 719–20. 
 387 See id. at 736–38 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 388 See, e.g., Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Dec. 24, 
2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/ [https://perma.cc/ZP99-TH8J]. 
 389 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 738, 750–52 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments); 
id. at 789–92 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments). 
 390 Notably, Justice Ginsburg issued a concurrence in the judgment stating she had done 
so for the reasons expressed in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, possibly implying that she 
regarded treating Justice O’Connor’s separate opinion as controlling in tension with 
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The same issue arose in Delo, a more complex case involving successive 
petitions for habeas corpus relief, for which there is a longstanding policy 
based on a federal statute that presumes strongly against judicial discretion—
let alone obligation—to entertain such petitions.391 The case produced three 
opinions. Writing for a majority of five that included Justice O’Connor, 
Justice Stevens remanded a case that dismissed a successive habeas petition, 
holding that the procedural bar in entertaining such a petition based on cause 
and prejudice should not apply to a claim involving new evidence of 
innocence when failing to hear the petition risks a fundamental miscarriage 
of justice.392 Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia chided the majority for relying 
upon equitable principles and caselaw in place of the relevant governing 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2244.393 He construed the statute to preclude hearing a 
successive petition unless it is clear the petitioner has not withheld the new 
basis for the claim and the successive petition is not otherwise abusive.394 
Justice Scalia found no statutory basis for allowing a claim to proceed based 
on factual innocence or to avoid a fundamental miscarriage of justice.395 
Justice O’Connor, despite joining the majority, produced a simple 
concurrence expressing the view that although the district court applied an 
incorrect standard in dismissing the petition, she did not read the majority to 
remove discretion as to whether to entertain such successive petitions.396 
In a footnote to his opinion, Justice Scalia stated the following: 
The claim that “the Court does not, and need not, decide whether 
the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is a discretionary 
remedy,” is not in my view an accurate description of what the 
Court’s opinion says. Of course the concurrence’s merely making 
the claim causes it to be an accurate description of what the Court 
today holds, since the narrower ground taken by one of the Justices 
comprising a five-Justice majority becomes the law.397 
As a doctrinal matter, whether Justice Scalia is correct is unresolved. If 
we view the Marks doctrine as one piece in a larger, more intricate, puzzle, 
his reading seems problematic. The other pieces fit less well together, 
 
O’Connor’s having also joined the majority. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in the judgments). 
 391 See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 301 (1995). The statutory and caselaw history is 
nuanced and what follows is necessarily simplified, but it does not undermine the essential 
insight as it relates to Marks. 
 392 See id. at 316, 332. 
 393 See id. at 342–45 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 394 See id. at 344. 
 395 See id. at 342–51. 
 396 See id. at 332–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 397 Id. at 344 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 333 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring)) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). 
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perhaps not at all, if there is no difference in the price paid by a median 
member of the Court in joining or not joining a majority opinion. We also 
gain less information from deciding Justices concerning which doctrinal 
differences mattered most, as we cannot observe what Justices might have 
willingly relinquished to advance a preferred ruling. 
Treating Marks as a bargaining rule avoids these problems by 
recognizing that Justices are active participants—with agency—in a 
complex bargaining process. This more robust image of the Court as a whole 
leaves other aspects of the larger, complex puzzle intact, even as part of that 
very completeness involves acknowledging inevitable incompleteness as an 
endemic feature of Supreme Court decision making. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article advances a counterintuitive observation: sitting members of 
the Supreme Court better reveal their understanding of the narrowest 
grounds rule through modeled behaviors than in their written opinions. This 
claim becomes more intuitive when we recognize that at its core, the 
narrowest grounds rule represents a partial solution to a more complex 
problem associated with group decision making. Because some aspects of 
that larger problem prove intractable—impossible to resolve without 
creating other, potentially greater, difficulties—it might be less surprising 
that when their voting behaviors affect the designated holding, the Justices 
make more nuanced assessments than when considering the narrowest 
grounds rule in the abstract. 
The narrowest grounds rule is an essential part of a nuanced system of 
Supreme Court decision making, also including outcome voting, strategic 
bargaining, precedent, holding versus dictum, and, on occasion, vote 
switching. Removing one piece risks making the others fit less well or not at 
all. Modeling narrowest grounds requires exploring the role of 
dimensionality in fractured Supreme Court cases. The implications are 
simpler when opinions align on a single dimension; problems arise when 
opinions implicate multiple dimensions. Failing to recognize this distinction, 
including by relying on imperfect metaphors rather than a model, encourages 
misguided claims of inapplicability, even in cases in which the narrowest 
grounds rule straightforwardly applies. 
This Article provided a clarifying statement of the narrowest grounds 
rule that avoids these challenges and that forthrightly acknowledges the 
inherent limitations of even a perfectly crafted doctrine. Along the way, the 
Article offered insights into Supreme Court bargaining dynamics, related 
Marks to other doctrines, and offered a partial antidote to a premise 
respecting a dominant school of political science. A better understanding of 
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the narrowest grounds doctrine promises to benefit lawyers, legal scholars, 
and perhaps most of all, judges and Justices, off or on the Supreme Court. 
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APPENDIX A: 
STATE COURT APPLICATIONS OF NARROWEST GROUNDS RULE  
TO STATE HIGHEST COURTS398 
States Relevant Authorities Quotes/Descriptions Y N U 
Ala. 
(elect.) 
Ex parte Ball, 
No. 1190842, 
2020 WL 
5742599, at *1 




“[I]f, in the prior case, a particular rationale supporting the 
result was agreed with by majority of judges, even in separate 
opinions, the zone of their agreement constitutes binding 
precedent and thus a ‘prior decision.’ . . . Conceptually, that 
cobbled-majority effect is no different from what would have 




Dep’t of Hum. 
Res., 865 So. 2d 
1228, 1232 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 2003). 
 
Id. at 1233 
(Crawley, J., 
concurring in the 
result). 
“[A]s this court noted in K.W. v. J.G., . . . Y.M was a plurality 
opinion.” (citations omitted) (citing K.W. v. J.G., 856 So. 2d 
859 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003); and then citing Y.M. v. Jefferson 




“I disagree with the statements in the [majority] opinion 
indicating that the holding in Y.M. . . . is somewhat less than 
authoritative because Y.M. was a plurality opinion. See my 
opinion concurring specially in E.W. v. Jefferson County 
Department of Human Resources, . . . which explains my 
opinion that the legal principle . . . was agreed with by a 
majority of this court.” (citations omitted) (citing Y.M., 890 
So. 2d 103; and then citing E.W. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep’t of 
Hum. Res., 872 So. 2d 167, 173 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) 
(Crawley, J., concurring specially)).  
E.W. v. 
Jefferson Cnty. 
Dep’t of Hum. 
Res., 872 So. 2d 
 “In Y.M., two members of this court concurred in an 
opinion that concluded that certain DHR court reports 
contained hearsay that was inadmissible in a hearing on a 
petition to terminate a parent’s parental rights. The parties in 
 
 398 This Appendix provides data for all fifty states on whether the lower courts within 
each state apply the narrowest grounds rule to nonmajority decisions of the state highest court. 
State courts are not bound by Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), to apply the 
narrowest grounds rule to state highest court rulings. Each listing is coded based upon whether 
the state judiciary is elected (elect.) or appointed (appt.). For each state, the table provides 
citations to relevant authorities and, as appropriate, case excerpts or synopses. For some states, 
the table provides helpful secondary authorities that inform how members of the bar have 
understood relevant aspects of state practice. At the end of each state listing appears a final 
classification coded as Y (yes), N (no), or U (unresolved), responding to the question: Do 
lower courts within the state apply the narrowest grounds rule to the state highest court’s 
nonmajority decisions? Each entry is preceded by an explanation, including the basis for 
inevitable judgment calls for some states. The end of the table provides summary data as to 
how many states fall within each category and further subdivides based upon whether the state 
judiciaries are appointed or elected. 
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167, 170 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 2003) 


































Id. at 173 
(Crawley, J., 
concurring 













Y.M. did not argue or present evidence to support a conclusion 
that the reports at issue might be admissible under an 
exception to the hearsay rule, and the main opinion did not 
address that possibility. As Judge Crawley points out, in his 
special concurrence [in E.W.], the holding reached by the 
main opinion in Y.M. ‘“may be viewed as that position taken 
by those Members who concurred in the judgements on the 
narrowest grounds.’” However, the fact that three members 
of this court concurred in the result reached by the main 
opinion in Y.M. may also be viewed as indicating that under 
the narrow facts of that case, and based on the limited 
arguments presented to this court in that case, the judgment 
was due to be reversed. The vote line in Y.M. reveals that 
every judge on this court agreed to reverse the trial court’s 
judgment because the court reports constituted inadmissible 
hearsay under the fact of that case; the vote line does not 
necessarily indicate that every judge on this court agreed with 
the rationale for that reversal. The fact that some judges 
concurred in the result in Y.M. did not necessarily foreclose 
the possibility that, under different facts or upon the 
presentation of other legal theories, those judges might reach 
a different result than they reached in Y.M. Rather, it is 
possible to interpret Y.M. as concluding that the trial court 
erred in admitting the court reports—in that case. We 
reiterate the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Alabama that 
‘[t]he precedential value of the reasoning in a plurality 
opinion is questionable at best.’ . . . Therefore, this court’s 
plurality opinion in Y.M. does not definitively support the 
mother’s hearsay argument.  
 
 However, we need not reach that issue because we 
conclude that any error the trial court might have committed 
in admitting [the evidence] . . . was harmless [under ALA. R. 
APP. P. 45].” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) 
(first quoting E.W., 872 So. 2d. at 173 (Crawley, J., 
concurring specially); and then quoting Ex Parte Discount 
Foods, Inc., 789 So. 2d 842, 845 (Ala. 2001)) (citing Y.M., 
890 So. 2d 103). 
 
“Although the Y.M. opinion may have been that of a plurality 
of the court, the result (and therefore the holding, because 
there was only one issue raised and addressed) was 
unanimous . . . . The principle of law resulting from a 
plurality opinion is the narrowest holding agreed to by a 
majority of the court. The United States Supreme Court has 
explained: ‘When a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of [a 
majority], [the narrowest grounds rule 
applies].’ . . . [However,] [i]n Y.M., there was a single 
rationale (the erroneous admission of hearsay) for the result 
(a reversal). Thus, while all members of this court may not 
have agreed with the discussion of the disputed issue in Y.M., 
all members agreed with the holding (that the case should be 
reversed based on the evidentiary error of improperly 
admitting hearsay). To attempt to characterize that holding as 




Id. at 174 
(Murdock, J., 
concurring in the 




something less than authoritative is misleading.” (citations 
omitted) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 
(1977)) (citing Y.M., 890 So. 2d 103). 
 
“While two members of this Court concurred in the plurality 
opinion in Y.M. . . . , I and two other members of this Court 
chose to concur only in the result reached in that case. While 
I cannot speak for the other two members of this Court who 
voted only to concur in the result in Y.M., I can say that I 
agreed with essential aspects of the analysis of the main 
opinion. More importantly, however, I note that the result 
reached in Y.M. was the reversal of the trial court's judgment 
and the remand of the cause for ‘proceedings consistent with 
the principles expressed in this opinion.’ . . . The ‘principle[] 
expressed’ in Y.M. that provided the basis for reversal was the 
principle that hearsay that is not otherwise admissible under 
our rules of evidence is not ‘competent evidence’ with respect 
to the issue whether to terminate parental rights. Therefore, I 
would not have concurred in the result reached in Y.M. 
without agreeing (1) that, under the facts of that case, the 
court reports at issue contained inadmissible hearsay 
evidence and, most notably for purposes of the present 
discussion, (2) that hearsay evidence that is otherwise 
inadmissible under our rules of evidence is not competent 
evidence with respect to the issue of whether to terminate 
parental rights.” (third alteration in original) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Y.M., 890 So. 2d at 114). 
Ex parte 
Discount Foods, 
Inc., 789 So. 2d 
842, 845 (Ala. 
2001).  
“We note again that this Court’s opinion in Discount Foods I 
was a plurality opinion. The precedential value of the 
reasoning in a plurality opinion is questionable at best.” 
Comments: 
Although a plurality of the Civil Court of 
Appeals in Alabama in E.W. discusses the 
narrowest grounds rule, that opinion 
ultimately acknowledges the Alabama 
Supreme Court has determined 
nonmajority opinions are of limited 
precedential value. The plurality also 
mentions it is unnecessary to resolve the 
application of the narrowest grounds rule 
to resolve the case. Separate concurring 
justices in that case seek to apply the 
narrowest ground rule. Although one 
might, based on the quoted language from 
the Alabama Supreme Court, classify this 
as N, due to the reliance among some 
lower court judges, we place this as a U.  
  U 
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Alaska 
(appt.) 
Alaska Dep’t of 





“In McDowell, [the court] held that the portion of the 1986 
subsistence statute limiting subsistence fishing and hunting 
activities to rural residents violated the [equal protection 
clauses] of the Alaska Constitution. . . . But while [the court] 
held that an equal protection analysis was proper[,] . . . [the 
court] did not reach a majority consensus as to the proper 
level of scrutiny to apply. [The plurality determined that 
“demanding scrutiny” was the appropriate test. But, Justice 
Moore, in a concurring opinion, articulated a less demanding 
“close scrutiny” test.] As [the court has] previously noted, 
‘[w]hen a fragmented court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of [the 
majority], the holding of the court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgment on the narrowest grounds.’ In McDowell, it was 
Justice Moore who concurred on the narrowest grounds and 
his position would therefore ordinarily be considered the 
court’s holding. However, Justice Moore’s concurrence 
expressly refused to rule out the possibility that a more 
stringent test was merited and our subsequent case law has, in 
fact, repeatedly articulated—although never actually 
applied—the plurality opinion’s stringent demanding 
scrutiny test. Ultimately then, it is not entirely clear which 
equal protection test carries precedential weight.” (last two 
alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting In re 
Adoption of Erin G., 140 P.3d 886, 890 (Alaska 2006)) (citing 
McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989)). 
In re Adoption 
of Erin G., 140 
P.3d 886, 890 
(Alaska 2006).  
An earlier case, In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973 
(Alaska 1989) (plurality opinion), involves a custody 
challenge by the non-Indian biological mother of an Indian 
child to an adoption involving the biological father (through 
artificial insemination) who is Indian and not her spouse and 
the biological mother’s sister. See id. at 974. The question is 
whether the biological mother may challenge an adoption 
proceeding under a federal statute, § 1914 of Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1914, or whether 
she is foreclosed from doing so based on any of three 
alternative theories: (1) the incorporation into ICWA of the 
Alaska statute of limitations absent duress or fraud, (2) a 
judicially crafted Indian-family exception to disallowing such 
challenges recognized in New Jersey, as a basis for denying 
standing, or (3) the concurrence’s newly crafted non-Indian 
mother of an Indian child exception as an alternative basis for 
denying standing. See id. at 974–77. The case is complicated 
by three factors: (1) the plurality comprises two Justices, and 
the concurrence and partial dissent are each on behalf of a 
single Justice; (2) because the concurrence finds no standing, 
it does not address the statute of limitations issue; and (3) the 
partial dissent does not address the concurrence’s novel 
standing analysis. All four Justices reject the New Jersey 
theory involving the non-Indian family exception, and 
logically, all Justices would agree that for the adoption 
challenge to succeed, all three bases for disallowing the 
challenge must be rejected. Any single theory is sufficient to 
disallow the adoption challenge. Because all reject theory 
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two, only the statute of limitations and the non-Indian mother 
of an Indian child standing theory are relevant. The plurality 
(for two) disallows the challenge based on statute of 
limitations; the concurrence (for one) disallows the challenge 
based on the novel standing theory. The partial dissent rejects 
the statute of limitations theory without addressing the novel 
standing theory. If we assume that had the concurrence 
addressed it, it would reject the statute of limitations theory, 
and that had the dissent addressed it, it would accept the 
concurrence’s novel standing theory, that would imply two 
justices out of four reject each of the two relevant theories 
advanced to bar the adoption challenge. The conclusion in In 
re Adoption of Erin G. that the narrowest grounds rule cannot 
be applied to In re Adoption of T.N.F is therefore valid 
because, based on reasonable assumptions, the case 
implicates more than a single dimension, meaning the Marks 
premise of a single dimension fails to hold. 
 
The opinion states: 
 
“We agree with David’s conclusion that T.N.F. does not have 
stare decisis effect. . . . The United States Supreme Court has 
held that ‘[w]hen a fragmented court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, the holding of the court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgment on the narrowest grounds.’ But one federal court 
has noted that this principle is inapplicable if there is no 
obvious ‘narrower’ opinion or ‘common denominator of the 
Court's reasoning.’ T.N.F. contains no ‘narrower’ reasoning 
agreed upon by all three affirming justices.” (alteration in 
original) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 
193; and then quoting Anker Energy Corp. v. Consolidation 
Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 169–70 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
Comments: 
Alaska has embraced language that 
suggests considering the application of 
Marks to its state highest court decisions, 
but the Manning court circumvents 
applying the reasoning from the opinion it 
identifies as narrower through a doctrinal 
exception, and the Erin G. court correctly 
recognizes that the doctrine’s premise 
does not apply in the earlier T.N.F. case. 
Although based on these cases one might 
categorize Alaska as Y, given these two 
uncertain applications, we take the more 








It does not appear that the Arizona Supreme Court has 
considered Marks as applied to their own fractured opinions; 
the databases show twelve cites to Marks only to discern the 
narrowest holding in U.S. Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., 
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State v. Bush, 423 P.3d 370, 387 (Ariz. 2018); State v. 
Medina, 306 P.3d 48, 63 (Ariz. 2013). 
Comments: Arizona has not addressed or resolved this issue.   U 
Ark. 
(elect.) 
Byrd v. State, 
879 S.W.2d 435, 
438 (Ark. 1994). 
 
In Byrd v. State, involving a criminal conviction for a 
misdemeanor by a six-person jury, Justice Brown discusses 
the Minnesota Supreme Court case, State v. Hamm, 423 
N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988). Justice Brown explains that the 
Minnesota Constitution is similar to that of Arkansas in that 
both constitutions “provide[] that the right to a jury trial [is] 
‘inviolate’ but d[o] not state the number of jurors.” Byrd, 879 
S.W.2d at 438. After explaining Justice Yetka’s opinion, the 
Byrd majority describes Justice Kelley’s concurring opinion 
as being “on narrower grounds.” Id. Whereas the Minnesota 
plurality treats the twelve-person jury as inviolate, Justice 
Kelley considers the permissibility of modifying it, albeit 
only by state constitutional amendment. See Hamm, 423 
N.W.2d at 387. Further, the Byrd majority appears to accept 
Justice Kelley’s opinion, stating “We agree and are reluctant 
to erode the fundamental right of trial by jury under our 
system of state government without a vote of the people, 
particularly in light of Amendment 16 which installed nine-
juror verdicts in civil cases and was a clear recognition by the 
people of this State that twelve-member juries was the 
standard.” 
Comments: 
Byrd may shed light on how lower courts 
should interpret plurality decisions by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court. The databases, 
however, do not show Arkansas cases 
expressly adopting the Marks rule for 
Arkansas plurality decisions, as opposed 
to using the doctrine to construe a 
nonmajority decision by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court; the case does not express 
a firm commitment to applying the rule to 
its own state highest court decisions. 






WL 2366207, at 
*21–22 (Cal. Ct. 
App. May 30, 
2013).  
Applying Marks to People v. Rodriguez, 290 P.3d 1143 (Cal. 
2012), and concluding that Justice Baxter’s “concurring 
opinion represents the Rodriguez holding” because “Justice 





WL 5231992, at 
*12 n.7 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 8, 
2015). 
“Because Justice Baxter concurred in the Rodriguez judgment 
on the narrowest grounds, his concurring opinion represents 
the Rodriguez holding. When a fragmented court decides a 
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys a 
majority assent, the court's holding may be viewed as the 
position concurring in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.” 
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2018 COA 8, 
¶ 38. 
 
“Breckenridge’s reliance on Justice Coat’s plurality decision 
in Expedia II is misplaced. ‘When a fragmented [c]ourt 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent’ of a majority of justices, ‘the holding of the 
[c]ourt may be viewed as that position taken by those 
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.’ Accordingly, Justice Hood's concurrence [on the 
narrowest grounds] in Expedia II is instructive.” (first and 
second alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Marks, 430 U.S. at 193) (citing City & Cnty. of Denver v. 
Expedia, Inc. (Expedia II), 2017 CO 32). 
Comments: Colorado appears to apply the Marks rule to its own nonmajority opinions. Y   
Conn. 
(appt.) 
Conn. Coal. for 
Just. in Educ. 
Funding, Inc. v. 
Rell, 176 A.3d 
28, 36 (Conn. 
2018). 
“[B]ecause Justice Palmer’s concurring opinion provided the 
narrowest grounds of agreement, it was controlling.” 
(referring to the split opinion in Conn. Coal. for Jus. in Educ. 
Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206 (Conn. 2010)). 
Little v. Comm’r 
of Corr., 172 
A.3d 325, 339 
(Conn. App. Ct. 
2017). 
Applying Marks to Luurtsema v. Comm’r of Corr. 
(“Luurstema II”), 12 A.3d 817 (Conn. 2011), and concluding 
“that the only parts of the plurality opinion in Luurtsema II 
that have any precedential value are the court’s affirmative 
answers to the reserved questions of whether Salamon applies 
retroactively in habeas corpus proceedings and to 
Luurtsema’s case in particular. Those answers are the 
narrowest grounds on which a majority of the panel clearly 
agreed.” (citations omitted) (citing State v. Salamon, 949 
A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008)).  





The Delaware Supreme Court has five members and generally 
hears cases in panels of three. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 2(a). The 
Delaware Supreme Court hears cases en banc if the panel is 
unable to reach a unanimous decision. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 
4. Accordingly, plurality decisions are rare, and it does not 
appear that the Delaware courts have addressed how to 
determine the holding of such fragmented decisions. The 
Rules of the Supreme Court of Delaware also do not address 
this question. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 2; DEL. SUP. CT. R. 4; The 
Supreme Court of Delaware: Oral Arguments, DEL. CTS., 
https://courts.delaware.gov/help/proceedings/supreme.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/BF49-CRV6]. Most notable is Rule 4(d), 
Panel assignments and the Court en Banc: Rehearing by 
Court. 
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Comments: Delaware has not addressed or resolved this issue.   U 
Fla. 
(appt.) 
Cannon v. State, 
206 So. 3d 831, 
834 n.3 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 
2016).  
“With a fragmented decision like [the Florida Supreme 
Court’s fractured Steinhorst v. State, 636 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 
1994) opinion], we are bound by the narrowest grounds on 
which a majority of the justices agreed.” 














Under the section titled “The Implication of This Case,” 
Justice Nahmias, writing a special concurrence, observes that 
the plurality opinion is narrower than his separate opinion and 
that the plurality opinion will be precedent in future cases. 
Justice Nahmias does not cite to Marks.  
Comments: 
This could be categorized as Y or U. 
Although this only appears in a special 
concurrence, it is against the interest of 
Justice Nahmias, who asserts that the 
plurality opinion, not his own, controls as 
precedent. Even so, we regard this an 
insufficient datum to conclude definitively 
that Georgia is applying the narrowest 
grounds rule to its own fractured state 
highest court opinions. 
  U 
Haw. 
(appt.) 
State v. Kikuta, 
253 P.3d 639, 
658 n.14 (Haw. 
2011).  
The Kikuta court declined to apply the narrowest grounds 
doctrine to State v. Stenger, 226 P.3d 441 (Haw. 2010), 
stating: “[U]nder the doctrine set forth in Marks v. United 
States, also known as the ‘narrowest grounds’ 
doctrine, . . . the holding of a plurality opinion ‘may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’ 
However, that doctrine has been discredited. More 
importantly, the doctrine has been applied very rarely and 
inconsistently by the Supreme Court.” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193). 
 
The Court relied upon Justice Alito’s opinion in Nichols v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994), criticizing 
Marks as more easily stated than applied.  
Comments: 
The Hawaii Supreme Court declined to 
apply the Marks rule to its own opinions 
regarding the doctrine as “discredited.” 
 N  




It does not appear that Idaho courts have considered Marks as 
applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. The 
research databases reveal five cites to Marks by Idaho courts 
to either discern the narrowest holding for U.S. Supreme 
Court plurality opinions or on the separate issue of retroactive 
application of laws. See, e.g., State v. Wass, 396 P.3d 1243, 
1248–49 (Idaho 2017); State v. Stanfield, 347 P.3d 175, 184–
85 (Idaho 2015); State v. Shackelford, 247 P.3d 582, 601 n.8 
(Idaho 2010). The databases show no Idaho cases using the 
narrowest grounds or similar language on their own 
nonmajority opinions. 





IL 110338, ¶ 25.  
Declining to apply Marks to a U.S. Supreme Court opinion, 
by adopting Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in United 
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008), instead of Justice 
Stevens’s narrowest grounds concurrence, stating “[u]nlike 
the federal courts, we are not required to discern the meaning 
of Justice Stevens’s concurrence and attempt to apply it.” 
Comments: 
This case is notable for two reasons. First, 
it addresses a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision and appears to mistakenly claim 
that the narrowest grounds rule binds only 
lower federal courts with respect to such 
nonmajority cases, rather than all lower 
courts. Second, although it does not 
definitively resolve the matter, by 
rejecting the application of Marks in a 
context in which it should be applied, the 
Illinois Supreme Court strongly implies 
that it would decline to extend the doctrine 
to its own case law. Although this could be 
classified as N or U, because it does not 
specifically address the application to state 
highest court decisions, we classify this as 
U. 
  U 
Ind. 
(appt.) 
Harvey v. State, 
719 N.E.2d 406, 
410 n.4 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1999).  
“This court is obliged to follow precedents established by the 
Indiana Supreme Court. However, no precedent for us to 
follow can be drawn from Emery as it was affirmed by an 
equally divided court in two separate opinions. Ordinarily, 
following the procedure used to extract a rule of law from a 
fragmented United States Supreme Court, we would look for 
the ‘least common denominator’ among the justices and find 
‘the position taken by the [j]ustices who based their 
acquiescence in the decision on the narrowest grounds.’” 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Frame v. 
State, 587 N.E.2d 173, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)) (citing 
Emery v. State, 717 N.E.2d 111 (Ind. 1999)) 
Comments: By “following the [same] procedure used to extract a rule of law from a fragmented Y   
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United States Supreme Court,” id., Indiana 





It does not appear that Iowa courts have considered Marks as 
applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. The 
research databases show four cites to Marks by Iowa courts 
to discern the narrowest holding for U.S. Supreme Court 
plurality opinions. See, e.g., Book v. Voma Tire Corp., 860 
N.W.2d 576, 592 (Iowa 2015). The databases show no Iowa 
cases using the narrowest grounds or similar language on 
their own nonmajority opinions.  






41 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2008). 
“The Kansas Supreme Court considered a case that is 
factually similar to [the appellee’s] in State v. Fisher. A three-
member plurality was joined by another justice in concluding 
that the district court properly suppressed evidence collected 
in a trash pull from a rural residence. The plurality opinion 
applied a two-part test. First, the court must determine 
whether the trash was located within the curtilage of the 
residence. . . . Second, if the trash is located within the 
curtilage, the court must determine ‘“whether the person 
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the trash 
container and whether that expectation of privacy in the 
garbage is objectively reasonable.’” . . . While the view 
we’ve noted from Fisher was adopted by only a plurality of 
three justices, it is consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court’s opinion in [California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 
(1988)]. Thus, the Fisher plurality’s conclusion seems to us 
equally applicable to [the appellee’s] case.” (citations 
omitted) (quoting State v. Fisher, 154 P.3d 455 (Kan. 2007)). 
 
This case is of limited value because the quoted language can 
be read either to imply general reliance on the plurality in a 
nonmajority case or specific reliance on the plurality because 
it accords with a U.S. Supreme Court case’s reasoning.  
Comments: 
There is insufficient data from which to 
determine whether Kansas courts rely on 
the plurality opinion in a nonmajority case 
or have failed to consider the application 
of the narrowest grounds rule. 








1641115, at *4 
(Ky. Apr. 22, 
2010).  
 
In Bailey, appellee, the marital father of a child in a custody 
dispute, relied on the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in 
J.N.R. v. O'Reilly, 264 S.W.3d 587 (Ky. 2008), to obtain a 
writ of prohibition that disallowed mandated paternity 
testing, claiming state statutes denied subject matter 
jurisdiction to any court to determine paternity of a child 
where there was no evidence or allegation that the marital 
relationship ceased ten months prior to the child’s birth. 
Bailey, 2010 WL 164115, at *2. 
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The Bailey court noted that in J.N.R., two justices joined the 
main opinion, two justices separately concurred in the result, 
and three justices dissented. See id. at *4. The Court 
explained that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and 
no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
[four] Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .” Id. (second and 
third alterations in original) (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193). 
The Bailey court further determined that under the relevant 
caselaw, a nonmajority decision may not overturn a past state 
highest court decision. Id. In this instance, the relevant 
proposition on which appellee relied was not expressed in the 
concurrence of four justices, comprising a majority. The court 
ultimately determined this did not end the matter, and it 
decided to allow required paternity, rejecting a claim of 
equitable estoppel. Id. 
Comments: 
The Kentucky Supreme Court states that 
the narrowest grounds rule controls its 
fractured decisions, although as applied to 
the specific case under review, this is 
dictum because the application would 
require a majority decision overturning a 
prior state highest court ruling. Even so, 
there is no contrary evidence suggesting 
that in a proper case the narrowest grounds 
rule would fail to apply. Therefore, 
although one might justifiably classify as 
a U, given the absence of contrary 
evidence, we are comfortable classifying 
as a Y. 







So. 3d 529, 568 





“A plurality opinion (consisting of less than four votes at the 
Louisiana Supreme Court) ‘lack[s] precedential authority.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2007-0492 (La. 12/2/08); 21 So. 3d 186, 210 (Knoll, J., 
concurring in the result)). 
 
 
State v. Karey, 
2016-0377 (La. 
6/29/17); 232 




“In finding this to be an enforceable agreement, the plurality 
opinion, in my view, ignores what could be a chilling effect 
on pre-trial discussions between district attorneys and defense 
attorneys, which would be to the detriment of all parties in the 
criminal justice system. Fortunately, as a plurality decision, 
its holding is on the more narrow grounds of the concurring 
justice.” (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193). 
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Warren v. La. 
Med. Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2007-0492 
(La. 12/2/08); 21 
So. 3d 186, 210 
(Knoll, J., 
concurring in the 
result). 
“[W]hile I concur in the result reached by the majority 
dismissing plaintiffs’ [medical malpractice] suit, I disagree 
with the majority’s reliance upon the plurality opinion in 
Borel v. Young, on rehearing, which has no precedential 
authority to support the holding that the three-year provision 
in [the Louisiana statute] is prescriptive, and its reaffirmation 
of Hebert v. Doctors Memorial Hospital. . . . I find plaintiffs’ 
action is perempted [sic] by the clear language of the 
[Louisiana statute], and write separately to reiterate my 
position on the issue of the peremptive [sic] nature of [the 
statute’s] three-year provision, which issue remained 
unresolved in our jurisprudence in light of the lack of 
precedential authority of the plurality opinion on rehearing in 
Borel.” (citations omitted) (first citing Borel v. Young, 2007-
0419 (La. 11/27/07); 989 So. 2d 42; and then citing Hebert v. 
Drs. Mem’l Hosp., 486 So. 2d 717 (La. 1986)). 
 
In a footnote, Justice Knoll added: “Prior to the majority’s 
reliance on Borel as authority, this reaffirmation [of Hebert] 
had no precedential value as Borel on rehearing was a 
plurality opinion.” See id. at 210 n.1.  
Comments: 
Although the Karey dissent appears to 
support applying Marks to a Louisiana 
Supreme Court nonmajority opinion, the 
separate Thompson and Warren opinions 
suggest that such nonmajority opinions 
lack precedential value. Given the limited 
and seemingly inconsistent authorities, 
Louisiana is categorized as “U.”   
  U 
Me. 
(appt.) 
Eaton v. Paradis, 
2014 ME 61, 




“[W]e had not precisely articulated the standard by which 
petitions for de facto parental rights must be evaluated until 
our recent opinion in Pitts v. Moore. The plurality opinion in 
Pitts stated [that what] ‘[a]n individual seeking parental rights 
as a de facto parent must . . . show [according to a two-part 
test].’ . . . Because we clarified the concepts necessary for a 
determination of de facto parenthood after the court denied 
[appellant’s] petition for de facto parental rights, we remand 
the case . . . in light of our opinion in Pitts.” (fourth alteration 
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Pitts v. Moore, 2014 
ME 59, ¶ 27, 90 A.3d 1169, 1179 (plurality opinion)) (citing 
Pitts, 2014 ME 59, 90 A.3d 1169). 
  
The Pitts plurality is also the narrowest grounds opinion. The 
plurality announced a two-part test for determining de facto 
parenthood: (1) that the person has undertaken a permanent, 
unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the 
child's life, and (2) that there are exceptional circumstances, 
which occur only when the nonparent can show that harm to 
the child will occur if he or she is not acknowledged as a de 
facto parent. See Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 27, 90 A.3d 1169. The 
concurrence determined that the state has a compelling 
interest to intervene when a person has shown the first factor 
above and that a showing of harm to the child is not required. 
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See id. ¶¶ 49–53 (Jabar, J., concurring). Finally, the dissent 
agreed with the two-part test (caretaking parental role and 
harm) but believed that the plurality reformulated or added to 
these standards, thus lowering the bar. See id. ¶¶ 66–72 
(Levy, J., dissenting). The dissent is therefore more 
demanding. Although this is narrowest, the Eaton court does 
not indicate that as the basis for relying on the plurality 
decision. 
Wood v. Wood, 
407 A.2d 282, 
284 n.2 (Me. 
1979).  
 
“In the Pendexter case, what appeared to be the opinion of the 
[Supreme Judicial Court of Maine] was signed by only one 
Justice. The opinion denominated a concurring opinion was 
joined in by three Justices. Thus, the principles enunciated in 
this latter opinion are controlling because only four Justices 
participated in the decision.” (citations omitted) (citing 
Pendexter v. Pendexter, 363 A.2d 743, 745, 747–50 (Me. 
1976)) 
Comments: 
Although the Eaton case relies on a 
narrowest plurality opinion, it does not 
state it is doing so on the basis of a Marks 
analysis; the substantially earlier Wood 
case is likewise unhelpful in resolving the 
question. 
  U 
Md. 
(appt.) 
State v. Falcon, 





Applying Marks to Schisler v. State, 907 A.2d 175 (Md. 
2006), and concluding that “careful examination of the 
opinion reveals that, in Schisler, all seven of the judges of this 
Court agreed that the General Assembly can end early the 
terms of incumbent members of a commission, regardless of 
who they are appointed by.” 
 
“As to plurality opinions, this Court has applied the [Marks] 
test for determining the precedential value of a case that lacks 
a majority opinion by the Supreme Court . . . . This approach 
is known as the ‘Marks approach,’ after Marks v. United 
States . . . .” (citation omitted). 
In re Nick H., 
123 A.3d 229, 




“Because Doe I is a plurality decision, we employ the Marks 
Rule to determine the Court’s holding . . . . Thus the Marks 
Rule requires us to determine the common thread running 
through the plurality and concurring opinions of Doe I.” 
(citing Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. (Doe I), 62 
A.3d 123 (Md. 2013)). 
  
“Because the Marks Rule directs us to the narrowest ground 
common to the plurality and the concurrence, Judge 
McDonald’s interpretations of Article 17 [of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights] . . . represents the ‘position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgment on the 
narrowest grounds.’” (quoting Wilkerson v. State, 24 A.3d 
703, 715) (Md. 2011)) (citing MARYLAND DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS, art. XVII). 
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Quispe del Pino 
v. Md. Dep’t of 
Pub. Safety & 
Corr. Servs., 112 
A.3d 522, 530 
(Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2015). 
“[B]ecause the ‘disadvantage’ standard used by the plurality 
in applying Article 17 [of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights] ‘did not command not command a majority of the 
Court, the holding of Doe [I] must be viewed as the narrower 
position taken by Judges McDonald and Adkins.’” (third 
alteration in original) (citing MARYLAND DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS, art. XVII). 
Guardado v. 
State, 98 A.3d 
415, 421 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 
2014). 
Applying Marks to Miller v. State, 77 A.3d 1030 (Md. 2013), 
which had no majority opinion, and concluding the Judge 
Battaglia’s plurality opinion in that case represented the 
narrowest holding. 
Cure v. State, 26 
A.3d 899, 910–
11 (Md. 2011). 
 
Analyzing what the Maryland Courts termed a “fractured” 
opinion and adopting the reasoning of Judge Wilner’s dissent 
in Brown v. State, 817 A.2d 241, 255 (Md. 2003) (Wilner, J., 
dissenting), which constituted the narrowest grounds, and 
held that “[f]or purposes of stare decisis, we note this is a 
proposition that garnered the support of the four Judges in 
Brown.” 
State v. Giddens, 
642 A.2d 870, 
874 n.6 (Md. 
1994).  
Applying a Marks-like rule to Prout v. State, 535 A.2d 445, 
450–51 (Md. 1998), in which “the three judge plurality 
believed that the issue of whether a particular crime bears on 
credibility should be viewed as a matter of trial court 
discretion. But the two concurring judges and two dissenting 
judges [i.e., four judges] each thought that the question was a 
matter of law.” (The Giddens court cited Prout as precedent 
for holding that this issue was a matter of law but did not cite 
to Marks.)  
Comments: 
Maryland applies Marks to discern the 
narrowest holding in its state court 
opinion. The chart does not include several 
additional unpublished opinions 
expressing this point. See, e.g., Feaster v. 
State, No. 1967, 2015 WL 9590659, at *5 






Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, No. 04–
2656, 2006 WL 
3208758, at *2–
3 (Mass. Sup. 
Ct. Sept. 29, 
2006).  
“The Cote-Whitacre decision consists of five different 
opinions . . . . The court thus [did] not present a majority 
opinion as to the rule of law to be applied in determining 
whether same-sex marriage is prohibited in another state 
[within the meaning of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 11, 12 
(repealed 2008)]. In Marks v. United States, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that when a divided Court provides no majority 
rationale for its decision, ‘“the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’ 
On the issue of statutory construction, Chief Justice 
Marshall’s concurring opinion in Cote-Whitacre articulates 
the narrowest grounds for the judgment of the court. . . . Chief 
Justice Marshall’s statutory construction, as the position of 
the court concurring in the judgment on the narrowest 
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grounds, thus represents the holding of the court on that 
issue.” (fourth alteration in original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193) (citing Cote-Whitacre v. 





(Mass. 2013).  
Applying Marks to Coombes v. Florio, 877 N.E.2d 567 
(Mass. 2007), and concluding that the holding “represents the 
narrowest position of the court, where Justice Ireland (joined 
by Justices Spina and Cowin) issued a concurring opinion, 
and Justice Greaney issued an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.”  
Comments: 
Massachusetts applies Marks to discern 
the narrowest holding in its state court 
opinions. 
Y   
Mich. 
(elect.) 





WL 4381870, at 
*4 (Mich. Ct. 
App. July 30, 
2020). 
In a personal injury action arising from hitting an obstruction 
arising from the ground at night, defendant argued that the 
open and obvious doctrine absolved it of any duty to the 
plaintiff. See Liquia, 2020 WL 4381870, at *2. In support of 
this argument, the defendant relied on a plurality opinion 
from the Michigan Supreme Court, Singerman v. Municipal 
Service Bureau, 565 N.W.2d 383 (Mich. 1997). Id. at *5. 
However, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that it is not 
bound by plurality decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court. 
Id. 
Auto Club Grp. 
Ins. Co. v. 
Booth, 797 
N.W.2d 695 
(Mich. Ct. App. 
2010). 
Auto Club involved an action for a declaratory judgment by 
an insurance company arguing that the defendant’s 
homeowner’s policy did not cover the defendant’s actions in 
an accidental shooting at his home. See Auto Club, 797 
N.W.2d at 696–976. Defendant relied on Allstate Insurance 
Co. v. McCarn, 645 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. 2002), in arguing that 
he was entitled to coverage based on a two-prong test devised 
by the Michigan Supreme Court. Auto Club, 797 N.W.2d at 
976. But in Auto Club, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted 
that there was no majority in McCarn and that plurality 
opinions in which no majority of the participating justices 
agree with respect to the reasoning are not considered 
authoritative interpretations binding under the doctrine of 
stare decisis. Id. at 699. 
Negri v. Slotkin, 
244 N.W.2d 98, 
99–100 (Mich. 
1976). 
“[The Court of Appeals’s] reliance [on People v. Jackson, 212 
N.W.2d 918 (Mich. 1973)] was misplaced. In Jackson we 
considered the impact on this Court of a case in which a 
majority of the justices sitting failed to concur in the 
reasoning for the decisions. . . . Plurality decisions in which 
no majority of the justices participating agree as to the 
reasoning are not an authoritative interpretation binding on 
this Court under the doctrine of stare decisis.” (footnote 
omitted). 






“Since neither [the plurality or dissenting] opinion [in People 
v. Thomas, 197 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 1972)] obtained four 







“The clear rule in Michigan is that a majority of the Court 
must agree on a ground for decision in order to make that 
binding precedent for future cases. If there is merely a 
majority for a particular result, then the parties to the case are 
bound by the judgment but the case is not authority beyond 
the immediate parties.”  
Comments: 
It does not appear that Michigan applies 
Marks to its state court opinions. Also, 
lower courts are not bound by plurality 
decisions more generally. 








“Recently, in State v. Stein, we addressed the standard of 
review in circumstantial evidence cases. In a three-justice 
plurality opinion, we said that when reviewing the sufficiency 
of circumstantial evidence, ‘our first task is to identify the 
circumstances proved.’ . . . Our second step is to ‘examine 
independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might 
be drawn from the circumstances proved.’ . . . We conclude 
that [the plurality] is the proper approach . . . .” (citation 
omitted) (first quoting State v. Stein, 776 N.W.2d 709, 718 
(Minn. 2010) (plurality opinion); and then quoting id. at 716) 
(citing Stein, 776 N.W.2d at 714). Although the court applies 
the plurality, this appears to be based on persuasiveness, not 
based on a rejection of the narrowest grounds rule, which isn’t 
discussed.  
Comments: 
It does not appear that Minnesota courts 
have considered Marks as applied to 
nonmajority opinions by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court. Rather, the courts seem to 
simply rely on the plurality’s opinion 
without expressly rejecting the application 
of the narrowest grounds rule in this 
context. Given the limited information, we 
classify Minnesota with a U. 
  U 
Miss. 
(elect.) 
Puckett v. State, 
2000-DR-01077-
SCT (¶ 9) (Miss. 
2002).  
Rejecting reliance on the plurality opinion in Booker v. State, 
699 So. 2d 132 (Miss. 1997) (plurality opinion), as it “is not 





(¶ 15) (Miss. 
2002).  
 
Rejecting reliance on Wolfe v. State, 98-KA-00047-SCT 
(Miss. 1999), because “a majority of all sitting judges is 
required to create precedent, and therefore, it follows that a 
plurality vote [in Wolfe] does ‘not create a binding result.’” 
(quoting Churchill, 619 So. 2d 900, 904 (Miss. 1993) (en 
banc)).  
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Churchill v. 
Pearl River 
Basin Dev. Dist., 
619 So. 2d 900, 
904 (Miss. 1993) 
(en banc).  
“[I]t is a logical conclusion for this Court to recognize that a 
plurality vote does not create a binding result. The narrowest 
holding in Presley, in which a majority of the sitting justices 
concurred, was that Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-6 is 
unconstitutional. As there is no majority vote for Part II, we 
can only note that it has no precedential value.” (first citing 
Presley v. Miss. State Highway Comm’n, 608 So. 2d 1288 
(Miss. 1992) (en banc); and then citing MISS. CODE. ANN. 
§ 11-46-6 (1992) (repealed 1992)). 
 
Part of the substantive ruling in Churchill, holding that a 
sovereign defendant is estopped from asserting sovereign 
immunity if it purchases public liability insurance, has been 
superseded by MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-17(4) (2021). See 
L.W. v. McComb Separate Mun. Sch. Dist., 97-CA-01465-
SCT (¶¶ 32–34) (Miss. 1999). This did not change the court’s 
conclusion that a plurality opinion does not create binding 
precedent.  
Morgan v. City 
of Ruleville, 627 
So. 2d 275, 278 
(Miss. 1993). 
“In Presley, this Court held Section 11-46-6 unconstitutional. 
However, there is a question as to whether this decision 
should be applied retroactively or prospectively. . . . [In] Part 
II of the decision in Presley, four justices agreed to apply it 
prospectively, three justices wanted to apply it retroactively, 
and two justices dissented altogether. . . . [A]ssuming that 
Part II of Presley received a plurality vote, it still cannot be 
used as authority to apply Part I of Presley in the instant 
case. . . . ‘[W]hen no single rationale commands a majority, 
“the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on 
the narrowest grounds.”[’] . . . The narrowest holding in 
Presley is simply that Miss.[ ]Code Ann. § 11-46-6 is 
unconstitutional. This holding is the only point of Presley 
which has precedential value.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Churchill, 619 So. 2d at 903) (first citing Presley, 608 So. 2d 
1288; and then citing MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-46-6). 
Comments: 
The Morgan case, in 1993, relied on the 
narrowest grounds rule, but the more 
recent Puckett and Buffington cases make 
plain that nonmajority decisions do not 
hold precedential status. Professors 
Richard Re and Saul Levmore have, in 
separate works, treated this state as 
applying the narrowest grounds rule based 
upon their analyses of the 1993 Morgan 
case. See Re, supra note 11, at 1961 n.116; 
Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and 
Reasoning Pluralities, 3 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES LAW 87, 96 n.18 (2002). Based 
on the more recent Mississippi cases 
presented in the chart, we treat this state as 
rejecting that rule, and thus categorize as 
N. 
 N  
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Mo. 
(appt.) 
May v. Greater 
Kan. City Dental 
Soc’y, 863 
S.W.2d 941, 
948–49 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
“This point [that a nonviable fetus is not a person for purposes 
of a wrongful death action] is controlled by Rambo v. Lawson, 
in which the court held that the plaintiff could not state a 
claim for the wrongful death of an unborn child. . . . ‘In 
Rambo, a plurality of this Court ruled that the term person 
does not include a nonviable fetus, and therefore, a civil cause 
of action for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus will not 
lie.’ The Rambo decision controls and decides this point 
against [the] plaintiff . . . .” (citations omitted) (quoting State 
v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345, 349 (Mo. 1992) (en banc)) (citing 
Rambo v. Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Mo. 1990) (en banc) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 
The substantive ruling in Rambo is superseded by statute such 
that a wrongful death action now includes the death of a 
nonviable fetus. See MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2020); Connor 
v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89, 92–93 (Mo. 1995) (en banc). 
This did not affect reliance upon the plurality opinion in 
construing a nonmajority case.  
Comments: 
It does not appear that Missouri courts 
have considered Marks as applied to 
plurality opinions by the Supreme Court of 
Missouri. Rather, in this relatively early 
case from 1993, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals seemed simply to rely on the 
plurality’s opinion in a nonmajority ruling 
but without directly addressing the 
applicability of the narrowest grounds 
rule. 




It does not appear that Montana courts have considered Marks 
as applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. The 
research databases only reveal two cites to Marks in cases 
involving the separate issue of retroactive application of laws. 
See State v. Goebel, 2001 MT 155, ¶¶ 18–23, 306 Mont. 83, 
31 P.3d 340; State v. Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000, 1012 (Mont. 
1979). The databases show no Montana cases using the 
narrowest grounds or similar language.  
Comments: Montana has not addressed or resolved this issue.   U 
Neb. 
(appt.) N/A 
Nebraska courts appear not to have considered Marks as 
applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. The 
research databases reveals only one cite to Marks, which 
declines to apply Marks to a federal case. See State v. Dubray, 
854 N.W.2d 584, 611 & n.80 (Neb. 2014) (citing Marks, 430 
U.S. at 193) (declining to apply Marks to Montana v. 
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996), to adopt the reasoning of 
Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion and claiming that 
resolving Marks as applied to the immediate case “is 
unnecessary to deciding this appeal”).  
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It does not appear that Nevada courts have considered Marks 
as applied to their own state highest court plurality opinions. 
The research databases reveal only three cites to Marks, 
construing the narrowest holding in federal cases or 
determining the unrelated question of retroactive application 
of laws. See, e.g., Stevens v. Warden, Nev. State Prison, 969 
P.2d 945, 948 (Nev. 1998); Marlow v. Baca, No. CR13-0660, 
2017 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 1921, at *11 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Dec. 26, 
2017). 




It does not appear that New Hampshire courts have 
considered Marks as applied to their own highest court 
plurality opinions. The research databases reveal only one 
cite to Marks dealing with the retroactive application of laws. 
See State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.H. 1978).  







640 A.2d 788, 
796 (N.J. 1994) 
(Clifford, J., 
concurring).  
This complex case involves the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
addressing its earlier ruling, Perini Corp. v Great Bay Hotel 
& Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1992) (plurality opinion), 
governing the terms under which an arbitration award may be 
revisited on judicial review. Id. at 366. Relying on a New 
Jersey statute, a Perini plurality found a basis in law for the 
award of damages resulting from a delay in contract 
performance, notwithstanding substantial performance. See 
id. at 383. The dissent, applying the same standard, did not 
find such a basis in law, and would, instead, have sustained 
the lower court decision modifying the arbitration award. Id. 
at 403 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
The Chief Justice’s concurrence determined that only in the 
event of egregious error is an arbitration award subject to 
judicial modification. Id. at 399 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring). 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Tretina v. Fitzpatrick & 
Assocs., once more, fractured but a majority coalesced on the 
Chief Justice’s view set out in Perini. Trentina Printing, 640 
A.2d at 792–93 (plurality opinion). The Tretina plurality 
opinion did not cite to Marks, whereas Justice Clifford, who 
changed his views to that of the Perini Chief Justice, did. Id. 
at 797 (Clifford, J., concurring). In doing so, Justice Clifford 
identified the Chief Justice’s Perini concurrence as 
controlling, but read that opinion narrowly, as restricting 
judicial review of arbitration awards without necessarily 
setting out a clear standard. Id. 
208 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [89:101 
Comments: 
Because this case involved a state highest 
court revisiting its own earlier decision, 
rather than a lower court construing a 
fractured state highest court decision, 
whether Marks applies to the state highest 
court decisions remains formally 
unresolved. Despite this, it appears that a 
majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
justices embrace the logic of Marks as 
applied to that court’s decisions. This is 
marked with a U, but is leaning toward a 
Y. 




It does not appear that New Mexico courts have considered 
Marks as applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. 
The research databases show only two cites to Marks in cases 
applying Marks to a federal case or the retroactive application 
of laws. See, e.g., State v. Norush, 642 P.2d 1119, 1121 (N.M. 
1982); State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8 (N.M. 2010).  
Comments: New Mexico has not addressed or resolved this issue.   U 
N.Y. 
(appt.) 
People v. Brown, 
7 N.Y.S.3d 19, 
21–22 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2015). 
“Following analogous precedent pertaining to plurality 
opinions by the United States Supreme Court, we apply the 
narrower approach of Judge Graffeo [in People v. Sibblies, 8 
N.E.3d 852, 855 (N.Y. 2014)], which leaves intact the well-
settled law that a post-certificate assertion that the People are 
not ready does not, by itself, vitiate the previously filed 
certificate of readiness” (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193). 
People v. Joseph, 
999 N.Y.S.2d 
320, 323 (N.Y. 
Crim. Ct. 2014). 
“Judge Statsinger [in People v. McLeod, 988 N.Y.S.2d 436 
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2014)] reasoned that in cases where a 
plurality opinion from an appellate court results in no clear 
ruling, the trial court must follow the more narrow reasoning: 
‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken 
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 





439 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. 2014).  
“While the Court of Appeals has not adopted a similar rule 
[as in Marks], it has expressly recognized that this is indeed 
the appropriate means of construing a fragmented decision of 
the United States Supreme Court. It seems more than 
reasonable, then, to assume that the Court of Appeals would 
apply the same rule of construction to its own decisions in the 
rare case where there is no single rationale adopted by at least 
four judges.” (citation omitted). 





S.E.2d 245, 250 
“According to Justice Newby in his dissent [in Crocker v. 
Roethling, 675 S.E.2d 625 (N.C. 2009)], ‘Justice Martin’s 
opinion, having the narrower directive, is the controlling 
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n.1 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2010).  
opinion . . . and requires the trial court to conduct a voir dire 
examination of the proffered expert witness.’” (quoting 
Crocker, 675 S.E.2d at 635 n.1 (Newby, J., dissenting)).  
Crocker v. 
Roethling, 675 
S.E.2d 625, 635 
n.1 (N.C. 2009) 
(Newby, J., 
dissenting). 
“The separate opinions of Justice Martin and Justice Hudson, 
when taken together, constitute a majority of the Court in 
favor of reversing and remanding. Justice Martin’s opinion, 
having the narrower directive, is the controlling opinion, and 
requires the trial court to conduct a voir dire examination of 
the proffered expert witness. References in this dissenting 
opinion to ‘the majority’ denote matters as to which the 
opinions of Justices Martin and Hudson seem to agree. When 
responding to one of those opinions separately, this dissenting 
opinion will refer to the authoring Justice by name.” (citation 
omitted) (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193). 
Comments: 
North Carolina applies the Marks rule to 
its state court opinions. Notably, this is 
first demonstrated in a dissenting opinion, 
but it then forms the basis for a subsequent 
ruling in the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals construing the relevant North 
Carolina Supreme Court opinion in which 
that dissent appears. 




It does not appear that North Dakota courts have considered 
Marks as applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. 
The research databases show one cite to Marks in a case 
applying Marks to a federal case. See State v. Orr, 375 
N.W.2d 171, 175 (N.D. 1985).  




It does not appear that Ohio courts have considered Marks as 
applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. The 
research databases reveal twenty-seven cites to Marks in 
cases applying the narrowest grounds rule to federal cases or 
related to the retroactive application of laws. See, e.g., State 
v. Adams, 144 Ohio St. 3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 
127, 169, at ¶¶ 252–56.  





It does not appear that Oklahoma courts have considered 
Marks as applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. 
The research databases reveal seven cites to Marks in cases 
applying the narrowest grounds rule to federal cases or related 
to the retroactive application of laws. See, e.g., In re Initiative 
Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 5 n.8 
(Okla. 1992).  
Comments: Oklahoma has not addressed or resolved this issue.   U 




It does not appear that Oregon courts have considered Marks 
as applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. The 
research databases reveal six cites to Marks in cases applying 
the narrowest grounds rule to federal cases. See, e.g., In re 
Validation Proc. to Determine the Regularity & Legality of 
Multnomah Cnty. Home Rule Charter Section 11.60 & 
Implementing Ordinance No. 1243 Regulating Campaign 
Fin. & Disclosure, 462 P.3d 706, 724 (Or. 2020) (en banc).  





233 A.3d 717, 
731–32 (Pa. 
2020).  
Applying Marks to Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. 
Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1990), and concluding, “We 
have little difficulty in stating with certainty that five Justices 
in Verbonitz agreed a prima facie case cannot be established 
by hearsay evidence alone, and the common rationale among 
those Justices involved due process considerations.”  
Commonwealth 
v. Alexander, 
243 A.3d 177, 
197 (Pa. 2020).  
“We begin our analysis by observing again that Gary was not 
a majority decision but rather an opinion announcing the 
judgment of the court. See 210 Pa. Code § 63.4(B)(3) (‘An 
opinion shall be designated as the “Opinion Announcing the 
Judgment of the Court” when it reflects only the mandate, and 
not the rationale, of a majority of Justices.’). . . . We apply the 
Marks Rule.” (citing Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 
(Pa. 2014)). 
McNeil v. 
Jordan, 894 A.2d 
1260, 1279 (Pa. 
2006).  
“Pursuant to the narrowest reasoning uniting a majority of the 
justices participating in this case, and the opinion of Mr. 
Justice Saylor, given the facts of this case the trial court is 
directed to assess whether Henry Jr. can establish probable 
cause that his requested discovery will permit the filing of a 
complaint capable of surviving a demurrer in the instant 
litigation and to rule accordingly.” (footnotes omitted) 
(citations omitted).  
Hardy v. 
Southland Corp., 
645 A.2d 839, 
842 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1994).  
“Applying this [Marks] analysis to the present case, it would 
seem that we would be obligated to apply the modified 
assumption of the risk doctrine as set forth in the lead Howell 
opinion.” (citing Howell v. Clyde, 620 A.2d 1107 (Pa. 1993)). 
Comments: 
Pennsylvania applies Marks to construe 
the narrowest holding in their state court 
nonmajority opinions. 
Y   
R.I. 
(appt.) N/A 
It does not appear that Rhode Island courts have considered 
Marks as applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. 
The databases reveal two cases applying the narrowest 
grounds doctrine to federal cases. See State v. Nordstrom, 529 
A.2d 107, 111 n.1 (R.I. 1987); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 
1108 (R.I. 1987). 
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It does not appear that South Carolina courts have considered 
Marks as applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. 
The research databases reveal two cites to Marks by South 
Carolina courts applying the narrowest grounds rule to federal 
cases. See State v. Harrison, 741 S.E.2d 727, 732 (S.C. 2013); 
State v. Key, 848 S.E.2d 315, 319–20, 319 n.2 (S.C. 2020).  
Comments: South Carolina has not addressed or resolved this issue.   U 
S.D. 
(appt.) 
State v. Guthrie, 
2001 SD 61, 
¶ 96, 627 
N.W.2d 401, 
434 (Gilbertson, 
J., concurring in 
part and 
concurring in 
result in part). 
“As there is no majority opinion regarding the rationale for 
adjudication of this issue, resolution of the conflicting 
theories set forth in the various writings of this case await a 
future decision of this Court.” As indicated by Justice 
Gilberston’s concurring opinion, South Dakota has not yet 
resolved how to construe its nonmajority opinions. Other than 
Guthrie, the databases reveal only one additional case citing 
Marks and applying the narrowest grounds rule to a federal 
case. See State v. Plastow, 2015 SD 100, ¶ 22 n.9, 873 
N.W.2d 222, 230 n.9. 




It does not appear that Tennessee courts have considered 
Marks as applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. 
The research databases reveal sixteen cites to Marks by 
Tennessee courts applying the narrowest grounds rule to 
federal cases and to assess the retroactive application of laws. 
See, e.g., State v. Feaster, 466 S.W.3d 80, 85 (Tenn. 2015).  
Comments: Tennessee has not addressed or resolved this issue.   U 
Tex. 
(elect.) 
Unkart v. State, 




“But a fractured decision may constitute binding authority if, 
and to the extent that, a majority holding can be ascertained 
from the various opinions in the case. Even if the rationales 
seem disparate, if a majority of the judges agree on a 
particular narrow ground for or rule of decision, then that 
ground or rule may be viewed as the holding of the court. 
With respect to Blue, it is not possible to ascertain a majority 
holding or the narrowest ground or rule that commands a 
majority of the court.” (footnote omitted) (citing Blue v. 
State, 41 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc)). 
 
In Blue v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas 
reversed and remanded a conviction following a trial judge’s 
informing the jury of a possible prior plea deal, which the 
defendant rejected, and implying that trying a criminal 
defendant suggests guilt. See Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 130–32 
(plurality opinion). The Blue court fractured with four 
separate opinions, three of which are relevant to the narrowest 
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grounds analysis. The opinion issuing the judgment 
comprised of four votes, and the dissent comprised of three 
votes. See id. at 129. Two judges concurred in the judgment, 
and one member joining the opinion issuing the judgment 
separately concurred, seeking to narrow the reach of the 
plurality ruling. See id. at 133 (Meyers, J., concurring in the 
judgment); id. (Mansfield, J., concurring); id. at 135 (Keasler, 
J., concurring in the judgment). (This implicated issues 
related to Washington v. Glucksburg and Shlup v. Delo.) This 
case, which is two dimensional, can be simplified as turning 
on two controlling issues: (1) Is the Texas court able to 
reverse and remand, despite the defendant’s failure to object 
to the trial judge’s comments, based on fundamental error 
without evaluating the case under Texas evidentiary rules?; 
(2) Applying the Texas evidentiary rules, does the 
defendant’s failure to object preclude review on appeal only 
if the claimed basis for error involves an evidentiary ruling? 
See id. at 130–31 (plurality opinion). The plurality rested on 
a combination of federal and state cases finding foundational 
error without applying the Texas evidentiary rules. See id. at 
132–33. The concurrence in the judgment determined that it 
must apply the state evidentiary rules but reasoned that those 
rules—intended to capture, not change, prior state law—
permitted a reversal even when the identified error is not 
evidentiary. See id. at 136–137 (Keasler, J., concurring in the 
judgment). The dissent rejected the first theory, claiming that 
the reversal may not rest on general state or federal precedents 
but must be assessed based upon state evidentiary rules. Also, 
the dissent rejected the concurrence in the judgment, claiming 
that raising the challenge was procedurally foreclosed by state 
evidentiary rules. See id. at 142–43 (Keller, J., dissenting). 
All judges agreed that to reverse and remand, the court must 
either apply a general fundamental error analysis or determine 
that the state evidentiary rules do not procedurally foreclose 
the appeal. See id. at 131 (plurality opinion); id. at 134 
(Mansfield, J., concurring); id. at 136–37 (Keasler, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 142–44 (Keller, J., 
dissenting). If those joining the opinion issuing the judgment 
would agree that when applying those rules the claim is 
procedurally foreclosed, and if those concurring in the 
judgment would agree that there is no independent basis 
beyond state evidentiary rules for the appeal, then separate 
majorities would reject each claimed basis for relief, 
supporting the inference that the case is two dimensional and 
thus, the premise of Marks fails to apply. 
Ervin v. State, 
331 S.W.3d 49, 
53 (Tex. App. 
2010). 
“When an appellate court decides a case without issuing a 
majority opinion providing a single rationale explaining the 
result, the majority holding is the position taken by those 
members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest 
grounds.” 
Haynes v. State, 
273 S.W.3d 183, 
187 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2008) 
“[W]e do not agree with the State that Collier contains no 
majority holding. Judge Keasler’s concurring opinion in 
Collier sets out a majority holding, because this opinion does 
contain the narrowest ground upon which five of the judges 
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(plurality 
opinion). 
concurring in the judgment in Collier agreed.” (citing Collier 
v. State, 999 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). 
Comments: 
Texas applies Marks to their state court 
opinions to discern the narrowest holding 
for precedential value. 




It does not appear that Utah courts have considered Marks as 
applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. The 
research databases reveal two cites to Marks by Utah courts 
applying the narrowest grounds rule to federal cases. See, e.g., 
Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, 73 P.3d 334; 
State v. Anderson, 2020 UT App 135, 475 P.3d 967 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2020).  




It does not appear that Vermont courts have considered Marks 
as applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. The 
research databases reveal three cites to Marks by Vermont 
courts applying the narrowest grounds rule to federal cases or 
related to the separate issue of the retroactive application of 
laws. See, e.g., State v. Fleurie, 2008 VT 118, 185 Vt. 29, 968 
A.2d 326; State v. Porter, 671 A.2d 1280 (Vt. 1996); State v. 
Lafountain, 628 A.2d 1243 (Vt. 1993).  




It does not appear that Virginia courts have considered Marks 
as applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. The 
research databases reveal eleven cites to Marks by Virginia 
courts applying the narrowest grounds rule to federal cases or 
related to the separate issue of the retroactive application of 
laws. See, e.g., Secret v. Commonwealth, 819 S.E.2d 234 
(Va. 2018).  
Comments: Virginia has not addressed or resolved this issue.   U 
Wash. 
(elect.) 
State v. Ruem, 
313 P.3d 1156, 








“In Washington, ‘[w]hen there is no majority opinion, the 
holding is the narrowest ground upon which a majority 
agreed.’ Therefore, when the rationale for a dissent more 
closely aligns with the lead opinion on a certain issue, that 
rationale forms the court’s holding as to that issue.” 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting In re 
Francis, 242 P.3d 866 (Wash. 2010)). 
 
In a footnote, Justice Johnson adds:  
“I see no reason for this court to follow th[e] [Marks] rule 
because of the significant differences between this court and 
our federal counterpart. We are elected directly by the people 
rather than appointed. . . . Just because my conscience will 
not allow me to sign an opinion that reverses Ruem’s 
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conviction does not invalidate my opinion that Justice 
Stephens’ Ferrier holding correctly states the law in 
Washington.”  
In re Francis, 
242 P.3d 866, 
873 n.7 (Wash. 
2010) (en banc). 
“The State’s reliance on Shale is also misguided because there 
was no majority opinion in Shale; the portion of the lead 
opinion upon which the State relies has no precedential value. 
The four-justice lead opinion and four-justice concurrence 
agreed only in the result . . . . When there is no majority 
opinion, the holding is the narrowest ground upon which a 
majority agreed.” (citing In re Shale, 158 P.3d 588 (Wash. 
2007) (en banc)).  
Davidson v. 
Henson, 954 
P.2d 1327, 1335 
(Wash. 1998) 
(en banc). 
“When there is no majority agreement as to the rationale for 
a decision, the holding of the court is the position taken by 
those concurring on the narrowest grounds.” (citing State v. 
Zakel, 812 P.2d 512 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)).  
Comments: 
Washington courts appear to follow the 
Marks rule although there is a recent 
separate opinion by Justice Johnson, 
writing separately and calling into 
question whether state courts should 
follow their “federal counterpart.” This 
appears to be a minority position and 
contrary to practice in the state. The 
overall weight of authority appears to 
support a Y. 






LLC v. Griffith, 
775 S.E.2d 90, 
104 n.1 (W. Va. 
2015) (Loughry, 




“Inasmuch as I concur in the result only as it pertains to 
punitive damages and do not concur in the rationale advanced 
by the author, the analysis as to punitive damages does not 
‘enjoy[ ] the assent’ of three Justices and is therefore, as to 
that aspect, a plurality opinion.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193). 
 
Comments: 
Other than Justice Loughry’s opinion, 
which refers to Marks in explaining that he 
concurs only in the result, not the 
rationale, it does not appear that West 
Virginia courts have considered Marks as 
applied to their nonmajority opinions. 
   U 
Wis. 
(elect.) 
State v. Weber, 
2016 WI 961, 
¶ 83 n.1, 372 
Wis. 2d 202, 887 
N.W.2d 554 
“I use the term ‘lead’ opinion for two reasons. First, I am 
concerned that without this cue, the reader may mistakenly 
believe that the lead opinion has any precedential value. 
Although four justices join in the mandate of the opinion to 
reverse the court of appeals (Zeigler, J., joined by 
Roggensack, C.J., Gableman, J.[,] and Kelly, J.), it represents 
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(Bradley, J., 
dissenting). 
the reasoning of only three justices . . . . Second, I use the 
term ‘lead’ opinion because although it is undefined in our 
Internal Operating Procedures, its use here is consistent with 
past description. We have said ‘that a lead opinion is one that 
states (and agrees with) the mandate of a majority of justices, 
but represents the reasoning of less than a majority of the 
participating justices.’” (quoting State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, 
¶ 143, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (Abrahamson & 
Bradley, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).  
State v. Lynch, 
2016 WI 66, ¶ 7 
n.9, 371 Wis. 2d 
1, 885 N.W.2d 
89. 
Declining to discern a narrowest holding from State v. Shiffra, 
499 N.W.2d 719 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), as modified by State 
v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, 
concluding, “[W]hile five Justices would reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals—in whole or in part—no more than 
three Justices can agree on the same rationale or result. As a 




2013 WI 75, 





“This court has followed Marks in applying plurality opinions 
of the United States Supreme Court and in applying plurality 
decisions of this court.” 
DeBruin v. St. 
Patrick 
Congregation, 
2012 WI 94, 




“There is no majority opinion of this court. . . . Accordingly, 
because no opinion has garnered the vote of four justices, 




Cnty. of Dane, 
2008 WI 83, 




“The lead opinion, coupled with the concurrence’s vote to 
reverse the court of appeals, decides the outcome in this 
dispute between the Town of Madison and Dane County. The 
lead opinion has no precedential value because the 
concurrence does not join the lead opinion’s statutory 
interpretation.”  
Comments: 
Wisconsin employs “lead opinions” when 
there is no majority; opinions bearing that 
designation do not necessarily express the 
holding on the narrowest grounds. Two 
Justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
define lead opinion as “one that states (and 
agrees with) the mandate of a majority of 
justices, but represents the reasoning of 
less than a majority of the participating 
  U 
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justices.” Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 143 
(Abrahamson & Bradley, JJ., concurring 
in part, dissenting in part). 
 
Among practitioners, there has been a 
recognized push for Wisconsin courts to 
resolve how to construe nonmajority 
opinions. See, e.g., Alan Ball, A Spike in 





(providing a statistical overview of 
fractured opinions in Wisconsin and 
arguing for a need for clarity respecting 
how to construe such opinions); Philip C. 
Babler, The Need for a Marks Rule in 
Wisconsin, Foley & Lardner LLP: Wis. 




(blog post from a senior attorney at the law 
firm of Foley & Lardner LLP, showing 
how practitioners in Wisconsin appear to 
construe state plurality opinions). 
However, Wisconsin has not yet resolved 
whether to apply the narrowest grounds 




It does not appear that Wyoming courts have considered 
Marks as applied to their own highest court plurality opinions. 
The research databases reveal two cites to Marks by 
Wyoming courts, applying the narrowest grounds rule to 
federal cases or related to the separate question involving the 
retroactive application of laws. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 
2014 WY 13, 317 P.3d 1108 (Wyo. 2014); Sodergren v. State, 
715 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1986).  
Comments: Wyoming has not addressed or resolved this issue.   U 
Summary: 
Prelim tally: 13 3 34 
Judicial Selection Breakdown Y N U 
Elected—partisan, nonpartisan, 
legislative 5 2 14 
Appointed—gubernatorial, assisted  8 1 20 
Method: This Table is based on searches of Westlaw and Lexis. Case citing references to 
Marks v. United States were filtered by state. Filtered cases were reviewed to determine if 
the state court cited Marks for narrowest grounds purposes, if the state court was using Marks 
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to decipher a U.S. Supreme Court decision, and if the court was applying Marks to state cases. 
Additionally, if a case cited to a second case not on the filtered list and the second case 
appeared to also discuss Marks or narrowest grounds, that second case was also reviewed. 
State cases were also searched using Westlaw and Lexis. State cases were narrowed by date 
range (1977–Present) and terms, such as: “narrow,” “narrowest,” “plurality,” “narrowest 
grounds,” “fractured,” “nonmajority,” and “split opinion.” Secondary sources were also 
examined for references to Marks and the narrowest grounds rule as applied to state cases. 
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APPENDIX B: 








Metro Broad., Inc. 
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 























“A majority of the Court in Fullilove did 
not apply strict scrutiny to the race-based 
classification at issue. Three Members 
inquired ‘whether the objectives of th[e] 
legislation are within the power of 
Congress’ and ‘whether the limited use of 
racial and ethnic criteria . . . is a 
constitutionally permissible means for 
achieving the congressional objectives.’ 
Three other Members would have upheld 
benign racial classifications that ‘serve 
important governmental objectives and are 
substantially related to achievement of 
those objectives.’ We apply that standard 
today.” (alterations in original) (internal 
citations omitted) (first quoting Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 472, 473 (1979) 
(plurality opinion); and then quoting id. at 
519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the 
judgment)). 
 
“Although the Court correctly observes 
that a majority did not apply strict scrutiny, 
six Members of the Court rejected 
intermediate scrutiny in favor of some 
more stringent form of review. Three 
Members of the Court applied strict 
scrutiny. Chief Justice Burger’s opinion, 
joined by Justice White and Justice Powell, 
declined to adopt a particular standard of 
review but indicated that the Court must 
conduct ‘a most searching examination.’” 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting 




which opted for 
the Marshall test, 
implicitly rejected 


















doesn’t control but 
notes that Marshall 




City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469, 487 
(1989).  
 
“The principal opinion in Fullilove, written 
by Chief Justice Burger, did not employ 
‘strict scrutiny’ or any other traditional 
standard of equal protection review.” 
 
It is notable that 
the Supreme Court 





Wygant v. Jackson 
Bd. of Educ., 476 
U.S. 267, 302 
(1986) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
“Despite the Court’s inability to agree on a 
route, we have reached a common 
destination in sustaining affirmative action 
against constitutional attack. . . . [I]n 
Fullilove, the Court upheld a congressional 
Although Justice 
Marshall’s dissent 
regards the Burger 
opinion as 
controlling, this 
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preference for minority contractors 
because the measure was legitimately 
designed to ameliorate the present effects 
of past discrimination.” 
allowed him to 
support a closer 
doctrinal position 
to his own than 











Constructors, Inc. v. 
Cuomo, 981 F.2d 











Constructors, Inc. v. 
Cuomo, 743 F. 
Supp. 977, 990 n.14 
(N.D.N.Y. 1990). 
“Fullilove had upheld the federal minority 
enterprises program . . . . In a splintering 
of opinions reasoning that ‘Congress had 
abundant evidence from which it could 
conclude that minority businesses have 
been denied effective participation in 
public contracting opportunities,’ . . . a 
majority of the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the federal set-aside 
program.” (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 477 
(plurality opinion)). 
 
“No judicial opinion obtained a majority in 
Fullilove. The plurality decision of Chief 
Justice Burger and the concurrence of 
Justice Powell, however, followed a 
middle path between the divergent 
opinions of a fragmented Court. Therefore, 
pursuant to Marks v. United States, this 
court is bound to follow the opinions of 
Justices Burger and Powell.” 













The District Court 
claimed to apply 
both Powell and 
Burger 
Tenn. Asphalt Co. 
v. Farris, 942 F.2d 
969, 973 (6th Cir. 
1991).  
 
“Chief Justice Burger, in an opinion for 
himself, Justice White and Justice Powell, 
emphasized [in Fullilove] the broad 
authority of Congress under the Spending 
Power provisions and the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution to provide a 
safeguard against federal funds being used 
to perpetuate the effects of prior 
discrimination that had largely excluded 
minority businesses from public 
contracts.”  
The Sixth Circuit 
gravitated toward 
Burger. 
Shurberg Broad. of 
Hartford, Inc. v. 
FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 








“In his plurality opinion [in Fullilove], 
Chief Justice Burger stressed Congress’ 
special constitutional authority under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to enact measures 
to remedy past discrimination. Justice 
Powell's concurrence also stressed that 
Congress had made the finding of past 
discrimination and that Congress had 
selected the particular remedy.” (internal 
citations omitted). 
 
The D.C. Circuit 
seeks to reconcile 









220 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [89:101 
Id. at 939 n.12 
(Wald, J. 
dissenting). 
“The application of Fullilove to this case is 
complicated by the fact that in Fullilove—
as in Bakke and Wygant—no opinion 
commanded a majority of the Court. I rely 
principally on Chief Justice Burger’s 
opinion, joined by Justices Powell and 
White.” 
The dissent relied 
solely on Burger. 
Winter Park 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
FCC, 873 F.2d 347, 
365–66 (D.C. Cir. 




Concurrence in part: “Both Chief Justice 
Burger’s plurality opinion and Justice 
Powell’s concurrence [in Fullilove] 
stressed Congress’s unique role in 
ensuring equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Both opinions, 
however, left obscure the extent to which 
Congress’s special role left it free to 
mandate racial preferences solely on the 
basis of general societal discrimination.” 
(internal citations omitted) 
The D.C. Circuit 
seeks to reconcile 









Contractors of Cal., 
Inc. v. City & Cnty. 
of San Francisco, 
813 F.2d 922, 928 




Contractors of Cal., 
Inc. v. City & Cnty. 
of San Francisco, 
619 F. Supp. 334, 
339 (N.D. Cal. 
1985). 
“[A]ppellants overlook that the Fullilove 
plurality relied on section 5 as authority 
only for the federal government’s 
imposition of affirmative action on state 




“Although no one approach commanded a 
majority of the Fullilove Court, lower 
courts, drawing from the above analysis, 
and other opinions rendered in the case, 
have distilled a three-part test to measure 
the constitutionality of affirmative action 
legislation.” 
The Ninth Circuit 







The District Court 
devised a three-
part test, which it 
claimed reconciled 
the major concerns 
expressed in all 
three opinions, and 
states this is closest 
to Burger. 
Hammon v. Barry, 
813 F.2d 412, 423–
24 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
 
“Likewise, the various opinions in 
Fullilove emphasized that the 10 percent 
government contract set-aside program at 
issue there was remedial in nature, 
specifically designed to reduce past racial 
and ethnic discrimination. In his plurality 
opinion, Chief Justice Burger dwelt on the 
fact that Congress created the set-aside 
program only in the wake of long 
experience with government contracts and 
after determining that a variety of 
impediments to equal opportunity existed 
in that arena.” 
The D.C. Circuit 
relied upon Burger. 
S.J. Groves & Sons 
Co. v. Fulton Cnty., 
696 F. Supp. 1480, 
1490 (N.D. Ga. 
1987).  
 
“Three of the six majority justices in 
Fullilove repeatedly emphasized that their 
decision to uphold the PWEA was based in 
large part on two considerations: first, ‘the 
legislative authority of Congress’ 
specifically delegated by the Constitution, 
particularly section five of the fourteenth 
amendment; and second, the electoral 
accountability of Congress as a ‘politically 
The District 
Court’s articulated 
test appears to 
reconcile the three 
opinions rather 
than to select one 
as controlling. 
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responsive branch[ ] of Government.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Fullilove, 
448 U.S. at 480, 490 (plurality opinion)). 
Britton v. S. Bend 
Cmty. Sch. Corp., 
775 F.2d 794, 809, 
811 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 
“In neither case [Bakke nor Fullilove] did 
any opinion command the assent of a 
majority of the Court. Thus the Court’s 
opinions do not provide the kind of 
guidance in the constitutional area that its 
decision in Weber does in analyzing Title 
VII challenges.” 
 
“In the period since the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Bakke and Fullilove a number 
of circuits have developed principles, 
based on the underlying concerns of the 
various Justices’ opinions, for determining 
whether the challenged voluntary 
affirmative action plan is sufficiently 
related to the governmental objective of 
remedying past discrimination.” 
The Seventh 
Circuit cites most 
heavily to Burger 
but generally seeks 
to reconcile and 
synthesize the 
opinions.  
Paradise v. Prescott, 
767 F.2d 1514, 
1531 (11th Cir. 
1985).  
“We recognized the absence of a definitive 
Supreme Court standard for judging the 
constitutionality of affirmative action. 
After examining the various opinions 
found in Bakke and Fullilove, we 
concluded that the appropriate standard of 
review should account for the concerns 
common to the various views expressed in 
those two fragmented decisions. Using this 
approach, we concluded that legislation 
employing benign racial classifications 
generally will be upheld if: (1) the 
governmental authority has authority to 
pass such legislation; (2) adequate findings 
have been made to ensure that the 
legislation is remedying the present effects 
of past discrimination; and (3) the use of 
the classifications extends no further than 
the demonstrated need of remedying the 




and attempted to 
reconcile the 





Dotson v. City of 
Indianola, 739 F.2d 
1022, 1027 (5th Cir. 
1984) (Wisdom, J., 
concurring in the 
result). 
“In Fullilove Justices Powell and Stewart 
indicate that the interests of ‘innocent’ 
whites may be taken into account in 
fashioning a remedial plan, but Chief 
Justice Burger’s plurality opinion, citing 
UJO, states, ‘When effectuating a limited 
and properly tailored remedy to cure the 
effects of prior discrimination, . . . ‘a 
sharing of the burden’ by innocent parties 
is not impermissible.’” (citation omitted) 




cites to all 
Fullilove opinions, 
it does not provide 






to synthesize and 
reconcile the 
Burger and Powell 
opinions. 
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Kromnick v. Sch. 
Dist. of Phila., 739 
F.2d 894, 901 (3d 
Cir. 1984). 
“The absence of an Opinion of the Court in 
either Bakke or Fullilove and the 
concomitant failure of the Court to 
articulate an analytic framework 
supporting the judgments makes the 
position of the lower federal courts 
considering the constitutionality of 
affirmative action programs somewhat 
vulnerable.”  
The Third Circuit 
implies that the 
choice is 
speculative. 
S. Fla. Chapter of 
Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Am., 
Inc. v. Metro. Dade 
Cnty., Fla., 723 
F.2d 846, 850 & n.7 














S. Fla. Chapter of 
Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Am., 
Inc. v. Metro. Dade 
Cnty., Fla., 552 F. 
Supp. 909, 931 
(S.D. Fla. 1982). 
“As in Bakke, the Court in Fullilove did 
not produce a majority opinion, with three 
different views emerging from those 
Justices voting to uphold the statute.” 
 
“The district court referred to the Chief 
Justice’s opinion as the ‘plurality opinion’ 
in Fullilove. Two justices also concurred 
in Justice Marshall’s opinion, however, 
meaning that neither the Chief Justice nor 
Justice Marshall’s opinion garnered the 
support of a plurality. Thus, to the extent 
that the term ‘plurality opinion’ connotes 
that an opinion commands more support 
than other opinions in the case, neither 
Chief Justice Burger nor Justice Marshall’s 
opinion qualifies.” (internal citation 
omitted). 
 
“While the plurality opinion did not 
explicitly state what standard of review 
should be applied to benign racial or ethnic 
classifications, Justice Powell wrote a 
concurring opinion in which he repeated 
his belief, first expressed in Bakke, that the 
strict scrutiny standard should be applied.” 
(footnote omitted)  
The Eleventh 
Circuit notes that 
the District Court 
had observed 
neither Marshall 
nor Burger, at three 
Justices each, can 













The District Court 
appears to rely 
upon Powell’s 
Fullilove analysis, 
combined with his 
Bakke analysis, to 
discern the 
evolving standard. 
Uzzell v. Friday, 
592 F. Supp. 1502, 
1517 n.29 
(M.D.N.C. 1984).  
 
“Chief Justice Burger wrote an opinion 
announcing the judgment of the Court [in 
Fullilove] in which Justices White and 
Powell joined. Justice Powell also filed a 
concurring opinion applying the test set 
forth in his opinion in Bakke.” 
The District Court 
appears to rely 
upon Powell’s 
Fullilove analysis, 
combined with his 
Bakke analysis, to 
discern the 
evolving standard.   
Williams v. City of 
New Orleans, 729 
F.2d 1554, 1568 









“Chief Justice Burger’s plurality opinion 
in Fullilove, joined by Justices Powell and 
White, notes that ‘[a]ny preference based 
on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily 
receive a most searching examination to 
make sure that it does not conflict with 
constitutional guarantees.’ Justice Powell 
wrote a concurring opinion adhering to his 
endorsement in Bakke of a strict scrutiny 
standard of review for all racially-based 
plans.” (internal citations omitted) 
The Fifth Circuit 
appears to 
synthesize the 
Burger and Powell 
positions, along 
with Weber and 
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Williams v. City of 
New Orleans, 543 
F. Supp. 662, 679 
(E.D. La. 1982) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Fullilove, 
448 U.S. at 491 (plurality opinion)). 
 
“The case [Fullilove] produced no 





The District Court 
offers no guidance. 
Bratton v. City of 
Detroit, 704 F.2d 
878, 885 (6th Cir. 
1983).  
 
“Fullilove is a plurality decision with little 
precedential value.” 






Ass’n v. Keip, 713 
F.2d 167, 170 (6th 
Cir. 1983). 
“Neither Fullilove nor Bakke produced a 
majority opinion from the Supreme Court 
and we depend on the several plurality 
opinions for guidance.” 
 
The Sixth Circuit 
seeks to reconcile 
all the opinions. 
Mich. Rd. Builders 
Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Milliken, 571 F. 
Supp. 173, 175 
(E.D. Mich. 1983).  
 
“Interestingly, each party relies upon 
Fullilove v. Klutznick in support of their 
respective positions. . . . In a plurality 
decision, the Court determined that the 
MBE was constitutional notwithstanding 
its mandate that ‘at least 10% of [any grant 
for local public works projects] shall be 
expended for minority businesses.’ In its 
ruling, it is clear that the Fullilove Court 
adhered to its earlier stance that ‘racial 
classifications are not per se invalid under 
[the Equal Protection Clause of] the 
Fourteenth Amendment.’” (internal 
citation omitted) (alteration in original) 
(first quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 454 
(plurality opinion); and then quoting id. at 
517 (Marshall, J., concurring in the 
judgment)). 
The District Court 
seems to rest on 
the Burger opinion. 
Sw. Wash. Chapter, 
Nat’l Elec. 
Contractors Ass’n v. 
Pierce Cnty., 667 
P.2d 1092, 1097 
(Wash. 1983) (en 
banc). 
“The concurring opinion of Justice Powell 
provides some guidance in interpreting 
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion, since 
Justice Powell did sign it, but is not 
controlling because Justice Powell was not 





articulates that the 
controlling opinion 
is Burger, not 
Powell, because 
Powell was not 
necessary to the 
majority, or 
median. 
M.C. West, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 522 F. Supp. 
338, 342 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1981). 
“Again, no one opinion [in Fullilove] 
spoke for a majority of the Court. A clear 
plurality of the Court, however, would 
require precise findings of discrimination 
before allowing an affirmative action 
program to stand.” 
The District Court 
implies reliance on 
Burger. 
 
Article (alpha by 
author) Quotes Notes 
Jesse H. Choper, 
The 
“As has become increasingly true, 
especially when the issue is controversial, 
Author suggests 
Burger and Powell 
224 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [89:101 
Constitutionality of 
Affirmative Action: 
Views from the 
Supreme Court, 70 
KY. L.J. 1, 5–6 
(1981–1982).  
 
there was no opinion for the Court. Rather, 
there were two principal opinions[, 
Marshall and Burger,] in Fullilove, written 
on behalf of a majority of the Court with 
three Justices subscribing to each.” 
 
“Of great significance were the votes of 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell to 
uphold the MBE provision since their 
positions in Fullilove raise to six the 
number of Justices committed to the view 
that the Constitution does not prohibit all 
race-conscious affirmative action.” 
were essential to 
raising supporting 
votes to six.  




and Some Thoughts 
on Judicial Role, 23 
ARIZ. L. REV. 87, 
167 (1981).  
“The point of the Burger and Powell 
opinions [in Fullilove] is that there will be 
judicial deference to congressional policy 
making, and that policy making authority 
seems clearly to include the right to define 
the evil sought to be remedied so long as 
the purpose is proper.” 
Author seeks to 
reconcile Burger 
and Powell. 
Drew S. Days, III, 
Fullilove, 96 YALE 
L.J. 453, 466, 467, 
474 (1987).  
 





“Justice Powell, who joined in the Burger 
opinion, wrote separately to restate his view 
on the proper standard of review.” 
 
 
“The efforts to delineate the appropriate 
test for evaluating the constitutionality of 
racial classifications ran from Justice 
Powell’s ‘strict scrutiny’ to Chief Justice 
Burger’s ‘most searching examination’ to 
Justice Marshall’s ‘substantially related to 
an important governmental objective.’ The 
truth is, however, that all the members of 
the majority applied a standard that fell 
below any of the ones upon which they 
claimed to rely.” 
 
“[T]he fact was not lost upon states and 
localities that only Chief Justice Burger, 
and perhaps Justice White, thought it 







This quote and the 
next seem to 
center on the 
Burger analysis. 
Deborah L. Jacobs, 




in State and Local 
Government, 17 
URB. LAW. 1, 5 
(1985).  
“In an opinion by Justice Burger which 
relied heavily on the plenary powers of 
Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth 
amendment to redress past societal 
discrimination, the Court in Fullilove 
upheld against a constitutional and statutory 
challenge a ‘minority business enterprise’ 
provision of the Public Works Employment 
Act of 1977.” (footnote omitted) (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1982)) 
This centers on 
Burger. 
Peter G. Kilgore, 
Racial Preferences 
in the Federal 
Grant Programs: Is 
“Fullilove, consisting of five separate 
opinions, none of which attracted more than 




without deciding.  
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L.J., May 1981, at 






Justices [in Bakke] expressing their view 
and one possibly making a change.” 
 
“The uncertainty left by these opinions [of 
Burger and Powell] has been reflected in 
lower court decisions.” 
Larry M. Lavinsky, 
The Affirmative 
Action Trilogy and 
Benign Racial 
Classifications—
Evolving Law in 
Need of Standards, 
27 WAYNE L. REV. 
1, 16 (1980).  
“All of the Justices comprising the majority 
concluded that the set- aside provision was 
enacted to remedy the effects of past racial 
discrimination. Unable to agree on a single 
legal approach, they wrote three separate 
opinions.” (footnote omitted). 
This does not 
choose. 
Michael J. Phillips, 
Neutrality and 
Purposiveness in 
the Application of 
Strict Scrutiny to 
Racial 
Classifications, 55 
TEMP. L.Q. 317, 
333–34 (1982).  
“While upholding [the MBE provision] by 
a 6-3 vote, the Court, in its various 
opinions, managed to enunciate at least four 
distinct positions on the constitutional 
treatment of congressionally-mandated 
reverse racial preferences. . . . The first 
position, marking a considerable departure 
from the framework of analysis previously 
used in equal protection cases involving 
race, was contained in Chief Justice 
Burger’s opinion announcing the judgment 
of the Court.” (footnotes omitted) 
Seems to rely 
upon Burger. 
John E. Richards, 
Equal Protection 




Us?, 33 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 601, 604, 606 
(1981).  
“Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices 
White and Powell, wrote the lead opinion.” 
 
“Although Justice Powell joined the Chief 
Justice’s opinion, he wrote separately to 





Mark B. Robinette, 
Comment, Fullilove 
v. Klutznick: An 
Initial Victory for 
Congressional 
Affirmative Action, 
8 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
377, 379, 387 
(1981). 
“The Supreme Court, speaking through 
Chief Justice Burger, focused its analysis 
on whether the MBE objectives were 
within the power of Congress and, if so, 
whether the means used for achieving the 
objectives were permissible.” 
 
“The decision also leaves undecided the 
appropriate level of equal protection 
scrutiny that should be applied to 
congressional affirmative action, inasmuch 
as the Burger opinion refused to define the 
level of scrutiny that it applied.” 
This quote notes 
that Burger 
declined to join 
the Powell 




226 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [89:101 
Method: These data are derived from searches of Westlaw, for cases, and HeinOnline, 
for law review and journal articles. Case citing references to Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448 (1980), were filtered by date range (1980–1990), depth of treatment (highest 
and second highest level), and searches within cases for “Burger,” “Powell,” “Marks,” 
and “narrowest grounds.” Additionally, if a case cited to a second case not on the filtered 
list, that second case was also examined. A similar search was completed using 
LexisNexis to check for database variations. For law reviews and journals search terms 
included: “Fullilove v. Klutznick”; “Fullilove”; “Klutznick”; “narrowest grounds”; 
“Burger”; “Powell”; and “Marks.” Articles were filtered by date range (1980–1990). 
Additionally, if an article cited to another article not on the filtered lists that was of note, 
the article was also reviewed. A similar search was completed using Google Scholar. 
Although no lower court treats the Powell Fullilove opinion as controlling on narrowest 
grounds, as Appendix A shows, two federal district court judges do rely upon the Powell 
opinion in Fullilove, combined with the controlling Powell opinion in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978), to derive an emerging 









Burger: 3  9 3 
Powell: 0 2 0 
Seeks to Reconcile 
Burger and Powell: 0 5 2 
Seeks to Reconcile 
Burger, Powell, 
and Marshall: 
0 5 0 
Not Applicable 0 3 4 
 
